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FOREWORD

The Saúl Litvinoff Civil Law Workshop Series was the second
of its kind to be conducted at the Louisiana State University Center
of Civil Law Studies (CCLS). It was conducted under the
leadership of the two signatories of the present foreword, coeditors of the Series, who also happened to be friends and
colleagues of Don Saúl.
The LSU Law Center had declared 2009 the Year of Litvinoff.
The Civil Law Workshop Series that started in 2009 and ended in
the spring of 2010 was dedicated to our regretted civilian and
comparatist, at a time where he moved to retirement after a rich
career as practitioner, teacher, author, and reformer of the civil law
of Louisiana. He attended the first sessions, but passed away in
January 2010, at a time when the Series was moving to its
conclusion. Every single contribution in this volume honors Don
Saúl and echoes the vibrant tribute by Dr. Agustín Parise and Julio
Romañach, Esq. The present volume also publishes the list of Saúl
Litvinoff’s academic publications, which reflects his prolific and
diverse scope of writings. It complements the Liber Amicorum
offered to Don Saúl in 2008 by his friends and published by his
beloved CCLS.1
A broad theme had to be found, so that the series could be
enriched by the contributions of Distinguished Visiting Professors
teaching short courses at the LSU Law Center and Visiting
Scholars conducting research at the CCLS. Given the bijural
nature of the LSU curriculum and the focus on mixed or hybrid
jurisdictions in recent years, the editors of the series thought that
cross influences between the civil law and the common law was a
topic to be visited under multiple, if not kaleidoscopic, angles.
Here is how the editors introduced this Workshop Series on
Civil Law and Common Law: Cross Influences, Contamination
and Permeability:
This Civil Law Workshop Series visits the relationship
between the civil law and the common law. How much and
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to what extent does each system influence or contaminate
the other?
At all times, legal ideas have circulated, often ignoring the
boundaries between legal families such as the civil law and
the common law. At the time of its Revolution, France
borrowed from England the jury system and justices of the
peace, yet with considerable adjustments. Earlier on,
English law had borrowed many techniques from Roman
law and Canon law, making them distinctly English. The
Anglo-American doctrine of mistake in contract is based on
Pothier's Treatise on Obligations. The American UCC did
not invent the irrevocability of offers. Trusts prosper in a
number of civil law countries. Examples are manifold and
can be found in every jurisdiction, “purely” civil or
“purely” common law or “mixed,” like Louisiana
implanting promissory estoppel in its Civil Code.
This Civil Law Workshop Series does not aim at tackling
all cross references and transplants. Speakers will identify
cross influences in their area of scholarship and are invited
to determine whether outside influences strengthen,
weaken, or contaminate a given system, in an attempt to
answer the following question: to what extent are the civil
law and the common law permeable to each other?
Topics will cover areas of substantive law, procedure, law
making and legal reform techniques, and legal education.2
Volume 3 of the JCLS follows the sequence of the Workshop
presentations. Essays presented at the Workshop are preceded
with an Introduction to Contamination by Professor Olivier
Moréteau, proposing the adoption of a preliminary provision to the
Louisiana Civil Code in order to remedy the impact of common
law contamination in areas of private law governed by ancillary
statutes. They are followed with a short article where Professor
Juan Cianciardo, Dean of the Austral University School of Law
(Buenos Aires, Argentina) develops challenging thoughts on the
principle of proportionality. The principle is applied in both civil
2. This is how the topic is described on the CCLS website. See
www.law.lsu.edu/civillaw;
and
more
precisely,
http://www.law.lsu.edu/index.cfm?geaux=ccls.civillawworkshopsecondseries
(last visited July 10, 2010).
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law and common law systems, in countless jurisdictions. The
article shows the application of the principle does not always
guarantee the supremacy of the human rights and makes proposals
to remedy the problem without abandoning proportionality.
The Series opens with a proposal to revive the case method in
civil law education, authored by Professor Fernando Toller, also
from Austral University School of Law, where he serves as the
director of doctoral studies. His oral presentation was objected to
by some members of the civil law faculty at the LSU Law Center,
who feared that the case method may weaken the civil law in the
State of Louisiana. Contamination would likely happen if the case
method was to be applied according to the model recommended by
Langdell for the Harvard Law School during the late nineteenth
century. The case method familiar to students all over the United
States was conceived not only as a teaching method, but also as the
best tool for the discovery of the principles of the common law.
Professor Toller must be read carefully. He takes us back to
the medieval origins of the academic tradition on the European
continent, pointing out the importance of casuistry in moral
science. The magisterial lecture, which remains the dominating
teaching method in the civil law world, was in medieval times
preceded by the quaestiones disputatae, or disputed questions,
which took at least as much time as the lecture. Cases were
debated, two students engaging in a dialectic competition. The
teacher would then wrap up the arguments, cite the authorities, and
give his solution. Fernando Toller shows how this practice was
lost with the advent of the national codes and makes a strong case
for reviving case discussion in legal education, elaborating on the
experience made at the Austral University School of Law. Readers
will understand the term “case method” may either be used for lack
of a better word or simply to show that if there is a common law
way of doing it (the Langdellian model), there is also room for a
civil law model. Under the civil law model, case studies are meant
to combine with lectures educating the students to the principles of
the civil law. Intelligently combined, case studies and lectures
help students gasp that the civil law is an organized system, not to
be confused with the inchoate maze of cases, patchy statutes, and
burgeoning solutions, as the common law may appear through a
purely Langdellian approach.
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In his Tucker Lecture given in 2008 at the LSU Law Center,
Professor Emeritus Jacques Vanderlinden argued that the
generalization of the case method had been the turning point
anchoring American law in the common law tradition, showing
that until then, the deductive method prevailed over the inductive
approach.3 Teaching methods may have a strong and sometimes
unexpected impact on the evolution of legal practice. This is why
Toller’s proposal may be found controversial, especially in those
parts of the world where the civil law tradition is weakened and the
risk of contamination very high. However, moral and legal issues
do emerge in the context of disputes. They can be debated in fact
based situations without weakening the principles structuring and
underlying the civil law. Legal education is no doubt an area of
cross-fertilization between the civil law and the common law
traditions. More case discussion is needed in the traditional civil
law classroom and some lecture-based overview of the subject
would better serve the training of the common law jurist.4
Things are moving the world over, not only in Europe or Latin
America, the regions visited by Fernando Toller, but also in East
Asia, as described by Professor Xiangshun Ding, of the Renmin
University School of Law in China. Professor Ding gives a brief
historical survey of the development of legal education in China
and Japan. He points to some American influence, in China in the
1990s with the creation of the Jurist Master (J.M.) program, and
after 2001 in Japan with the development of new professional law
schools. The Chinese J.M. seems to be modeled on the American
J.D., and reformation has been made on the initiative of the
government. In Japan, the initiative came from the private sector,
in an attempt to triple the number of lawyers by the year 2010,
offering legal education and training at graduate level. Whilst
being aware of the limits of the American influence, the reading
shows how much stress is now placed in the development of legal
skills, with attempts to have more legal practitioners teaching in
3. Jacques Vanderlinden, “From the Civil Code of Louisiana to Langdell–
Some Hypothesis about the Nature of Legal Systems,” 35th John H. Tucker, Jr.
Lecture in Civil Law, Baton Rouge, May 16, 2008. To be published under the
title Is the Pre-20th Century American Legal System a Common Law System?
An Exercise in Legal Taxonomy, in 4 JCLS (forthcoming 2011).
4. See Olivier Moréteau, Bilan de santé de l’enseignement du droit,
ETUDIER ET ENSEIGNER LE DROIT : HIER, AUJOURD’HUI ET DEMAIN. ETUDES
OFFERTES A JACQUES VANDERLINDEN 273 (2006).
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classrooms, as well as increased participation in simulation and
moot court competitions, the development of externships and
internships, and the dawn of clinical legal education.
Professor Ulrich Magnus, of the University of Hamburg,
invites Leibnitz to tell us that developing a legal system combining
civil law and common law techniques makes us live in “the best of
all possible worlds.”5 The pessimist may not agree that this is the
case in Louisiana, though this no doubt makes it a fascinating
jurisdiction to study for purposes of understanding the dynamic of
legal systems in an age of globalization. Professor Magnus clearly
demonstrates that the Vienna Sales Convention (CISG), after thirty
years of existence, still offers the best possible compromise
between the two leading legal traditions. We are proud to publish
this masterful comparative essay in the year 2010, marking the
thirtieth anniversary of the signature of this very successful and
most promising international instrument.
Anxiety may, however, plague both the civil law and the
common law, as demonstrated by Professor Sheldon Leader, of the
University of Essex. Professor Leader writes: “The civil and
common law systems both raise a question that is well known.
How is it possible to combine the acknowledged fact that courts
often make fresh law with the belief that the legislature is the site
for law making with which democracies are most comfortable?”6
He then introduces the question of judicial bias, which is more
troubling when the judge acts in good faith. Cures are looked for
both in legal positivism and natural law, and an intermediate
theory is proposed, inspired by Ronald Dworkin. Judges decide
cases on the basis of settled law, a collection of valid statements
that may be explicit but also implicit. Dworkin makes the
argument that judges may add to the body of explicit law as long
as they remain faithful to the body of implicit law and keep the
system coherent. The issue of moral impartiality is also discussed
and the beauty of this analysis is that it fits the shoes of both civil
law and common law jurists: Best of both worlds? The role of the
judiciary is no doubt magnified, yet does not sacrifice democracy,
as discussed at the end of this short but major contribution,
showing the convergence of the two western legal traditions.
5. GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, ESSAI DE THÉODICÉE (1710).
6. Sheldon Leader, Legal Theory and the Variety of Legal Cultures, 3 JCLS
99 (2010).
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Reading Dr. Nono Makarim’s essay on freedom of the press in
Indonesia, one comes to realize that anxieties such as those
described by Professor Leader may be blissful dreams in other
parts of the world. Indonesia received Dutch law during the
colonial period and has a codified legal system with a sophisticated
civilian heritage. However, the essay indicates that it still has a
long way to go to have a fully independent judiciary. During a
three-month Fulbright visit at the LSU Law Center, Dr. Nono
Makarim, holder of both an LL.M. and a Doctorate in Law from
the Harvard Law School, co-founder, thirty years ago, of one of a
leading law firms in Jakarta, worked at evaluating the teaching of
legal method in order to assist the Indonesian Judicial Commission
in the design and administration of law exams to assess candidates
for the position of Justice at the Indonesian Supreme Court. His
essay is rich in legal analyses, presented in the context of a
complex political, economic, and social evolution. Dr. Makarim
proves, if need be, that legal analysis does not go that far if limited
to the study of black letter law. Comparison with other East-Asian
countries shows a rather conservative judiciary and a slow move
from dictatorship to democracy, whilst statistics reveal that
Indonesia seems to do better than its neighbors in protecting
freedom of the press. Comparatists know that everything is
relative, and yet this does not prevent the article from making a
number of strong points on matters of interest for constitutional
law, tort law, and criminal law scholars. Freedom of the press is
challenged in many ways in all parts of the world, including
Europe and Latin America. One can only benefit from a diversity
of perspective and experience in understanding the problems and
testing possible solutions.
Professor Santiago Legarre, of the Catholic University School
of Law (Buenos Aires, Argentina), is a longtime friend of the LSU
Law Center, where he has taught several times as a Distinguished
Visiting Professor. He explains how the model of the United
States Constitution inspired the Argentine Constitution of 1853,
allowed Congress to enact, in the words of Legarre, a general
legislation for all the provinces to be applied by federal courts.
Provincial courts were left with a smaller spectrum of laws to
apply. Once Buenos Aires joined the federation, a revision of the
constitution took place in 1860, allowing provincial courts to apply
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federal derecho común (ius commune). This resulted in the
development of provincial variations in the interpretation of that
derecho común, to which no remedy has been found so far.
Professor Legarre’s article starts with a vibrant homage to Saúl
Litvinoff, rich in personal anecdotes adding to the “Litvinovian”
legend of intransigence, elegance, culture, wit, and charm. It is too
late to ask Don Saùl to make concluding remarks to this volume.
He was second to none at bridging differences between the civil
law and the common law without tampering with each system’s
integrity. An art largely reflected in his publications, the list of
which concludes the present volume.
The Saúl Litvinoff Series also included a presentation by
Professor Jörg Fedtke, a distinguished German scholar who joined
the Tulane University School of Law, where he is a Co-Director of
the Eason Weinmann Center for Comparative Law. His Time to
Move On-Challenging a Tired Division-Common Law Methods in
a Civil Law System was not ready in time and had to be moved on
to a forthcoming volume, proving that our theme is too broad to be
dealt within a single volume.
Our last fore-words will be of thanks, to our devoted student
editors, to Jennifer Lane who facilitates everything, to our
wonderful Information Technology team, and last but not least to
our unsurpassable Managing Editor, Dr. Agustín Parise, who
served during four years as a most active and efficient Research
Associate at the CCLS before heading to Europe, and must be
remembered as the co-founder of the Journal of Civil Law Studies:
“En unión y libertad,” and, if I may add, “y amistad!”
Olivier Moréteau & Ronald J. Scalise Jr.
Saúl Litvinoff Civil Law Workshop Series Editors

AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTAMINATION
Olivier Moréteau
I. CONTAMINATION DEFINED
The word contamination occupies a central place in the title of
the Saúl Litvinoff Civil Law Workshop Series, Civil Law and
Common Law: Cross Influences, Contamination and Permeability.
The text announcing the Series left the word contamination
unexplained.1 Influences and cross influences are familiar to legal
historians and comparatists alike.2 They have been visited and
addressed under a variety of names that include reception,3 legal
transplants,4 migration5 or circulation of legal ideas,6 diffusion7 or
transposition.8 Contamination is not one of those, though a useful
term to indicate the permeability of legal systems and the
sometimes less visible influences they may have on one another. It
was discussed at the fringe of the Second International Congress of
the World Society of Mixed Jurisdictions Jurists in the summer of
2007. At the end of this two day congress, a group of enthusiastic
scholars had gathered in the back room of a tavern in the oldest
part of Edinburgh. While savoring haggish and sipping beer or
 Professor of Law, Russell B. Long Eminent Scholars Academic Chair,
Director of the Center of Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University, Editor-in-Chief, Journal of Civil Law Studies.
1. Cited in the Foreword by O. Moréteau and R. Scalise, presenting the
Series papers gathered in the present volume.
2. For a recent overview, see Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the
study of Transplants and Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMP. L.
441 (2006).
3. LA RECEPTION DES SYSTEMES JURIDIQUES: IMPLANTATION ET DESTIN
(Michel Doucet & Jacques Vanderlinden eds. 1994).
4. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (2d ed. 1993).
5. ERIC AGOSTINI, DROIT COMPARE 243 (1988), (Les migrations de
systèmes juridiques).
6. Rodolfo Sacco, La circulation des modèles juridiques, in RAPPORTS
GENERAUX AU XIIIE CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARE– MONTREAL
1990 (1992).
7. William Twinning, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 49 JOURNAL
OF LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (2005).
8. Esin Örücü, Law as Transposition, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 205 (2002).
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scotch, we discussed possible terms that may go beyond the word
mix. Contamination happened to be the word of the day. P.G.
Monateri used it in the context of the law.9 It is not a clean and
comfortable word like hybrid, transplant, reception, or circulation.
It has troubling, unhealthy overtones. Yet, contamination is not a
fully negative term, for instance when used in the context of
linguistics or musicology.
When taken out of the medical sphere, where it typically
indicates that something is going wrong, the word goes back to its
etymological sense. Contamination means “to enter in contact
with.”10 The Latin tamen (taminare) is the fact of touching, and is
also connected to impure contact with (cum).11
From an anthropological viewpoint, this is a very rich concept,
inviting to revisit the interference of legal traditions with a new
and less conventional eye. Contact among human beings generates
changes in identity and behavior and the same applies to human
groups and societies. There is always a risk of being altered by the
contact of another. Alter means otherness but leads to alteration,
with its ambivalent connotation. The same can be said of
contamination. The identity of a group may be altered at the
contact of another. Groups, societies, and individuals have
fluctuating identities, and they change when influenced by other
groups, societies, and individuals. The same applies to legal
systems that grow organically in symbiosis with the group
9. Pier Giuseppe Monateri, The Weak Law: Contaminations and Legal
Cultures, 1 GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES, Issue 3, Article 5 (2001), available at
http://www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol1/iss3/art5 (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
10. Contaminate, from the Latin contaminatus, past participle of
contaminare, bring into contact. THE BARNHART CONCISE DICTIONARY OF
ETYMOLOGY (1995).
11. Originally the word was used in a religious context, with a meaning of
impure contact: LE ROBERT, DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DE LA LANGUE
FRANÇAISE (Alain Rey ed. 1992). Religion abandoned the word. In the 17th
century, contaminate meant “Soil by an impure contact,” (souiller par un
contact impur) but was marked as an “old” word. Medicine gave it a revival in
1863. Contagion had given the French contagionner, which disappeared and
was replaced by contaminer. The word was the connecter to pathology. A
figurative sense was “changer la nature de quelque chose,” “change the nature
of something,” “altérer,” “alter.” Remarkably, the word “altérer” or to “alter”
which means to render other has developed a negative connotation. Linguists
use the word contamination in a neutral way. There is no value judgment in
describing a linguistic contamination.
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generating them and react to the contact with other social groups
and legal systems.
What does the word contamination add to the more
conventional language describing these phenomena? Reception,
transplants, migration, circulation, and the like describe the visible.
Contamination refers to the less visible. Its effects, good or bad,
may appear later on. A transplant may take place with all its
visible effects, yet generating some invisible or less visible
changes in the system of the recipient.
This is where
contamination takes place.
It is important to identify contamination and be aware of it.
When contamination has a negative effect, remedies or ways to
lessen that effect may be found and implemented. The following is
an example of a systemic contamination in the context of
Louisiana, with a proposal for a possible remedy.
II. CONTAMINATION IN LOUISIANA
After the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, the Territory of Orleans,
later to become the State of Louisiana, resisted political attempts to
impose the common law.12 The civil law was maintained13 and
the adoption of a Digest of the Civil Laws in 1808 and of a Civil
Code in 1825 confirmed that Louisiana belonged to the civil law
world at least as far as private substantive law was concerned. The
State Constitution contains provision that prohibits the adoption of
the common law by reference,14 as had been done in a number of
other states. The Civil Code in its revised version makes
provisions regarding its interpretation.15 These provisions, like the
rest of the Code, are of civil law fabric.16
The Civil Code however does not contain the entire legislation
governing matters that fall within the realm of private law. Many
12. For a detailed account, see GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA,
POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS (rev. ed. 2009).
13. Act of March 2, 1805, 8th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 Stat. 331, sec. 4.
14. LA. CONST. art. III, §15B: “A bill enacting, amending, or reviving a law
shall set forth completely the provisions of the law enacted, amended, or
revived. No system or code of laws shall be adopted by general reference to it.”
This provision appeared in the first Louisiana Constitution of 1812, § 11, and is
to be found in all subsequent versions.
15. Articles 9–13, revised by 1987 La. Acts No. 124, § 1.
16. Id.
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statutory rules affecting matters dealt with in the Civil Code are
found in the Revised Statutes. They form Title 9 of the Revised
Statutes, under the heading of Civil Code Ancillaries.
The structure of Title 9 runs parallel to that of the Civil
Code but the organization is somewhat confusing. It
contains . . . the Louisiana Trusts Code, to be found at R.S.
9:1721–9:2252.
[Provisions for instance deal] with
procedural details that pertain to a topic dealt with in the
Civil Code, like in the case of divorce (see R.S. 9:301–
9:376). They also contain matters not dealt with in the
Code and that could have found a place there, like the law
on human embryos (R.S. 9:121 to 9:133).17
Title 9 is just one among 56 titles:
The big bulk of legislation in Louisiana is to be found in
the Revised Statutes. The Revised Statutes are arranged in
Titles running in alphabetic order, with General Provisions
in Title 1 and running from Aeronautics (Title 2) to
Wildlife and Fisheries (Title 56).18
But there is more to it:
The General Provisions of Title 1 start with a Chapter 1,
Interpretation of Revised Statutes, which contains
interpretative provisions that differ from the traditional
rules to be found in the Civil Code and are of a common
law facture. For instance, R.S. 1:7 and 8, providing that
singular may denote plural and one gender may denote
others, sound like Section 6 of the British Interpretation Act
1978 or similar provisions of other states’ codes.19
As indicated by the amount of detail found therein, the length
of the provisions, the lack of systematic organization, the heavy
legislative style, the Revised Statutes are of common law fabric.20
Louisiana judges are more likely than not to apply common law
methods of interpretation when applying the Revised Statutes,
17. Olivier Moréteau & Agustín Parise, Recodification in Louisiana and
Latin America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1120 (2009).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Though examples of poorly drafted legislation can be found in most
civil law jurisdictions.
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moving away from the civilian idea that a code is a system where
provisions are to be interpreted by reference to one another. This
may make sense, since the Revised Statutes are not a code in the
civilian sense. But it is a sign of common law contamination, since
this conflicts with the civil law tradition.
In civil law jurisdictions, much ancillary legislation is to be
found outside the civil code, sometimes compiled in codes that
may be described as satellite codes.21 These satellite codes revolve
around a civil code that tends these days to be weakened by a
decodification process, due to piecemeal revision breaking the
harmony or consistency of the civil code, or as a consequence of
removing provisions from the code to develop the law outside the
code, in ancillary statutes or satellite codes.22 These processes are
endogenous to civil law systems. They happen regardless of any
significant exogenous influence or contamination by another legal
system.
However, even where the civil code is losing some of its
density and attractive force, it is understood that it contains all
basic rules that would apply by default in the absence of specific
provisions to be found in satellite codes or ancillary statutes. This
means that satellite legislation is interpreted by reference to the
civil code. If the civil code grants a right and a special statute
limits this right, the limitation will be regarded as an exception to
the rule and will therefore be interpreted restrictively: exceptio est
strictissimae interpretationis.23 This means that the scope of the
special rule that makes exception to the general rule may not be
enlarged by analogy. Likewise, a special rule (lex specialis) found
outside the civil code will derogate the general law (lex generalis)
found in the civil code (specialia generalibus derogant),24 which
means that the civil code must apply whenever a situation falls
outside the scope of the special provision.25
21. Moréteau & Parise, supra note 17, at 1109–1112.
22. See id.
23. See HENRI ROLAND, LEXIQUE JURIDIQUE, EXPRESSIONS LATINES 83 (3rd
ed. 2004).
24. For instance, the New Home Warranty Act, see LA. REV. STAT.
§9:3141–3150 (2010).
25. The fact that ancillary legislation sometimes provides for
“exclusiveness” (See e.g. New Home Warranty Act, LA. REV. STAT. §9:3150
(2010)) does not exclude the application of the Civil Code for claims not falling
within the ambit of the ancillary provisions. As a matter of fact, such
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Under the influence of the common law methodology, some
judges in Louisiana tend to forget these rules and to interpret the
Revised Statutes as if they were autonomous, using common law
methodology and making no reference to the Civil Code. It is
fortunate that other judges continue interpreting satellite legislation
on the background of the Civil Code. The fact however that courts
may be divided on the issue indicates that some contamination is at
work, which is not at all surprising in a mixed jurisdiction.26
III. THE CASE FOR A PRELIMINARY PROVISION
Other mixed jurisdictions are similarly affected. To avoid
common law contamination, Quebec adopted a preliminary
provision in its 1991 Civil Code,27 reminding citizens and jurists
alike that the Civil Code is a central star in the private law galaxy.
The Preliminary Provision says:
The Civil Code of Québec, in harmony with the Charter of
human rights and freedoms (chapter C-12) and the general
principles of law, governs persons, relations between
persons, and property.
The Civil Code comprises a body of rules which, in all
matters within the letter, spirit or object of its provisions,
lays down the jus commune, expressly or by implication.
In these matters, the Code is the foundation of all other
laws, although other laws may complement the Code or
make exceptions to it.28

“exclusiveness provisions” are redundant in civil law jurisdictions where judges
know that the applicability of the lex specialis excludes that of the lex generalis.
“Exclusiveness” provisions exist in Louisiana because the State is a mixed
jurisdiction where a number of attorneys and judges operate without having a
full training in the civil law.
26. See e.g.Carter v. Duhe Construction, Inc., 921 So.2d 963 (La. 2006)
with a powerful dissent by Knoll J. applying Civil Code methodology in
interpreting the New Home Warranty Act, LA. REV. STAT. §9:3150 (2010).
27. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.], Preliminary Provision (Que.). 1991, c. 64, in
force since January 1st, 1994.
28. Id. The words “droit commun” used in the French version were
translated by ius commune, for lack of a better word in English. The term
“common law,” though linguistically correct, had to be rejected, by fear of . . .
contamination!
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In a recent reflection on the place of the civil code in
Louisiana and the legal universe, I advocate the adoption in
Louisiana of a Quebec style Preliminary Provision.29 The
provision could read as follows:
The Civil Code comprises a body of rules governing basic
obligations and rights of citizens regarding their person,
property, and relations between persons and property
which, in all matters within the letter, spirit or object of its
provisions, lays down the jus commune, expressly or by
implication. In these matters, the Code is the foundation of
all other laws, although other laws may complement the
Code or make exceptions to it. It must be interpreted in
harmony with the general principles of law and subject to
norms having a constitutional nature.30
A debate over such a draft provision would help reveal and
assess the extent of the ongoing contamination. Further research
on the Quebec Preliminary Provision tends to prove the efficiency
of the proposed remedy,31 in helping keep the civil law tradition
and methodology alive and fertile throughout the major areas of
private law that are not directly governed by the Civil Code, much
as the sun dispenses light and energy to all planets within the solar
system.

29. Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus: The Place of the Civil Code in
Louisiana and in the Legal Universe (forthcoming 2010).
30. Id.
31. On the Quebec Civil Code Preliminary Provision, see Alain-François
Brisson, La Disposition pré1iminaire du Code civil du Québec, 44 MCGILL L. J.
539 (1998-1999). See also Jean-Maurice Brisson, Le Code civil, droit
commun?, LE NOUVEAU CODE CIVIL, INTERPRETATION ET APPLICATION (1992);
H. Patrick Glenn, La disposition préliminaire du Code civil du Québec, le droit
commun et les principes généraux du droit, 46 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT 339
(2005).

DON SAÚL LITVINOFF (1925-2010)
Agustín Parise† & Julio Romañach Jr.‡
On January 5, 2010, in his adoptive city of Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, the great Argentine jurist, Saúl Litvinoff, bid farewell to
his family, students, and colleagues. Don Saúl was born in Buenos
Aires on March 15, 1925. He graduated from the National High
School of Buenos Aires (Colegio Nacional de Buenos Aires) in
1944 and the law school of the University of Buenos Aires
(Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Buenos Aires) in 1949.
He received a doctorate from that same university in 1956, and
obtained the degree of master of laws from Yale University, in the
United States, in 1964. Since 2002, he had been a corresponding
member of the National Academy of Law and Social Sciences of
Buenos Aires (Academia Nacional de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales
de Buenos Aires).
His vocation for teaching led Dr. Litvinoff to be a law
professor in several universities, in the Americas as well as in
Europe. However, his teaching activities took place primarily at
Louisiana State University (LSU). He was a professor at that
university from 1965 to 2009, in which year he was named
professor emeritus. His most important contributions to the
science of the law include the two volumes of his treatise on
obligations1 and his course books on sales2 and obligations.3


Originally published in Spanish in REVISTA JURÍDICA LA LEY (Febr. 2,
2010) (Arg.), at 1-2.
†
Former Research Associate, Center of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana State
University Law Center.
‡
Staff attorney, Louisiana State Law Institute; Member of the Louisiana
and Florida Bar Associations.
1. SAÚL LITVINOFF, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL,
5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2nd ed. 2001); and SAÚL LITVINOFF, THE
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: PUTTING IN DEFAULT AND DAMAGES, 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE (1999).
2. SAÚL LITVINOFF, SALE AND LEASE IN THE LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE
(1978) (followed by several editions, the last of which was published in 1997).
3. SAÚL LITVINOFF, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN LOUISIANA
JURISPRUDENCE (1979) (followed by several editions, the last of which was
published in 2008).
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Dr. Litvinoff occupied a fundamental role in the development
of the Louisiana Civil Code that is currently in force. Starting in
1969, he was appointed Reporter of the Louisiana State Law
Institute,4 and was in charge of the revision of the titles on the law
of obligations of that civil code. Thereafter, also acting as
Reporter, he was in charge of the revision projects of the contracts
of sale, compromise, and exchange, among others. Dr. Litvinoff
was the best ambassador that Argentine law could have had in the
United States.
The impact of the work of Dr. Litvinoff was valued in
Louisiana, not only by the local universities, but also by the state
legislature and bar. It is noteworthy, for example that the LSU
Law Center declared 2009-2010 to be the Year of Litvinoff. In
addition, in 2008 and under the direction of Olivier Moréteau, the
Center of Civil Law Studies at LSU, which Dr. Litvinoff directed
between 1976 and 2005, published a Liber Amicorum in his
honor.5 The book includes works of lawyers and legal scholars
from around the world who paid tribute to his life.
Don Saúl’s teaching vocation was very strong, and it could
only be matched by his vast knowledge. He could quote
legislation on a particular subject area from, among others,
Argentina, Brazil, Ethiopia, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Nigeria,
Panama, and Spain, and at the same time remember the names and
nicknames (designed by him) of all the students in his class. It is
very rare to find professors of that caliber. Our notebooks would
become full of notes, not only of legal matters, but also of how to
conduct a law course, and more importantly, how to treat human
beings. His students, who became brothers in spirit in his classes,
were able to discover and appreciate the many levels of his
knowledge and of his zeal for life. His sources were infinite in
many aspects! Don Saúl’s brilliant work performance enticed
students and colleagues to join the ranks of his admirers and the
many that were grateful to him.

4. The Louisiana State Law Institute is an official law revision agency for
the State of Louisiana. For more information on the Institute, see, William E.
Crawford & Cordell H. Haymon, Louisiana State Law Institute Recognizes 70Year Milestone: Origin, History and Accomplishments, 56 LOUISIANA BAR
JOURNAL 85 (2008).
5. ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SAÚL LITVINOFF (Olivier Moréteau, Julio
Romañach. jr., & Alberto Zuppi eds. 2008).
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It is worth adding that Dr. Litvinoff was not only a renowned
academician and codification expert, but he was also a legal
consultant to many American and multinational companies and to
innumerable law firms in the United States that frequently solicited
his expert opinion on innumerable practical problems. Don Saúl
prided himself on being a legal professional in the broad sense of
the term.
What a privilege to have known that great Argentine jurist Don
Saúl, who managed to make clear what was obscure and to render
the difficult, simple—that one corresponding member of the
National Academy of Law and Social Sciences who, certainly
dedicated his life to the human aspect of the law!
The academic world and his students are grateful for his
dedication, intelligence, and intellectual generosity.
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METHOD IN CIVIL LAW EDUCATION
Fernando M. Toller†
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ABSTRACT
The article explores the origins, foundations, and present
development of the case method in the Civil Law tradition. It
supports the idea that, properly defined, this methodology is very
suitable for law, and not only in Common Law jurisdictions, but
also the Civil Law and is even more appropriate in Continental law
schools. There are indeed some undisputable common roots
between Common Law and Civil Law regarding this pedagogical
tool.
The misunderstandings and skepticism about the usability of
this method in Civil Law education are challenged and answered.
The article proves that the case method is a serious and useful
scholarly tool; it is not a new pedagogical technique, but is rooted
and was nourished in ancient educational tradition, especially in
humanities and law; it fits law as well as business, not only in the
Common Law but also in the Civil Law tradition; it is deeply
related to the entire history and development of the Civil Law.
The author claims that it is not accurate to affirm that the case
method is inherent and exclusively bound to a system using case
law as a primary legal source, such as the Common Law tradition.
He points out that it can be a fertile method in the Civil Law
tradition.
The work encourages a rebirth of this methodology for the
teaching and learning of the Civil legal system, demonstrating that
the Civil Law was taught with this methodology in the past and
that present experience in contemporary law schools proves that it
is an outstanding teaching tool in Civil Law jurisdictions.
The case method is not an exotic flower having no place in the
garden of Civil Law, but an important pedagogical element for the
renovation of the Civil Law, the revival of which ought to be
encouraged.
I. INTRODUCTION:
WHY A REVIVAL OF THE CASE METHOD
IN THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION?
Currently, the case method is—especially in the Anglo-Saxon
world—a pedagogical tool used in a wide variety of disciplines—
if not all—both in social and “hard” sciences.1 Cases are used in
exact sciences to illustrate a physical principle or to train students
1. See MICHAEL MASONER, AN AUDIT OF THE CASE STUDY METHOD 1, 11,
41-42, 46 (1988); MICHAEL R. LEENDERS & JAMES A. ERSKINE, CASE
RESEARCH: THE CASE WRITING PROCESS 4 (2d ed. 1978).
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in the use of the algebraic method—e.g. “exercises” or
“problems.” For instance, cases are used in naval academies:
students analyze the possible courses of action that Nelson had in
Trafalgar, learning the use of tactics and strategies. Case
methodology is also used to analyze agricultural, governmental, or
engineering problems. Although not referring to them as “cases,”
many schools and universities present students with problems of
logistics, journalism, and architecture. Furthermore, it is well
known that the case method is widely used in business and legal
studies, especially in the United States.
The operation and functioning of this methodology is different
depending on the discipline. The methods used to teach
accounting are not the same as the ones used in teaching political
science. Nevertheless, in every example cited the educational
device used is the case method. In these fields, this methodology
consists in some kind of analysis of a real or hypothetical situation,
an examination of the different forms of scrutiny and alternatives
available and an evaluation and discussion of possible correct
solutions and sometimes trying to find the best one. In this article,
sometimes I use the concept of “case” and “case method” in this
broad sense—for instance, regarding this methodology in the study
of medicine—a little more comprehensive than the specific legal
use of case method that I will explore further in this article. I think
that is important to widen the focus to better understand the
varieties and possibilities of this methodology. In this way a
greater awareness of the sources and roots of the case method and
its educational legacy and potential in the law becomes clear.
In this article I am adopting a working concept of case method
in legal education that encompasses Langdellian and nonLangdellian approaches. Here the case method referred to is a
pedagogical tool mainly consisting of the discussion in classrooms
wherein judicial decisions are studied and students analyze written
hypothetical or situational cases that are supplied by professors. It
does not impair the case method to use it in a different way from
the Langdellian approach of strict observance. This theme is later
developed in III.C. In this approach the professor never explains
the law, but exclusively gets it by extracting the principles from
cases after painful and meticulous discussion carried on with the
students. I propose that the case method could improve by adding
previous, correlative, or posterior explanations by professors of the
general principles governing a legal institution or a juridical
problem or situation. This could then be supplemented with the
use of codes, hornbooks, and manuals. This would enrich the case
method, and for several reasons, improve the old Langdellian
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system. This improved method could then be used in both
Common Law and Civil Law courses.
We use this approach for two decades to teach Civil Law in
Austral University Law School, with encouraging results, as I
demonstrate infra in V.E. Therefore, I am including here both the
Langdellian goal to find out the law from the case discussion and
to reintroduce an entire science in an inductive way with a more
modern approach to case method. The core of the operation of
case method wherein the discussion or analysis of the professor
with students and between the students. This would enable the use
of interpretative devices and options to reach a solution and show
the value of different paths that could be used by legal advisers or
judges. They would thus better understand adjudications and the
correct, just and suitable answers for the given situation.
Consequently, this methodology endeavors for the students to
develop and cultivate a critical legal mind that is oriented towards
problem-solving. It is key that they understand the principles of
law not as abstract conceptualizations, but as the answers to the
complex juridical problems found in real life.2
These comments lead to the following questions: Where does
this methodology come from and how has it spread so quickly? Is
it really suitable for legal studies? A positive answer to the latter
leads to another question: Is the methodology appropriate for the
study of the Civil Law, as much as it is for the Common Law?
These questions will be answered using a historical perspective,
with a focus on the antecedents and the origins of the use of the
case method, and on its relation with similar methodologies used
in the past. Revealing its foundations will show how to address
the difficulties generated by a revival of the case method in Civil

2. For my complete concept of “case method,” and the correlative concept
of “case,” see my work ENSEÑAR Y APRENDER DERECHO CON EL MÉTODO DEL
CASO: FUNDAMENTOS Y MODOS DE IMPLEMENTACIÓN (forthcoming March
2011), especially chapters III, §§ 16-17, VI, §§ 29-36, and XII, III, § 78. I am
not excluding alternative forms to perform it pursuing specific educational goals
in the broad field in which I draw the general scope of this methodology. For
example, I am not excluding, neither the debate of mini-cases in the
development of a theoretical lecture, nor discussion and analysis using role
playing, or the discussion of problematic fragments of movies, nor the analysis
of cases outside the classroom hours, individually or in groups, just orally or in
written form. One of the main problems on the comprehension of this
methodology is that different professors, of diverse traditions or sciences,
frequently have a narrow view of the case method, in some way parochial, to see
different and complementary approaches that are available within case law
methodology.
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Law education, and uncover some of the extraordinary
possibilities for the methodology in this legal tradition.3
Legal education is a fascinating and challenging topic when
explored in the context of the relationship between the Civil Law
and Common Law traditions. There are at least two main reasons
for that. The first one is that education is the beginning of several
things, and to spread and develop the tradition in teaching,
learning and training in law is a very important matter. This is
especially true since there is undoubtedly a cross fertilization
between education and practice. The second reason is that legal
education is probably one of the main topics revealing the cross
influences, the common roots and future permeability of the
Common Law and Civil Law traditions. I am of opinion that such
permeability does not contaminate or impair one tradition or the
other, but helps to improve both of them.
Why speaking of a “revival” of the case method in Civil Law
education?
There are several reasons why exploring the
foundations of the case method in civilian legal education: a)
because it is necessary in order to understand, teach and further the
knowledge and learning of the Civil Law; b) because it may be
convenient, and even mandatory, in the forthcoming Bologna
unification process of education in Europe; c) because the case
method fits the Civil Law very well; d) because the Civil Law was
in fact taught with the case method; e) because there are several
common roots between the Common Law—where the case
method flourished—and the Civil Law regarding this kind of
pedagogical tool; f) because, based on the last points, the case
method is not an exotic flower that has no place in the garden of
Continental Law; and g) because there is, currently, a revival of
case method in Civil Law education.
The topic of this work, besides the relevance that it has for
those interested in this didactic method, has an added benefit.
Many law professors in the Civil Law tradition look at the case
method with skeptical eyes, in the belief that it is inexorably linked
to the characteristics of what they mistakenly think is its origins or
its nature. Such bias reveals a triple misunderstanding: firstly, that
3. Due to the scope of this paper, I will not deal with the different versions
of the method in the 20th century in the two main areas where it is used, law and
business. For the expansion and use of the method in law schools, see JULIO
CUETO RÚA, EL “COMMON LAW”: SU ESTRUCTURA NORMATIVA. SU ENSEÑANZA
301-05, 311-23, 350-94 (1957). For the use of this methodology in business
schools, see FRITZ ROETHLISBERGER, THE ELUSIVE PHENOMENA: AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL ACCOUNT OF MY WORK IN THE FIELD OF ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 141-142, 171-172, 233, 236238, 275, 288-289 (George F. Lombard ed., 1977).
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the case method is some kind of educational toy deprived of utility
in serious science or scholarship; secondly, that the case method is
useful to teach business administration, but unfit for a more
organized and sophisticated discipline like the law; and thirdly,
that the case method is characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon world,
that is only useful for teaching the Common Law. Is it possible to
answer these objections to the use of the case method in Civil Law
education? May we make these professors realize what the origins
and fundamentals of the case method are or can be? The aim of
this article is to dispel these erroneous and preconceived notions
and help to uncover the usefulness and possible applications of the
case method thereby encouraging Civil Law scholars to further the
revival of this powerful tool within Civil Law education.
In short, we are going to explore the roots of legal education
with the case method and use this knowledge to understand present
legal education and influence the future of legal education in Civil
Law jurisdictions. This article endeavors to support the view that
there are compelling reasons to reintroduce the case method in the
Civil Law world. This articles calls for a revival of this
methodology.
II. FIRST MISCONCEPTION:
THE CASE METHOD IS NOT FOR SERIOUS SCIENCE
The idea that law may be taught with the case method meets a
formidable intellectual resistance among civilians, especially those
who are solely academics. This may be due to several erroneous
positions and assumptions.
Some law professors are afraid to be challenged by students
and feel that the exercise of case method is more demanding than
explaining a theoretical point. Others think that the method only
fits a seminar size system of education, with classes of fifteen or
twenty students and may not be workable with classes of fortyfive, sixty, or more students. Others point to the shortage of
casebooks in Civil Law countries, unlike America where more
than 6,000 casebooks have been published since the time of
Langdell.
Nevertheless, most professors have a skeptical or distant
attitude towards the case method due to graver concerns. Namely,
Civil Law professors commonly reject the use of the case method
with the belief that it is not a serious pedagogical device to be used
for a serious academic discipline. They espouse the idea that the
dogmatic dimension of the law demands a dogmatic, lecture-based
style of instruction. The professor lectures ex cathedra, students

28

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 3

take notes and, sometimes, ask questions to the teacher for
clarification.
The study of the law is a science. Moreover, the law is a
complex system that combines techniques from art, science, and
philosophy. To fully understand the problems individuals and
society have in relation to justice and to resolve them, it is
necessary to synthesize all these disciplines within the context of
law. Taking into account the scientific character of the study of
the law, I believe that considering its use in other disciplines that
that are widely accepted as “sciences” can dissipate Civil Law
professors’ misunderstandings of case method. To this end, it is
useful to see how it was used, from the very beginning, in medical
education.
A careful observation of medical education reveals that the
analysis of cases has been used for a considerable time.4 This
methodology was first used by Galen (200-129 B. C.), who taught
his pupils with concrete “cases,” who were sick people, and then
asking his students about the right diagnosis and possible
treatments.
The pedagogical ideas of Galen continue to be valid today. In
medical schools, students examine actual patients, evaluate their
symptoms, diagnose them, and consider and recommend
therapeutic alternatives.5 Furthermore, the so-called “medical
athenaeums” of old handed down by tradition, consisted of a
professor or physician presenting a case wherein the pathology of
a patient, were discussed with medical students.
It is therefore not surprising that the modern manifestation of
this case method is carried out in the classroom in which is used
for teaching students at the Harvard Medical School. It was
borrowed from the Harvard schools of law and business.6 Clearly,
the case method is undoubtedly compatible with “serious”
scientific study.
4. See LEENDERS & ERSKINE, supra note 1, at 14.
5. On the relationship between case method and the practitioners’ formation
in Medicine, see HARPER W. BOYD JR., DONALD M.T. GIBSON, CHARLES P.
IFFLAND & LEE A. TAVIS, CASOS EN “MARKETING” 4 (Stanford Business School
trans., 1967; original in English: MARKETING MANAGEMENT: CASES FROM THE
EMERGING COUNTRIES, 1966).
6. For an interesting presentation of the change of teaching methodology
carried out a few years ago in that famous American medical school, and of the
program elaborated for that change, see: Daniel A. Goodenough, Changing
Ground: To Medical School Lecturer Turns to Discussion Teaching, in
EDUCATION FOR JUDGMENT: THE ARTISTRY OF DISCUSSION LEADERSHIP 83-98
(C. Roland Christensen, David A. Garvin & Ann Sweet eds., 1991). In
Argentina, the Austral University Biomedical School uses case method for the
same purposes.
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III. SECOND MISCONCEPTION:
THE CASE METHOD IS NOT FOR LAW, BUT FOR BUSINESS SCHOOLS
A. From Errors to Denial
For many, including those connected to the business world,
particularly Civil Law professors, the case method is viewed as
having been created in the twentieth century in the American
business schools, and more specifically, in the Harvard Business
School. The model is then seen as having spread to other
universities around the world, where it is now used extensively to
teach business management.
From this understanding arose the first objection of most
Continental Law professors to the use of case method in the
learning and teaching of Civil Law: the case method is not for
law, but only for business schools. We are going to demonstrate
that this assumption is clearly inaccurate.
B. The Fruits of the Law: The Beginning of the Case Method in the
Harvard Business School
In the nineteenth century the case method was used for
teaching business and commerce in France and Germany,7 but the
Harvard Business School has the honor of being the first to use the
case method in a conscious and systematic way in the business
world. However, as American lawyers know quite well, the case
method was used to teach law previously to its introduction for the
teaching of executives. Furthermore, searching the origins of the
methodology, it is possible to see that the case method had been
used previously not only in law, but in other sciences and arts as
well. The story is as follows.
The first American business school, Wharton, was created in
1881. Wharton is now part of the University of Pennsylvania.
The case method was not used there.
The Harvard Business School was created in 1908, under the
name of Graduate School of Business Administration. It was part
of the Graduate Department, in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at
Harvard University.8 Up until that moment, American business
7. See MASONER, supra note 1, at 10-11.
8. See The Harvard Guide: History, Lore, and More. Did You Know?
(2007), in http://www.news.harvard.edu/guide/lore/lore9.html (last visited July
10, 2010); and JOSÉ LUIS GÓMEZ LÓPEZ-EGEA, MÉTODOS ACTIVOS EN LAS
ENSEÑANZAS DE DIRECCIÓN: ANÁLISIS Y CONCLUSIONES DE LA EXPERIENCIA
DEL IAE 65 (Research paper; Universidad de Navarra, Pamplone, 2000;
unpublished).
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schools focused solely on undergraduate studies. Harvard, with
the intention of making business a true profession, innovated by
accepting graduate students.9
In the early twenties, under Dean Wallace B. Donham, the
Harvard Business School made the first use of the case method as
a pedagogic tool within a business context. The dean was a
Harvard Law School graduate, and was first exposed to the case
method while at law school. He borrowed this debate method and
applied it to the business school. The transplant was made,
naturally, with minor modifications born of the natural differences
between law and business.10
In 1910, Donham’s predecessor in the Deanship, Professor
Edwin Francis Gay, advised Professor Melvin Thomas Copeland
to complement his lectures with debates between students. The
advice was implemented and executives who taught the classes
introduced business problems in class and asked their students to
solve them in writing, making recommendations. Donham’s
training in law introduced him to the case method and he soon
recognized the importance of using this tool in the field of
business. In 1920, he encouraged Copeland to publish in 1920 the
first casebook on business—Marketing Problems11—and within a
few years the school faculty committed to using the case method.12
It is undisputable that the development of case method in
management education has been due largely to the Harvard
Business School.13 Furthermore, horseshoe or U shape classrooms
were invented there in the 1950s to facilitate discussion amongst
the students to enable them and the professor to effectively interact
with one another.14 In Harvard MBA classes, the case method
remains the chief pedagogical tool. Their students analyze an
average of 600 cases over the course of two years.15 Thousands of
9. See The Harvard Guide, id., referred in the previous footnote.
10. See ROETHLISBERGER, supra note 3, at 123.
11. It was later published several times under the name PROBLEMS IN
MARKETING.
12. See LEENDERS & ERSKINE, supra note 1, at 14, 102.
13. See MASONER, supra note 1, at 11. Regarding the precise way of
utilizing the case method in the Harvard Business School see these classical
works: THE CASE METHOD OF TEACHING HUMAN RELATIONS AND
ADMINISTRATION: AN INTERIM STATEMENT (Kenneth R. Andrews ed., 1953);
THE CASE METHOD AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL: PAPERS BY PRESENT
AND PAST MEMBERS OF THE FACULTY AND STAFF (Malcolm P. McNair & Anita
Hersum eds., 1954); and TEACHING AND THE CASE METHOD: TEXT, CASES, AND
READINGS (Louis B. Barnes et al. eds., 3d ed. 1994).
14. See Roland Christensen et al., Acknowledgments, in EDUCATION FOR
JUDGMENT (C. Roland Christensen et al. eds.), supra note 6, at xxv.
15. Cf. ROBERT RONSTADT, THE ART OF CASE ANALYSIS 6 (3d ed. 1993).
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cases were studied in Harvard and gradually became available to
other schools and professors. Thus, this methodology has actively
spread, first to other American business schools and then to
business schools all over the world.
Having established this, let us leave business schools and go
back to the law schools, where the professors of management
found the case method.
C. The Restoration of Case Method in the Contemporary World:
Langdell and the Harvard Law School
In the modern times, the case method experienced a
renaissance in 1870 at Harvard Law School.
Christopher
Columbus Langdell became dean of the school for the academic
year 1869-1870 and remained there until 1900. He introduced the
case method as the main instrument to teach principles of judgemade law and to teach the students how to think in a legal way.
Prior to Langdell stretching back to and since the colonial age,
retired judges delivered strictly theoretical classes to teach the law.
Practical training was left to practicing lawyers, who dispensed it
in an informal setting over a certain period of time, without much
institutional organization.16
The theoretical framework for
American lawyers was laid by reading the four volumes of
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England.17 Following
the creation of American universities, this teaching system
remained mostly untouched within the academic world.
In a rudimentary stage before Langdell, cases were used to
teach American law students. In 1810, Zephaniah Swift used a
casebook to teach law at his law firm in Connecticut. Later in
1865, Professor John Norton Pomeroy used cases to teach law at
New York University. Langdell’s innovation, strictly speaking,
was in making the teaching and learning with cases the main

16. See CHARLES EISENMANN, THE UNIVERSITY TEACHING SOCIAL OF
SCIENCES: LAW 19, 67-68, 89-90, 92 (1954). It was a report on the teaching of
law by this professor at the University of Paris for the International Committee
of Comparative Law.
17. The COMMENTARIES were written between 1765 and 1769 based on
Blackstone’s classes in Oxford, being the first clear and complete exposition of
the Common Law system. It is because of this that the treatise was considered
the most important authoritative source on Common Law, thus enjoying a
predominant position in England and the United States. See about this SIR
WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 702-727 (reprint 1966)
(1938); DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 252 (Earl Jowitt & Clifford Walsh eds.,
1959).

32

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 3

instrument of legal education.18 His influential and visible
position as professor of law and dean of the Harvard Law School
contributed decisively to the success of his proposal. It is worth
highlighting that Langdell introduced cases in the study of
contracts, a key course in the study of law, and published his
casebook with a prestigious publishing company, thus making it
widely available for purchase to the public.
Langdell explained his method in his book, A Selection of
Cases on the Law of Contracts, the first part of which was
published in 1870—a year after his arrival to Harvard. It was used
the first time during the first semester of the academic year 18701871. Its methodology rested on two main ideas: legal
gnoseology within a positivist matrix and legal pedagogy.
Through his legal gnoseology, he denied the existence of
general principles deriving from nature and instead believed that
induction could be used to analyze all the Common Law
precedents and reduce them to general principles. From there,
rules could be obtained and applied to concrete cases. The
applicable law for new cases could be obtained from principles
obtained from previous cases. In this way case law could be clear
and scientific, a key principle for the practice of law. According to
Langdell, the science of law could be created following this
method.
From a pedagogical standpoint, Langdell conceived the case
method as a way to lead students to acquire by themselves, by
means of their personal work and methodically oriented
discussions, the juridical spirit. Rather than memorizing the law,
they would start from a concrete case and use principles derived
from them to reach general principles that could then be
analogized and applied to other cases.19 He did not hand books
and materials to students to be studied, but instead used course

18. See RAMÓN BADENES GASSET, METODOLOGÍA DEL DERECHO 433
(1959).
19. About the philosophical and pedagogical ideas of Langdell see C.C.
LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS v-vi (1871).
The first part, published in 1870 with the same publisher, has 460 pages. The
following year, his complete new edition had 1022 pages, with 336 cases,
mainly full text without brackets or edition. For a complete and deep study on
Langdell and his legal ideas see WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE:
THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1994). About his legal
ideas see also William C. Chase, Book Review, J. AM. HIST. 1752-1753 (1995)
and BADENES GASSET, supra note 18, at 434.
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materials to be used as information for problem solving and to
discover the legal rule through induction.20
For a fruitful application of the method, Langdell created three
principles and explained them in the foreword of his book on
contracts as follows:
I entered upon the duties of my present position, a year and
a half ago, with a settled conviction that law could only be
taught or learned effectively by means of cases in some
form...
I was expected to take a large class of pupils, meet them
regularly from day to day, and give them systematic
instruction in such branches of law as had been assigned to
me. To accomplish this successfully, it was necessary,
first, that the efforts of the pupils should go hand in hand
with mine, that is, that they should study with direct
reference to my instruction; secondly, that the study thus
required of them should be of the kind from which they
might reap the greatest and most lasting benefit; thirdly,
that the instruction should be of such a character that the
pupils might at least derive a greater advantage from
attending it than from devoting the same time to private
study.
How could this threefold object be accomplished? Only
one mode occurred to me, which seemed to hold out any
reasonable prospect of success; and that was, to make a
series of cases, carefully selected from the books of reports,
the subject alike of study.21
After several early difficulties and resistances, the case
method gradually gained popularity, and eventually achieved a
consolidated position towards the end of the nineteenth century
and into the early twentieth century.22 After a rocky start, for more
than a hundred years the case law methodology has remained the
basic pedagogic methodology for teaching law in the United
States.23

20. See Julio Barboza, Reflexiones acerca del Punto II del temario, in
INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE ESTUDIOS JURÍDICOS INTERNACIONALES, LA
ENSEÑANZA Y LA INVESTIGACIÓN DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 175 (1969).
21. LANGDELL, supra note 19, at v.
22. See JOSEPH REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS (REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING), 84 (1914). The same idea in BADENES
GASSET, supra note 18, at 433.
23. See EISENMANN, supra note 16, at 111.
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Two powerful reasons converged to create the success of case
method. The first one is that United States is, fundamentally—and
even more in Langdell’s time—case law. Juridical principles
usually come from rulings and statutes are interpreted through
these decisions under the rubric of stare decisis. The second
reason is that the goal of law schools in the United States is to
prepare law students to be practicing attorneys who can solve
cases correctly and think clearly. Therefore, it is crucial that those
studying law be able to interpret, reason from, and use cases to
support their position.24
It is worth mentioning that Langdell’s epistemological
principles were strongly resisted by those who favored legal
realism—particularly Holmes25 and Llewellyn.26 Legal realists
disapproved of and criticized the case method’s attempt to teach
law, which they viewed as a science, through the studying of
cases. Nevertheless, it is possible to keep Langdell’s pedagogic
method to educate lawyers using debates about cases without
sharing his idea of the law as a science. The two ideas are very
different and this fact has not been stressed enough.27 Yet it is
essential to grasp the fact that one may use the case method
without endorsing a philosophical approach to the law that
conforms to the “empirical” conception of the Common Law—a
conception in the Anglo-Saxon tradition and that clearly
contradicts some fundamental tenets of the Civil Law tradition.
In conclusion, the case method is not an educational resource
born in business school, but one that originated in and was
perfected as a specific legal educational device.
IV. THIRD MISCONCEPTION:
THE CASE METHOD IS ONLY FOR THE COMMON LAW
A. Cases and Discussions: From Rome to the Renaissance
Theology, and Back to Socrates
The second major objection to the case method in Civil Law
education is that the case method only applies to the teaching of
24. See id. at 115-116; and CUETO RÚA, supra note 3, at 308-309.
25. See Oliver W. Holmes, Book Notices-Review of CC Langdell, Summary
of the Law of Contracts and WR Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract, 14
AM. L. REV. 233-234 (1880).
26. See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); and Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with
Legal So-Called Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 665 (1935).
27. See William Epstein, The Classical Tradition of Dialectics and Legal
American Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399, 399-400, 422-423 (1981).
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the Common Law because the tradition is created on a case-bycase basis. It is absolutely dependent on the case made law and
stare decisis, and this is viewed as being inadequate in a Civil Law
system, which is based on pre-existing legal rules.
Although Langdell was the modern “inventor” of case method
for its use in a classroom, he can more properly be seen as a
“restorer” in light of pertinent historical antecedents. The use of
cases in legal education is indeed much older than Langdell and its
use in the Harvard Law School. It is deeply connected to the Civil
Law and Continental tradition, starting with Roman Law—the
wellspring of Civil Law. The case method has remained a
component of legal education in the European and Latin American
law schools, and experienced great expansion with the teaching of
moral and ethics. Moving further back in time, one discovers the
genesis of this methodology in Greek philosophy, within the
Socratic methodology and Aristotilian dialectics.
B. The Focus on Cases as the Core of Roman Law
Roman jurists understood quite well the relationship between
cases and law. They did not conceive of the law as a mere
rationalistic abstraction. Rather, they viewed it as a discipline that
required the exercise of prudence in each individual case. Thus,
the early Greeks gave importance to circumstances and exceptions,
paying attention to different shades and factual adaptations. It was
in this context that the jurist Alfen could say in causa ius esse
positum: “the fair solution depends on the case,” or “the right is
determined in the case.”28
Casuistry is therefore one of the main elements of the spirit of
Roman Law, which explains its current pedagogical utility. The
Romans were the genius inspirers of this juridical method that
flourished as a method to solve cases.29 The essential flexibility of
ius of Rome lies in the prudentia iuris, cause of the ars iuris; and
this is what makes Roman Law so fertile and vital to this day.30 It
did not develop as a “science of law,” but as casuistry and practice
wherein situational law, sought to achieve a fair solution for each

28. D. 9, 2, 52 [DIGEST].
29. See MANUEL JESÚS GARCÍA GARRIDO, RESPONSA: CASOS PRÁCTICOS DE
DERECHO ROMANO PLANTEADOS Y RESUELTOS 17 (10th ed. 2003); and Alfredo
Di Pietro, Foreword, in GABRIEL DE REINA TARTIÈRE, CASOS DE DERECHO
ROMANO 10-11 (2004).
30. See Alfredo Di Pietro, note in GAIUS, INSTITUTAS 38 (Alfredo Di Pietro,
trans. 4th ed., 1993).
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case. Hence, the Romans understood the law, ius, to be that which
is just, fair.31
This attention to cases in Roman Law derives from a unique
feature: they had the legal rules of the responsa of Roman
iurisprudentes or iurisconsulti as main source of their laws. These
“answers” were authoritative elaborations based on concrete
problems or “cases that were formulated as verdicts, legal opinions
or answers to the praetor, to the iudex, or directly to the parties
involved in the lawsuit, generating a doctrinal precedent.32
Besides their intrinsic value, the importance of the answers
remained in the fact that, as Gaius says, “the sources of law for the
Roman people are . . . [among others] the answers of the
prudent,”33 conceived as “the decisions and opinions of those to
whom it has been granted to create law.”34 In this way, although
“private” jurists, who had the authority of their author, gave many
answers, many other jurists had a special privilege given by the
emperor, known as ius publicæ respondendi. These decisionsanswers were vested with the strength of mandatory authority for
judges.35
In 533, Justinian’s jurists gleaned from those answers the
famous Digest, a restatement of legal opinions about actual cases.
It is interesting to note that the Digestus or Pandectis—as it was
also known—formed one of the fundamental parts of the Corpus
Iuris Civilis. The Digest was made as an official selection of
Roman case law by the Emperor. Useful for practical application
of the law by judges, these cases were primarily meant for the
education of those aspiring to serve the office of justice. Justinian
understood that the education of the new jurists was of greater
importance and effectiveness than the coercive imposition of
opinions to the court magistrates. Centuries later, his theory was
validated when the summary of opinions on cases was used for the
formation of jurists in the European ius commune.36
31. See JULIO CÉSAR CASTIGLIONE, LAS LECCIONES DEL DERECHO ROMANO
O EL NACIMIENTO DEL DERECHO 61, 64, 97-98 (1995).
32. See PONPONIUS, D. 1, 2, 2; F.C. DE SAVIGNY, I SISTEMA DE DERECHO
ROMANO ACTUAL 154-155 (Jacinto Mesía & Manuel Poley trans. 2d ed., 1870);
ALVARO D´ORS, DERECHO PRIVADO ROMANO 28 footnote 4 (1968); and Di
Pietro, in GAIUS, supra note 30, at 58-59 n. 8.
33. GAIUS, supra note 30, at I, 2. I have consulted the versions of Di Pietro,
aforementioned, and of JAVIER NÚÑEZ DE PRADO, INSTITUCIONES JURÍDICAS
(1965). About the “answer of the prudent” as source of law, see also PAPINIAN,
D. 1, 1, 7.
34. GAIUS, supra note 30, at I, 7.
35. See L.B. CURZON, ROMAN LAW 18-20 (2d ed.1974) (1969).
36. About that idea of Justinian and the use of the Digest in the education of
students in the ius commune, see A. D´ORS, F. HERNÁNDEZ-TEJEDOR, P.
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Furthermore, Romans invented the Institutes or Institutas, or
method of institutions. This is the best possible way of explicating
the law in a scientific manner. The best exponents of this method
are Gaius’s Institutes and, some centuries later, Justinian’s
Institutes.
They were introductory works, which were a
compilation of a comprehensive theoretical material based on
casuistry, culled from the infinite number of answers to actual and
specific legal problems where the jurists attempted to find the
fairest solution possible to the problems presented.
That is the last reason that explains why Roman Law was
eminently practical, focused in its application. Roman jurists
reasoned from particular cases to general principles. They took
into consideration each problem and studied it in light of the
general principles, and endeavored to arrive at practical, wellfounded solutions.37 Ihering, one of the greatest Roman Law
experts and one of the finest Civil Law thinkers and writers, spoke
about the spirit of this ancient system of law and said that its goal
was to regulate the reality. He pointed out:
Law exists to be applied. Law’s application is its life and
truth. What doesn’t really exist, what exists only in statutes
and paper, it’s only a legal ghost; . . . on the contrary, what
is carried out as law, is law, even though it is not in the
statutes, and even though neither the people nor the
doctrine are aware of it.38
Ihering also pointed out that, while the modern law is
structured by concepts, Roman Law was structured without
dividing or isolating concepts from concrete cases.39
As shown above, the study of case law or casuistry is the best
method for teaching Roman Law.40 It is not a surprise, therefore,
that those opinions, together with the Institutes, were studied in
both the rival schools of the Sabinians and the Proculeians, private
institutions called stationes ius publicæ docentium et

FUENTESECA, M. GARCÍA-GARRIDO & J. BURILLO, I EL DIGESTO DE JUSTINIANO
7 (1968).
37. See PAUL (PABLO) KRÜGER, HISTORIA, FUENTES Y LITERATURA DEL
DERECHO ROMANO 49-50 (ca. 1880).
38. RUDOLF VON IHERING, III L’ESPRIT DU DROIT ROMAIN DANS LES
DIVERSES PHASES DE SON DÉVELOPPEMENT § 43 (O. de Menlenaere & A.
Maresq trans., 3d ed. 1877).
39. Id. at § 58.
40. See D´ORS, supra note 32, at 7; id., El valor formativo del Derecho
Romano, in id., PAPELES DEL OFICIO UNIVERSITARIO 159-169 (1961); and id., El
dogma jurídico, in PAPELES, 170-184.
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respondentium.41 There, the law student was an auditor: he
listened to the consultations made to the iurisprudentes, whose
opinions, while rather short, could have as companions detailed
explanations in form of discussions with the students.42
One cannot but agree with Rudolf Stammler, when he said
that the texts of the Roman jurists are crucial for developing
critical thinking in law students.
For Stammler, it was
inconceivable that this magnificent way of teaching future judges
and lawyers was abandoned.43
Thus, we can conclude that Roman Law, from where the Civil
Law sprung, had the use of and the studying of cases at the very
core of its practice and spirit. The reading of cases, the
researching of them, the study with cases, is no abandonment of
the Roman Law heritage, but honoring it in a higher degree.
C. Case Analysis in Legal Education in Renaissance Europe and
the Colonial Americas
Centuries later, the Glossators and Post-Glossators did not use
cases as the Roman iurisprudentes did. Rather, they worked
exclusively with Roman jurists’ opinions and elaborations on the
cases. But it was not necessary to wait for Langdell: between
Ulpian and him, continuity was broken by the ius commune and,
with it, by the ius canonicum.
In some prominent law schools both in Europe and the
Americas—especially in the paradigmatic schools of Salamanca,
Lima, and Mexico—the Civil Law was taught with cases and
principles obtained from Justinian’s Digest and Code, and Canon
Law with the Decree of Gratian and the Decretals of Gregory
IX.44 The method consisted in reading a text, asking questions and
receiving answers from the students. After that, they “put the
case” to the learned principles, that is, real and hypothetical cases
about the theory and norms were explained.
With all these
elements a discussion was held based on the laws extracted from
the cases and authorities.45 In the University of Mexico, for
example, Pedro Farfán’s Constitutions of 1580 prescribed that in
the learning of canons, laws, or theology reading, disputes, and
41. See JOSÉ M. CARAMES FERRO, HISTORIA DEL DERECHO ROMANO DESDE
SUS ORÍGENES HASTA LA ÉPOCA CONTEMPORÁNEA 214 (5t ed. 1993).
42. See KRÜGER, supra note 37, at 53.
43. See EL JUEZ, 44 et seq. (Emilio F. Camus trans., 1941), quoted by
BADENES GASSET, supra note 18, at 429.
44. See VÍCTOR TAU ANZOÁTEGUI, CASUISMO Y SISTEMA: INDAGACIÓN
HISTÓRICA SOBRE EL ESPÍRITU DEL DERECHO INDIANO 235 (1992).
45. Id. at 237.
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solutions were practiced “so that students could develop their
memory and cultivate their intelligence and understanding.”46
It is interesting to point out that in the book Arte Legal para
Estudiar la Jurisprudencia (Legal Art to Study Law), which was
published in Salamanca in 1612 by Francisco Bermúdez de
Pedraza as a repertoire of advice to students, it was stated that laws
or canons should be read before attending class, and that it should
be done “very slowly, one, two, or three times, until understanding
it and putting a case to it.”47 That is, students new to the study of
law were advised to study slowly and to imagine cases of
application to prepare themselves for the discussion that would
take place in class. Similarly, the exam given at the conclusion of
the students’ formal university training, which consisted of an hour
exposition about the assigned point, followed the requirement that
the student “put the case to the text” and “bring the reason to doubt
and to decide.”48
In this way, the introduction of case for discussion and the
application of the studied texts, in sixteenth to eighteenth century
law schools helped to stress the idea that the law should be applied
to constantly changing facts, thus the art of deciding and solving
cases with unique facts was paramount.49
D. Not Only for Law: Casuistry in Moral Science
The science of ethics is very close to the study of law. Legal
reasoning and ethical reasoning can be seen as brothers, or even
twins. For this reason it is fruitful to explore the utilization of the
case method in the study and research of ethics.
At the end of the sixteenth century, morality began to
bifurcate from the other theological disciplines, and casuistry
began to manifest in its teachings. This tendency became clear by
the middle of the seventeenth century due to the influence of
Canon Law.
It is important to remember here the deep influence of the
Civil Law on Canon Law and, through it, of Roman Law. Martín
de Azpilcueta, the so-called Doctor Navarrus (1493-1586),
famous canonist and moralist from the University of Salamanca,

46. Id. at 240.
47. BERMÚDEZ OF PEDRAZA, ARTE LEGAL PARA ESTUDIAR LA
JURISPRUDENCIA 103-104 (1612), quoted in TAU ANZOÁTEGUI, supra note 44, at
236-237.
48. See TAU ANZOÁTEGUI, supra note 44, at 240.
49. Id. at 238-242.
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played a key role in the development of casuistry with his
Manuale sive Enchiridion Confessariorum et Poenitentium.50
The decisive year for its development came in 1600 when the
Spanish Jesuit Juan de Azor (1536-1603) published the first
volume of his Institutiones Morales. It was a truly summa,
following the new system of presenting and discussing series of
hypothetical cases on concrete moral issues with solutions. The
work was intended as a manual that would explain morals and
teach them to confessors.51
Another important man in the application of the case method
to the exposition of Morality was Cardinal Francisco Toledo, SI
(†1596), who wrote Instructio Sacerdotum s. Summa Cassum
Constientiæ.52
In this way the use of casuistry was first seen in moral
theology. As a result, works of true scientific merit and some
monumental works, such as Antonio Diana’s (1585-1663)
Resolutiones Morales, known as Summa Diana, were produced.53
Unfortunately, the system was flawed.
It lacked the
prudential method of Roman Law and ossified due to its adherence
to rigid rules and strict use of rationalism. These authors of
Catholic casuistic works were the true products of their authors
who were primarily concerned with repelling the threat posed by
Protestantism. Thus, they aimed primarily at giving to confessors,
who may have no instruction in theology, solutions that were
thought of in advance. In this way, these works focused on
distinguishing mortal sins from venial sins and neglected an
examination of the principles and nature of goodness. That is
why, distancing themselves from the Roman Law methodology,
they started to develop sophisticated ways of distinguishing the
moral acts, trying to avoid the committal of mortal sins by
introducing subtle shades and exceptions, frequently forced.54
Gradually, the casuistic method fell into disfavor. When the
Jesuits had their controversy with the Jansenists, it suffered a
50. About the surging of casuistry and the influence of Azpilcueta, see
MARTIN GRABMANN, HISTORIA DE LA TEOLOGÍA CATÓLICA 231-233 (David
Gutiérrez trans., 1940).
51. See JOSÉ LUIS ILLANES & JOSEP IGNASI SARANYANA, HISTORIA DE LA
TEOLOGÍA 206-208 (1995); and GRABMANN, supra note 50, at 231-233. The
works of Azor had three volumes and was published between 1600 and 1611,
with the complete name of INSTITUTIONES MORALES, IN QUIBUS UNIVERSÆ
QUESTIONES AD CONSCIENTIEM RECTE AUT PRAVE FACTORUM PERTINENTES
BREVITER TRACTANTU.
52. See GRABMANN, supra note 50, at 233.
53. Id. at 233-234, 236; ILLANES & SARANYANA, supra note 51, at 208-209.
54. See about this respect HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 337-341 (4th
American ed. 1884, from the tenth London ed.).
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serious blow from the hands of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), who
hardly censored it in his attack to Jesuits—who used it as their
theological methodology.
In 1656 and 1657, the French
mathematician who was a Jansenist wrote eighteen letters—the
famous Lettres Provinciales—in defense of a friend of his who
was also a famous Jansenist. Pascal’s use of wit and irony
introduced the previously unknown topic to the general public.
Those Provincial Letters, besides their Jansenist origins,
popularized the rejection of casuistry in ethics. As a result, to the
extent that many influential moralists actively tried to avoid using
the methodology.55
In the twentieth century, the disfavor for the casuistic method
for teaching morality was due to strictly theological—and not
pedagogic—reasons. Indeed, the method became so modified as
to begin to separate moral casuistry from integral theology and
philosophical anthropology. Many books ended up as a simple
compendium of ethical obligations with solutions and
punishments.56 As previously shown, this state of development
was far from the spirit of Roman casuistry, from where the method
began. Nevertheless, using practical cases in the teaching of ethics
is a clear methodological contribution from the discipline. It still
hasand should continue havinga preponderant role on both the
discussion of theoretical problems and in the learning of the
concrete usage of general principles.57
E. Greek Dialectics and the Socratic Method as Fundamentals of
Modern Case Method
Before examining the case method’s current manifestation, it
is instructive to once more look to the ancient world in order to
55. On this intervention of Pascal, well known, see, among others, id. at
341.
56. See GRABMANN, supra note 50, at 231-232; and ILLANES &
SARANYANA, supra note 51, at 209. However that is not of direct importance to
the history of case method, we could say that today the moral theology is again
in the good path, recovering the value of individual conscience, of biblical
sources, of foundation of ethical solutions in the dogmatic theology, etc. On this
see SERVAIS PINCKAERS, LAS FUENTES DE LA MORAL CRISTINA: SU MÉTODO, SU
CONTENIDO, SU HISTORIA 309-336 (2d ed. 2000); and AURELIO FERNANDEZ, I
TEOLOGÍA MORAL 352 (2d ed. 1995).
57. See ILLANES & SARANYANA, supra note 51, at 209. To have a complete
view about the history, scope of the casuistry as a method of morals, this author
recommends to consult H. Lio, Casuistica, in I DICTIONARIUM MORALE ET
CANONICUM 573-578 (1962); R. Boluillard, Casuistique, in II CATHOLICISME
630-637 (1949); and E. Dublanchy, Casuistique, in II DICTIONNAIRE DE
THÉOLOGIE CATHOLIQUE cols. 1859-1877 (1923).
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uncover its basis. The Civil Law tradition was and still is greatly
influenced by Greek philosophy. The dialectics and the Socratic
method are central to this philosophy. Although they did not deal
overly with “cases,” the dialectical and Socratic method have long
been exercised in university teaching—particularly in English
speaking countries.
It is generally recognized that the Greek dialectical method,
where one evaluated and considered counterarguments to arrive to
a decision, is a superior method to arrive at the truth when
debating an opponent. It also forms the foundation and supports
the modern American system of legal education by means of the
training in reasoning through the case method. Thus, the classic
pattern that is used to teach the law develops critical thinking
skills, the ability to speak intelligently and persuasively, and how
to point out the errors and inaccuracies of one’s opponent. Hence,
facts, that are relative to important general or abstract aspects of
the law are learned and the process of how the law works
exposed.58
Three great Greek thinkers are primarily credited with helping
to create the dialectical method. Socrates (469-399 B. C.) was the
first to contribute with his method of discovering error by means
of questions.
In second place, Plato (427-347 B. C.) offered the supreme
study of dialectics, as a method of questions and answers to
educate those that would be the ruling philosophers. With this
system, he tried to discover the last and deepest truths of the world
of pure forms, with a rational process of analyzing arguments
critically and eliminating false propositions.59
Finally, Aristotle (384-322 B. C.) studied the dialectical
method and used it as a critical process for the study and teaching
of the human problems of aphoristic nature. For him it is
characteristic of the practical and prudential truth—especially, in
the ethics and in the politics—where the premises are generally
accepted, but not evident themselves—as it happens in apodictic
environment, typical of metaphysics. Aristotle conceived of the
dialectical method as a useful pedagogical tool wherein truth was

58. See Epstein, supra note 27, at 400, 416-423. This article stresses the
contribution to dialectics of the three big Greek thinkers, and its relevancy for
the learning of the practice of the law, in the sense pointed in the text. Of this
work of Epstein, at 401-408, I have also condensed the following paragraphs of
the text, with Socrates’s, Plato’s and Aristotle’s contributions.
59. See id., REPUBLIC 531e, 532a-b, 533b-c, 534e, 535a, 537c, 541b and
543b-c.
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expected to emerge from the interaction of opposing arguments.60
From some of his texts, where he asserts that the teacher should
always say what he thinks and never teach something that is false.
The interrogatory facet of the debate in case method should not
carry the professor to strive only for ingenious obfuscation.
Ultimately, he must fulfill his special obligation to further
righteousness and truthfulness.61
The Socratic method, also called maieutics—pertaining
to midwifery—,should be said to consist of teaching through the
discussion of problems and the skillful interrogation of students.
The teacher “gives birth” or induces the ideas in the students who
discover them by themselves. This method was immortalized in
Plato’s Dialogues. More precisely, maieutics, the second moment
of the Socratic method, which started with the irony—from eiro, to
interrogate, is an interrogation that is intended to make the speaker
aware of his or her ignorance. Ignored wisdom is the beginning of
the acquisition of knowledge. Socrates began the dialogue
admitting his ignorance; then he asked for the student’s opinion.
After the answer, he asked new questions that confused the
speaker, until the student admitted that he ignored the topic. In
that moment, maieutics began, founded in Socrates’ idea that the
truth does not emanate from the outside, but rather it is inside
everyone. Thus, the teacher’s task is to facilitate its emergence.
Plato explained this phenomenon found by this method of learning
as the process of remembering ideas that we have from our
previous life, and that were forgotten. Taking into account
different opinions, Socrates achieved a definition accepted by all
the speakers, showing, against the Sophists, that the truth could be
arrived at using this method.62
The Socratic methodology of philosophical analysis, used by
modern law professors has five clear characteristics. It is doubtful
or uncertain. The professor begins with an actual or professed
ignorance for the discussed topic. In this way, the search for
60. See especially the treaty of the TOPICS and, therein, the points I.1 100a
25-101a 18, I.2 101b 3-4, I.14 105b 19-22, VIII.5 159a 25-32, and VIII.10 160b
22-40. Aristotle also worked on dialectics in PERIHERMENEIAS—on the
interpretation and the propositions—, the PRIOR ANALYTICS—syllogisms to
know the truth—, the POSTERIOR ANALYTICS—truths that can be known by
syllogisms—, the SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS—acknowledgment of false
reasoning—and the RHETORIC—rules of argumentation in a debate.
61. This is the opinion of Epstein, supra note 27, at 405-407, pointing out
Aristotle’s texts in TOPICS, VIII.5 159a 25-32, VIII.9 160b 10-13, and VIII.10
160b 22-40.
62. See JUAN CARLOS ZURETTI, BREVE HISTORIA DE LA EDUCACIÓN 54-55,
59-60 (1988); and ENRIQUE D. N. TELLO ROLDÁN, MANUAL DE HISTORIA DE LA
EDUCACIÓN Y LA PEDAGOGÍA 104-105, 107 (1999).
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knowledge is begun. It is also dialectical or dialogic, as didactic
mechanism and technique for the actual discovery of truth, by
means of the maieutics of questions and answers that start from an
accepted conception, to arrive to a different and more appropriate
one. Additionally, it is also conceptualizing or definitional in its
endeavor to acquire philosophical concepts. It is empiric or
inductive by criticizing the starting concept by referring to
concrete issues and common experiences. And, finally, it is
deductive. It proves that the definition elaborated by means of its
implications and consequences is correct.63
In Greece, the Socratic method coexisted with lessons that
were given directly by the teachers.64
Though not coinciding exactly with the case method, the
Socratic method shares with it obvious similarities.65 In this sense,
it is generally accepted that Socrates’ method constitutes the basis
and foundation of the modern case method. Moreover, in the
American legal system they are frequently seen as being
synonymous.
Before moving to the next step, it is important to reiterate that
the dialectics and the Socratic method, which are so strongly
connected with the American approach to case method in legal
education, were highly influential in the western tradition, where
the Civil Law appeared and developed.
F. Discussion Method, Foundation of Medieval Teaching
Our next stop is in the first medieval universities, where we
find a widely spread pedagogical tool: the methodology of
discussion or debate. The medieval debate method is closely
related with Greek dialectics and the Socratic method. The
discussion is one of the main elements of the case method, to such
an extent that it is sometimes named this way.
The discussion method generated in the debate clubs in
Anglo-American universities. It also relates to the current problem
method, appearing sometime around 1930 in the United States as a
derivation of the law school case method and marking a return to
the original Socratic method. It tried to enlarge the student’s
creativity and participation while addressing legal problems with a
63. See Ken Samples, The Socratic Method, in http://www.str.org
/site/news2?page=NewsArticle&id=5631 (1998) (last visited July 10, 2010). It
can be seen, as paradigmatic example of the idea pointed out in the text, the
platonic dialogue MENON, where Socrates interrogates if it is possible to
transmit knowledge.
64. See ZURETTI, supra note 62, at 83.
65. See GÓMEZ LÓPEZ-EGEA, supra note 8, at 25, 89.
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scientific approach, as a counterpart to the single discussion of
solutions already given by the courts.66
The use of debate between two contenders, as a didactical
method, finds its origin near the year 1100, in the school that the
University of Paris originated from. It grew from the hands of
William of Champeaux (1070-1121), and, especially, of his
apprentice and then leader of a rival school, Peter Abelard (10791142).67 The method was very successful and, though it originated
in the School of Theology, it also spread and dominated in the
schools of arts—philosophy—, law and medicine during the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.68 The method gained the
denomination of quæstiones disputatæ—disputed questions—and
became typical of the medieval teaching, sharing equal footing
with the lectio—lesson or lecture.
Between Socrates’ method and the debate method there was a
narrow relationship: the first raised different quæstiones, some of
them to get a quick solution for the teacher, while others, more
meaningfully, gave material for the dispute, of which consisted the
second method.69
In the disputes, which were common practice in medieval
universities, two students engaged in a dialectical competition on a
previously determined issue, under the supervision of one or
several teachers. After one or several sessions discussing an issue,
66. On the problem method like an intermediary among the theoretical
teaching and the case method, see MASONER, supra note 1, at 12; and
EISENMANN, supra note 16, at 111. One of the first to propose the problem
method, as superior of mere case method, for the reason pointed in the text, was
Jacob Henry Landman in his book THE METHOD OF STUDYING LAW (1930).
Anyway, Landman’s critique of the case method has diverse inconsistencies,
generalizations without enough elements and many confusing aspects of that
methodology. Among these last ones there is critic to the original method of
Langdell that had already evolved for the time when the book was written,
without need of giving for good the judge’s reasons, like it happened in its
original version. Cf. in this respect H. Claude Horak, Scanning Old Procedures,
2 J. HIGHER ED. 52-53 (1-1931), where reviews the book of Landman. On the
origins of the problem method in the United States, see María T. del Rosario
Moya, La utilización de los fallos y opiniones consultivas de la Corte
Internacional de Justicia y las decisiones de otros tribunales internacionales en
la enseñanza del Derecho Internacional Público, in INSTITUTO
INTERAMERICANO DE ESTUDIOS JURÍDICOS INTERNACIONALES, supra note 20, at
195.
67. See MAURICE BAYEN, HISTORIA DE LAS UNIVERSIDADES 21-22, 27 (A.
Giralt Pont trans., 1978).
68. See Laura E. Corso de Estrada, Rasgos de una Quæstio Disputata del
siglo XIII, in TOMÁS DE AQUINO, CUESTIÓN DISPUTADA SOBRE LAS VIRTUDES EN
GENERAL 22 (1998).
69. Id. at 20-21, and corresponding footnotes.
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the teacher summarized the opposing arguments, typically based
on reasoning and the citation of numerous profane and religious
authors, expressing the cultural heritage of the time. He analyzed
and confronted them, and finally gave his solution. Disputes have,
accordingly, an aporia-lysis structure originating with Socrates,
Plato and Aristotle: an issue to discuss, some alternatives, and a
solution to the problem.70
On the other hand, much like in Antiquity, many teaching
methods became literary forms for investigation. A number of
Quæstiones Disputatæ published by philosophers and theologians
of that period give testimony of that oral methodology.71 Among
them, those written by Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) should be
mentioned as giving an extraordinary example of an author
following the method to elucidate different matters.
Those written disputes not only originated in the private
disputes among one teacher’s students, but also in those carried
out openly, on a weekly or biweekly basis, where, choosing topics
that constituted a comprehensive theme, teachers debated among
themselves for entire mornings, in the presence of the whole
school, with bachelors and students also intervening. Then, in a
second part that took place the following day, a teacher unified
logically the adduced reasons, expressed the authorities that
endorsed what he would sustain, exposed his own doctrine—
determinatio magistralis—and, finally, answered each of the
contrary reasons. In the end, the teacher’s thought on an issue was
the subject of discussion and scrutiny by the university
community. Some people took notes, which were reviewed and
improved by the teacher: these are the works that came to us.72
Twice a year, extraordinary disputes opposed the most
qualified professors “with open agenda,” since they were ad
voluntatem cuiuslibet.
Books followed under the title of
Quæstiones Quodlibetales, like those written by Thomas Aquinas,
or by William of Ockham (ca. 1280-1349).73
70. Id. at 18, 24-25.
71. Id. at 17-20, and corresponding footnotes.
72. Id. at 22-26, with corresponding quotations. Each disputed question
would correspond to what has come to us as quæstio, corresponding the
different articles that an issue is composed to the extension of a private dispute,
in scholis. The number of existent quæstiones can give us an idea, on the other
hand, of the great frequency with which the disputes were carried out. See id. at
26-27 and footnote 39.
73. On the lessons and medieval disputes, cf. also ETIENNE GILSON, LA
FILOSOFÍA EN LA EDAD MEDIA 135-136 (M.M. and J.C. trans., 1940). With
regard to the quodlibetales questions, see also Corso de Estrada, supra note 68,
at 27-28.
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An application of the disputed question method, though not in
the oral form, may be found in the book Sic et Non of Abelard.
The book gathers Bible and Church Fathers doctrines on many
issues that are apparently contradictory, with the purpose of
formulating the problems and encouraging a desire to solve them.
Nearly a hundred years later, Abelard’s method, that immediately
deserved a large adhesion, was entirely adopted by Alexander of
Hales (1185-1245) and also by Thomas Aquinas in many of his
works, especially in his Summa Theologiæ.74
Aquinas offers a paradigmatic example of the system. When
following this method, his works are divided in different treatises,
first outlining a general quæstio that contained different problems
or articles. Each of these articles opens with quotations from
different authorities that express opinion contrary to the author’s—
more than twenty in Quæstiones Disputatæ, five or six in Summa
Theologiæ.
Then, these authorities are contradicted with
quotations from other thinkers (sed contra), helping Aquinas shape
the status of the question (status quæstionis). Aquinas then
expresses the solution that he maintains, with his reasons and
proofs (corpus articuli, solutio or respondeo). Finally, he answers
with detail to each of the objections outlined in the first place(ad
primum, ad secundum, etc).
Not only did medieval thinkers create universities, but they
also developed a more efficient teaching and research methods,
contributing to a renaissance rather than a dark age. Their pattern
of analyzing the problem, alternatives, solution, and answers to the
incorrect alternatives comes very close to the IRAC (Issue, Rule,
Analysis, Conclusion) system of analysis of cases in American law
schools.75 The medieval writing methodology is a very suitable
methodology for scholarly work. The only criticism one may
suggest is to finish the answers to the alternatives before exploring
one’s own solution.
In relation with these medieval analytic and teaching methods,
another aspect of the purest classic tradition in education should be
explored. The trivium was an introduction to university studies,
leading to the “bachelor” degree.
It developed from the
74. On Abelard and their system of “yes and not,” see GILSON, supra note
73, at 75, 139.
75. The IRAC system organizes the case analysis following the next or
similar questions: ISSUE–What factual elements could be taken into account and
what issues arise from that specific circumstances? RULE–Which is the law or
rule that could govern and solve the issue? ANALYSIS, APPLICATION OR
ALTERNATIVES–Am I bound to apply this rule to this facts? How does one apply
this rule to these specific facts? Are there other alternatives of solution?
CONCLUSION–Which is the most satisfactory solution and why?
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Carolingian Renaissance to the first centuries of university
teaching. By means of three subjects, the students were introduced
to wisdom and to the heights of thought. These three subjects
were: rhetoric—oratory and literary style—, dialectics—logics,
argumentation, and art of discussing—and grammar—including
literature and analysis of written texts. This knowledge was the
core of medieval teaching. Together with the quadrivium—
arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music—, they formed the
famous seven liberal arts, called this way for their liberating effect
on the mind. They developed in human beings an ability to think
with discipline and ease, and were characteristic of free men.76
The Socratic method was central to the training in the three arts of
the trivium, the conjunction of which being a clear antecedent to
the case method.77
Therefore, we can conclude that the medieval discussion
method of analyzing issues in oral or written form is an important
antecedent to the modern case method, especially in law and
business, taking from them several elements of its dynamics and
functioning.
G. Case Method in Classroom and Medieval “Apprentice’s”
System out of the Schools
Before explaining when and why the Civil Law lost the case
method, its relationship with professional training or
apprenticeship must be explored; this element is deeply rooted in
western tradition.
The educational system for apprentices of occupations and
professions consists of learning an art through direct experience
under the guidance of a master, with whom the apprentice can
learn, “case by case,” the secrets of the specific job. This reveals
how much the case method can be a “vicarious experience,”

76. On these seven liberal arts and their influence during that period, see
GILSON, supra note 73, at 17-18, 39, 84; and ZURETTI, supra note 62, at 117,
119, 129. This classification was introduced in schools by Alcuin of York (735 804), Charlemagne’s educational and more important collaborator, who wrote a
treaty on each one of the arts of the trivium: DE GRAMMATICA, DE RHETORICA
and DE DIALECTICA. Added to philosophy, theology, law and medicine, they
somehow summarized the “arts”—humanities—and the “sciences.” With
relationship to Alcuin and his educational influence see also Salvador
Claramunt, Alcuino de York, in I GRAN ENCICLOPEDIA RIALP 502-503 (2d ed.
1981).
77. Also relates the way of teaching the trivium with case method,
MASONER, supra note 1, at 10.
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because it bases the learning and training on the reproduction of
real experience of a job, with its advantages and limitations.78
This system of apprenticeship or learning by training has been
regulated since the Code of Hammurabi and had an outstanding
importance in the Middle Age, where it structured most of the
teaching system. Its significance must be highlighted: it is still
perpetuated nowadays as an unavoidable element in the formation
of young professionals starting in a function or a company.79
Apprenticeship is a worldwide constraint for the young
lawyer. It is sometimes optional—although often generalized— in
those systems promoting educative internships during legal studies
or after graduation, like in Argentina. It is often compulsory. In
many European countries, such as France or Italy, there is no
special emphasis on the case method in law school but
professional practice with attorneys at law or in the judiciary
varying between one year and five years, before being licensed to
practice is required.80
In conclusion, the case method is an extraordinary tool that
vicariously teaches the real functioning of law across legal studies,
and apprenticeship is the natural continuation of the case method
in the last years of study and after graduation.

78. With regard to that characteristic of case method, see W. Waller Carson,
Jr., Development of a Student Under the Method, in THE CASE METHOD AT THE
HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL (McNair & Hersum eds.), supra note 13, at 86;
RONSTADT, supra note 15, at 2-3, 8; and GÓMEZ LÓPEZ-EJEA, supra note 8, at 3,
78-81, 85-86, 160-161.
79. On the relationship among the apprentices’ system and case method, cf.
Juan Antonio Pérez López, El método del caso: instrumento pedagógico para el
profesional de la acción 2, Nota técnica 0-394-023 ASNN-3, IESE-Universidad
de Navarra (1993); and MASONER, supra note 1, at 9.
80. This system is actually used in Germany (one year and half of practice),
Belgium (three to five years), Denmark (three years at least, plus exam), France
(three years), Ireland (one or two years), Italy (two years and an exam), the
Netherlands (three years for the attorneys at law and four for the judges), Greece
(one year and half, plus exams), and England (after an exam, one period of
practice of two years). On this see II CONVOCATORIA DE AYUDAS DE LA
ANECA PARA EL DISEÑO DE PLANES DE ESTUDIOS Y TÍTULOS DE GRADO:
LICENCIADO EN DERECHO (“LIBRO BLANCO” DE LA LICENCIATURA EN
DERECHO), 19-21 (june 2005). This study was presented to the ANECA by fifty
five
law
schools
from
Spain;
it
was
published
in
http://derecho.usal.es/libroblanco/05PartePrimera.pdf
and
http://derecho.usal.es/libroblanco/06PartePrimera.pdf (last visited July 10,
2010). That specific part of this work was done by professors Alarcón Caracuel,
Campins, Arenas, and Camas.
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H. When and Why the Civil Law System Lost the Cases
All the previous epigraphs show a legal pedagogy inclined
towards casuistry and discussion. The use of the case method in
the Civil Law tradition, with variations in times and places, started
in Rome and went across the Middle Ages and the Modern Age.
Things changed when, under rationalistic ideas, Roman Law was
largely put aside to be replaced with the study of National Law
with the codification movement starting in the late eighteenth
century.81
The change was not negative in itself. What is negative is the
positivist and legalist deviation that accompanied this change in
the nineteenth and twentieth century. This influence led to the
abandonment of prudentialism in juridical analysis and, thus, of
cases, leading to the loss of the case method.82
This abandonment generated an alarming situation:
- the classroom was filled only with the lecture method,
and the classes became boring and the students were
not involved.
- the law is perceived solely as a system of abstract
concepts logically related, without relation to real life
and real problems.
- the textbook—a good idea and a valuable product of
the Civil Law tradition—, largely replaces cases.
- the students remain passive and generally do not learn
in a critical way.
- the key of education is to be able to repeat memorized
rules, principles, and concepts in the examinations.
The ability to use them and transfer them to real
situations being all too often neglected.
- there can be an abyss between law school and the life
of lawyers. Students often have no idea how to deal
with a real problem.
This phenomenon gained influence in Europe and the
Americas, yet with some exceptions.83
V. THE REVIVAL OF THE CASE METHOD IN CIVIL LAW EDUCATION:
FROM IHERING TO THE THIRD MILLENNIUM
As pointed out already, in modern times the United Stated is,
without any doubt, the leading country in teaching law with the
81. See TAU ANZOÁTEGUI, supra note 44, at 242-251.
82. Id. at 250.
83. Id.
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case method. It has not been completely alone in this endeavor.
Emerging from the deep roots explored in the past sections,
several attempts (some very successful) to use the case method in
Civil Law classrooms have been made.
A. Legal Education in Germany
In first place, we should consider Germany, with experiences
preceding national codification. Rudolf von Ihering (1818-1892)
allegedly used an experimental and Socratic method in class,
starting in 1847. Also, in the Fourth German Congress of Jurists
in Mainz in 1863, the judicial advisor Volkmar, of Berlin, put
forward a reform project of legal studies, where he insisted in the
practical and pedagogical formation of the professorship and in the
creation of a legal clinic to support the needs of practice.84
That is why in Germany in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, many professors taught with hypothetical cases
that the students should resolve, inside or outside the classroom,
written or orally, in order to be discussed later. Some volumes
were published with cases in order to teach. This method was
praised for forming critical legal minds and stimulating a scientific
study of the law in the quest for answers to practical problems. It
highly favored by the Pandectists, simultaneously favorable to
meeting students with social needs that was going to solve the
law.85
The German experience revived by Ihering can be traced back
to the medieval ius commune. Based on the old Bologna model
and developed with a rich contribution by German scholars trained
in Roman Law, it was taken to its most sophisticated refinement
by the great Pandectists until the day a civil code—BGB—was
substituted to the usus modernus pandectarum. To this day, a
significant part of class work in German law schools is dedicated
to the study and discussion of cases, and exams frequently consist
of analysis of concrete legal situations.86

84. On Ihering and Volkmar, see BADENES GASSET, supra note 18, at 440.
85. See OLIVER, LA ENSEÑANZA SUPERIOR EN ALEMANIA 89 (1918), quoted
by BADENES GASSET, supra note 18, at 440.
86. I appreciate the several explanations that were kindly made to me on the
German legal education by professors Peter Sester (Universität Freiburg and
Universität Karlsruhe), Ulrich Magnus (Universität Hamburg), and Álvaro Pérez
Ragone (Universität Köln and P.U.C.V.).
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B. Some Endeavors for a Practical Legal Education in France,
Italy, and Spain
Several practical attempts took place within the European
legal education. Let us see at a glance the situation in the last
century in three law-leading countries.
In France, the Code Napoleon and the abstract approach of the
School of Exegesis largely influenced the legal education. At the
beginning of the twentieth century some law professors also chose
to introduce, along with theoretical classes, some practical
applications of the principles by means of exercises with cases.87
Furthermore, legal studies were amended in 1954, in view of
getting the student more in touch with practice.88 Nowadays in
France, in addition to the traditional lecture (cours magistral),
from first year to fourth French Law students attend seminars
(travaux dirigés), complementing core subjects, where they are
invited to discuss and comment court decisions and hypothetical
cases. However, this vital part of the teaching is assigned to the
least experienced teachers. Students are invited to write or present
orally a commentary on a case, which must satisfy stringent
formalistic canons, with the risk of prioritizing form over
substance.89
Something similar happened in Italy, where in 1920 practical
exercises in legal teaching became compulsory.90 Their case
method is used partially for discussions in universities and in some
seminars organized by non-university institutions.91
In Spain, after a long history of theoretical approach to legal
education, legal studies were reformed in 1990, with a timid
attempt to include practical teaching.
This includes the

87. See Alfredo Orgaz, La enseñanza práctica en la Facultad de Derecho
de París, 6 REV. DE DERECHO Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES 782 (1927) (Arg.), quoted
by BADENES GASSET, supra note 18, at 440-441.
88. BADENES GASSET, supra note 18, at 441.
89. Cf. Olivier Moréteau, Bilan de santé de l’enseignement du droit, in
ETUDIER ET ENSEIGNER LE DROIT: HIER, AUJOURD’HUI ET DEMAIN. ETUDES
OFFERTES À JACQUES VANDERLINDEN 273, 285-301 (2006).
90. See BADENES GASSET, supra note 18, at 441.
91. See René-Jean Dupuy, in THE UNIVERSITY TEACHING SOCIAL OF
SCIENCES: INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (René-Jean Dupuy ed., 1967) (It was a
report on the teaching of International Law carried out in the International
Association of Legal Sciences, under the direction of this professor from Nice,
answering a request by Unesco); and G. Arangio-Ruiz, Italy, in id., 62 (that is
one of the national reports content in the general report).
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introduction of a Practicum at the end of legal studies and
practical credits in different subjects.92
Nonetheless, despite these initiatives in the direction of more
practical teaching, one cannot say that the use of the case method
is widespread in France,93 Italy,94 or Spain.95
C. The Civil Law Education in Europe and the “Declaration of
Bologna”
The current situation in France, Italy, Spain, and many other
countries may change in the wake of the “Declaration of
Bologna,” carried out on June 19, 1999, by the Secretaries of
Education of a number of European states, most of them members
or future members of the European Union. The “Bologna
Process” that started with the Declaration is not a European Union
initiative, but rather an intergovernmental project. More than 45
countries (n.b. countries outside Europe are admitted) have now
signed the Declaration, which creates a European Space of Higher
Education, an idea to be found in the earlier Declaration of La
Sorbonne (1998). With a set deadline in the current year 2010, the
signatories must make efforts towards the convergence of their
national systems of higher education, making them consistent and
compatible, facilitating the recognition of degrees among different
countries. Access to a unified work market must be facilitated
within the European Union and must remove obstacles for the
mobility of students, professors, and researchers.

92. See Royal Decree 1424/1990, of October 26, which establishes the
official law degree and the general guidelines of studies to obtaining it, in B.O.E
of November 20, 1990, number 278; and CONSEJO DE UNIVERSIDADES,
REFORMA DE LAS ENSEÑANZAS UNIVERSITARIAS – TÍTULO: LICENCIADO EN
DERECHO. PROPUESTAS ALTERNATIVAS, OBSERVACIONES Y SUGERENCIAS
FORMULADAS AL INFORME TÉCNICO DURANTE EL PERÍODO DE INFORMACIÓN Y
DEBATE PÚBLICOS 40-41 (1988) (Informe técnico del grupo de trabajo N° 10–

Título de Licenciado en Derecho). See also the references, very few, to the need
of more critical and practical teaching, done by some professors or universities
that sent their suggestions to the project, id. at 152-153, 630-631, 745-746. In
the book there are also oppositions and resistances to the introduction of
practical activities in universities, for different reasons, like it happens at 161167 and 200-201.
93. See Moréteau, supra note 89, at 285-290; and Dupuy, supra note 91, at
19-20, 35-36.
94. In Italy, legal education traditionally has been theoretical and, although
it has been tried to emphasize practice, most of the teaching consists of formal
lectures. See also Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 91, at 61.
95. I spent five years teaching law in Spain, and it is widely known that the
lecture is almost the unique pedagogical tool used there.
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The principal elements of the European university
convergence may be summarized as follows. Degrees are
structured in two mandatory cycles: graduate—bachelor—and
postgraduate—master—, or undergraduate and graduate studies, to
use the American lexicon. The first cycle is comprised of three
years (180 credits) and the second cycle of two years (120 credits),
with the possibility to extend the first one to four years (240
credits) and to shorten the second to only one (60 credits). A third
cycle leads to the doctorate, typically of three years of duration.
Subjects or courses are measured in “European credits,” or
ECTS—European Credit Transfer System—, calculated on the
assumption that a full time student works for 60 credits a year or
30 in a semester. Each institution is free to allocate the number of
credits to each course or learning experience. Computation of
credits is not exclusively based on the number of course hours like
in English speaking countries, but on the average of expected
working hours dedicated to the subject by students. For a given
course or activity, this may include lectures, supervised work in
small groups, personal study time, and various ways of evaluation.
Motivation of professors and students is required, with the intent
to establish an education based on learning and not exclusively on
teaching. The student is expected to have an active role in his
studies and the professor is his or her tutor in that process.96
The Bologna Process has pushed the Old Continent to change,
with an effort to adapt the different national university systems to
the Declaration. Almost every European country has made
adjustments towards a mandatory two-cycle system regarding
legal education: first cycle—Bachelor, Licenciatura, Licence,
Baccalauréat, or other variants—, plus second cycle—Master—,
plus the elective third cycle—Doctoral studies. The “bachelor”
degree should enable people to access law-related jobs in
companies, public administration, or as legal representatives.
However it will not be enough to qualify as a judge or attorney. A
master is required, often supplemented by compulsory professional
training and additional exams, the system varying from country to
country.97

96. Other elements of the system of Bologna are: it requires a system of
information that reveals the contents and level of received education; it has tried
to avoid an excessive duration of the higher studies with respect to their nominal
duration, instead trying that the studies are carried out in the years in which they
are structured.
97. On the European system of studying law under the Declaration of
Bologna, see the comparative study included in II CONVOCATORIA DE AYUDAS,
supra note 80, at 5-18. Professors M.R. Alarcón Caracuel, Mar Campins, Rafael
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Italy was the first country of the European Union to adopt the
Bologna system, applying it in 1999 and 2000 to all fields,
including law.98 France and Germany had their reforms in 2002.99
Other countries already had a Bologna compatible system—
Greece, Finland, England, and Scotland—, while others like Spain
or Portugal, have delayed the process.100 Many countries adopted
the “three plus two” years formula, while others followed a “four
plus one,” or “four plus two.”

Arenas and Ferran Camas, from the Universities of Sevilla, Barcelona,
Autónoma of Barcelona and Girona, carried out this part of the study.
98. Italy made changes in 1999 (Decree n. 509 of November 3, 1999) and
2000 (Ministerial Decree of August 4, 2000), and other countries follow its
approach. In legal studies this country adopted a three level system (graduate,
postgraduate, and doctoral levels) that last three, two, and three years, the first
two compulsory. The first cycle (180 ECTS), which is started by the students at
19 years old, offers the degree Laurea Triennale in Giurisprudenza and has as
an objective to provide the students adequate dominium of the general
scientifics methods and contents, and of specific profesional skills. The second
cycle (120 ECTS) gives the Laurea Specialistica degree, with five
concentrations or orientations, which is intended to preparate higly qualify
professional activities in specifics areas. In the first two years of the Laurea
Specialistica there is the Master di primo livello (60 ECTS), and in the second
year the elaboration and presentation of an original work of end of studies is
required. For an analysis of the new Italian system see Manuel J. Peláez, La
Historia del Derecho y la Historia de las Instituciones en las nuevas
Licenciaturas italianas adaptadas a Europa (El Decreto m. de 4 de agosto de
2000 del Ministerio de Universidades y de la Investigación Científica y
Tecnológica), 25 REV. DE ESTUDIOS HISTÓRICO-JURÍDICOS 507-512 (2003)
(Chile).
99. Germany, as is pointed out by Peláez in the work mentioned in the
previous footnote, reformed the law studies in 2002, not including structural or
substantial reforms regarding the subjects of the law degree that were in
operation before that year.
100. Let us take the Spain case. This country became part of the European
space of higher education since the 2008-2009 academic year. In the Organic
Act 6/2001, of December 21, the topic was discussed, with a generic regulation
in articles 87-89 (B.O.E., December 24, 2001). The Real Law Decree 9/2005, of
June 6 (B.O.E., June 7, 2005), has modified the Act on some points. Spain will
have a four years graduate degree, with a master of one year or two, both
necessary to become an attorney at law. To begin doctoral studies it is
necessary to have a previous Master degree. Cf. II CONVOCATORIA DE AYUDAS,
supra note 80, at 21. The X Conferencia de Decanos y Decanas de las
Facultades de Derecho de las Universidades Españolas, that took place in Vigo
on June 28, 2008, confirmed that basic legal formation requires in Spain a
minimum content of 240 credits ECTS, which means four years of full time
studies.
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D. Perils and Menaces against the Revival of the Case Method in
European Civil Law Education
It can be expected that all the effort put on the European
Space of Higher Education will come to fruition and will not be
mere wishful thinking. Signs already exist that the generalization
in that continent of master studies of professional character which
embrace the adoption of case method in legal education, is
increasing its use in European countries.
Despite the positive signs and promising openings, triggered
by the Declaration of Bologna, a lot remains to be done to promote
the case method in Civil Law education. Whilst promoting more
active student participation, the Declaration of Bologna does not
put a special emphasis on the practical formation of university
students. In addition, one should not neglect the idiosyncrasy and
manifold traditions of different societies and academic
communities.
Unfortunately, reality shows that many law schools of
continental Europe keep a predominantly lecture-based legal
education, making little room for case discussion, which keeps
students in a passive role as spectators of the professor’s
teachings.101 The situation in Latin America is the same.102
Therefore, except for some law schools, some professionally
oriented programs (usually at Master level), or some individual
professors, in Continental Law or Civil Law countries facts
demonstrate that the practical teaching in legal education is limited
or remains nonexistent, despite expressed desires, official plans or
statements to the contrary. Many professors from continental
Europe give more value to a dogmatic formation, which they give
by means of classes with formal lessons, rather than investing time
in the discussion of cases.
Many have never used this
methodology in class.103 When recognizing that things should
change, they put the blame on the large number of students and
lack of resources: the lecture system appears to be more
compatible with mass education. But they ignore the fact that in
United States it is common to see classes of more than a hundred
students learning with the case method, especially in the first year
101. This, which is well known, is outlined, among many others, by
Moréteau, supra note 89, at 285-290; Dupuy, supra note 91, at 19-20, 35-36;
Arangio-Ruiz, in id., at 61.
102. Cf. E. Jiménez of Aréchaga, Latin America, in THE UNIVERSITY
TEACHING SOCIAL OF SCIENCES: INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (René-Jean Dupuy
ed., 1967), at 72, 76-77.
103. See Dupuy, supra note 91, at 19; Moréteau, supra note 89, at 285-290.
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of legal studies. The number of students is not the problem, the
real purpose of the professor is.
The same lecture-based legal education is the rule in law
schools in countries with quite different legal traditions, like
Japan, Eastern Europe, the Nordic countries,104 and also in some
Common Law countries.105 It is necessary to exclude England of
this panorama, because it has made spectacular strides in
promoting case discussion in class, with a multiplication of
casebooks in the last twenty or thirty years.106
In consequence, there is no systematic and generalized
teaching with a legal, critical, and practical mentality. With some
exceptions, the use of the case method in class as a privileged tool
for developing that mentality is almost inexistent in many
countries. The theoretical class, current version of the medieval
lectio, remains largely predominant.
The lectio, originated in cathedral and monkish schools where
it coexisted with disputes, consisted in the reading of a text—
something necessary in a time previous to Guttemberg—, from
which the professor carried out a comment and developed his own
ideas.107 The development of printing did not change this pattern.
The debate system of education, close to the Roman prudentialism
forgotten, the influence of rationalism leads the university
education to be based on the accumulation of knowledge by the
professor and its oral transmission to students, all too often in a

104. See S. Tsuruoka, Japan, in THE UNIVERSITY TEACHING SOCIAL OF
SCIENCES: INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (René-Jean Dupuy ed., 1967), at 67-68; and
I. Hambro, The Scandinavian States, id. at 89; G. Haraszti, Hungary, id. at 4546; and S. Jankovi.ć, Yugoslavia, id. at 146-147.
105. See P. K. Iranian, India, in THE UNIVERSITY TEACHING SOCIAL OF
SCIENCES: INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (René-Jean Dupuy ed., 1967), at 53-54; and
E. I. Nwogugu, Nigeria, id. at 80-81.
106. This way, England completes the extended previous use of cases in its
jurisdiction, with great quantity of books that followed the methodology of the
restatements, where the state of case made law is summarized in a certain field,
sometimes beginning with 14th century decisions and many of those books
being perpetuated because of generation-to-generation updates. Before the
current circumstances, when the case method spread more and more in British
law schools, they used to expose the English legal system, mainly based on
cases, in a theoretical or abstract way and not using case discussion or debates,
and they did not have significant casebooks. On the previous situation in
English law schools, see EISENMANN, supra note 16, at 116; and K. R.
Simmonds, United Kingdom, in THE UNIVERSITY TEACHING SOCIAL OF
SCIENCES: INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (René-Jean Dupuy ed., 1967), at 115-117,
121.
107. See JAIME PUJOL BALCELLS & JOSÉ LUIS FONS MARTIN, LOS MÉTODOS
EN LA ENSEÑANZA UNIVERSITARIA 19 (2d ed.1981).
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way similar to dictation.108 This way, lecture method is a system
“based mainly on a continuing exposition of a lecturer” and where
students can “ask or participate in a small discussion, but generally
they just listen and take notes.”109
Therefore, in most Civil Law countries law schools have not
realized at all, or some of them not fully realized, that the case
method can be effective to carry out very diverse exercises and
legal training, with great utility and benefits. A Civil Law
professor wrote in Buenos Aires, cases can be used to let the
student employ rules and principles to different facts, analyze
cases interpreting pertinent rules and looking for different
alternatives of construction and application, identify and qualify
facts and evidences, commit in the search and analysis of
alternatives in a situation, etc.110
E. The Blend between Civil Law Substance and American
Approach to Legal Education in the Revival of the Case Method in
Some Latin American Law Schools
Several law schools in Latin America, especially in Argentina
and Brazil, apply the case method intensively in legal education.
They successfully blend the Civil Law tradition of explaining the
codes, the rules, and the legal system, with the Common Law
approach of the last century of teaching and learning with cases
and recovering the roots of the old Civil Law tradition to teach law
with cases.
Among the law schools that are applying the case method in
legal education, the Austral University Law School (Facultad de
Derecho de la Universidad Austral), from Buenos Aires, is a
leader. It has been a pioneer in promoting a participatory approach
to legal education since 1988, when it started as an institute of
research and postgraduate studies. This institution delved deeply
into the case method when starting a masters’ degree in the
beginning of the 1990s and a J.D. program in the middle of the
same decade. Austral Law School has compiled collections of
cases, trained hundreds of law professors in the case method, and
is spreading the methodology in law schools in Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru.
108. Id. at 20-21, 23-24.
109. See UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
UNIVERSITY TEACHING METHODS (THE PULLS REPORT) 170 (1964), quoted in
PUJOL BALCELLS & FONS MARTIN, supra note 107, at 21.
110. On this, see ABEL M. FLEITAS ORTIZ DE ROSAS, DERECHO DE
FAMILIA–MÉTODO DE ENSEÑANZA. CASOS Y OTRAS VARIANTES 25-79 (1996)
(1994), where the author gives many ideas on the point.
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It could be convenient to provide at this point of our survey a
short explanation of the case method used for twenty years in the
Civil Law tradition at Austral Law School. The employment of
this methodology largely resembles the use in American law
schools; Austral tried to follow and adapt to Civil Law needs. The
use of case method in this Argentinean law school is therefore
much closer to the current American legal education approach than
to the way this methodology was used in the Civil Law in ancient,
medieval, and colonial times. Nevertheless, the utilization of case
method in Austral adds to the United States common experience a
strong combination with the teaching of general framework of
legal concepts that is required for a logic and structured legal
system like the Civil Law. The results of using this methodology
to expand the benefits of an ordered system like the Civil Law for
the training of a critical legal mind are extraordinary. However,
naturally, the use of case method in the environment of Civil Law
demands a special and continuous effort, and Austral Law School
needs to focus again and again its commitment with this
methodology. The reasons probably are the constraints to know
the complete logic system, characteristic of Civil Law, and the
formation and customs of the professors of this legal tradition,
conspires against the use of this pedagogical tool.
The case method in Austral is used both in the basic law
degree and at the LL.M. level. In the J.D. courses the professors
devote one third of their time in classroom to discuss cases with
the students, and in the LL.M. programs the proportion is two
thirds of the classroom hours. The remaining time is for the
explanations and explorations of principles and theory, aimed to
structure the knowledge, trying to achieve that not in a one way
style, but in a participatory and Socratic approach. In the LL.M.
one-third to a half of the time devoted to case debate is carried out
in groups of discussion of five to eight students, using special
small seminar rooms dedicated only to this purpose. The
professors visit the teams, spending five to ten minutes with each
group of discussion. In the J.D. program, the group discussions are
not mandatory, but some professors do that for specific case
debate in the classroom, or sometimes, out of classroom time
giving assignments to a group to deal with a specially complex
case analysis in written form.
The J.D. and LL.M. students at Austral are required to use
theoretical materials and casebooks—hornbooks, manuals and
articles, on the one hand, and published casebooks when available
or more commonly a set of cases tailor made by the professors, on
the other hand. Because of the Civil Law tradition and needs, the
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systematic knowledge and theoretical approach is strongly further
underlined there than it is in American law schools. Therefore, the
relation between cases and materials are opposite to American
legal education: the quantity of cases never surpasses the
theoretical materials and rarely is 50% of the total elements to
study. It is more common that 60 to 80% of the pages to study and
analyze are of theoretical and scientific nature, and 20 to 40% of
the total amount consist solely of cases—judgments or
hypothetical.
The cases are mainly judicial decisions—mostly of the
Supreme Court and upper courts, but also from lower courts. Like
in American law schools, depending on the professor the
discussion could be about a unique case for an entire class hour—
more common—, or about a line of decisions—e.g. two to five
judgments. Currently most of the large cases—20 to 100 or more
pages—are given to the students edited with brackets, focusing on
the important excerpts, but is not uncommon to discuss a very long
decision. In the last decade the use of hypothetical or “situational”
cases increased in classroom discussion and examinations, for the
benefits of students: learning law facing a problem without the
rigid structure of a closed case, with the main problems mostly
answered by majorities and dissents in upper court decisions. This
way, with the situational cases, Austral follows the approach from
the front to cases suggested by Llewellyn.111 The midterm and
final examinations consists of analysis of cases—judgments and
hypothetical—, combined with theoretical questions and problems
in the J.D. program, and exclusively at the LL.M. level.
Other remarkable institutions promoting the case method in
law are the Escolas de Direito da Fundação Getulio Vargas,
located in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The São Paulo branch is
developing an extraordinary “Casoteca Latino-Americana de
Direito e Política Pública” that may be consulted on the
Internet,112 resembling the Harvard Business School cases clearing
house. This Escola also published two interesting books about the
case method and other participatory methodologies in the teaching
of the law.113
However, a number of issues have to be dealt with. In
Argentina, for example, there was much discussion about the
111. Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 211, 212-213 (1948-1949).
112. See http://www.gvdireito.com.br/casoteca (last visited July 10, 2010).
113. See MÉTODOS DE ENSINO EM DIREITO: CONCEITOS PARA UM DEBATE
(José Garcez Ghirardi org., 2009); and ENSINO JURÍDICO PARTICIPATIVO:
CONSTRUÇÃO DE PROGRAMAS, EXPERIÊNCIAS DIDÁTICAS (José Garcez Ghirardi
& Rafael Domingos Faiardo Vanzella orgs., 2008).
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practical approach to legal education and the refusal of the lecture
method. Nevertheless, with some exceptions, the case method did
not spread in all the classrooms. Most professors who try to apply
the case method think that it consists mostly in narrating cases to
students, not sharp discussions about them.
The situation will hopefully improve. Between 2002 and
2006, an Argentinean National Commission of Private Law
Schools prepared a project of guidelines for the national
accreditation of law schools. In this guidelines project, the case
method is required for all legal education. In the near future, this
requirement may be made mandatory by administrative decision.
However, despite the multiple shadows that the case method
situation has in Europe and in Latin America, I firmly believe that
in 30 years the main question will be not about which law school
is using the case method, but which law school has the best
performance in using the case method, because all of them will
need it, similar to how the current discussion is not who uses the
lecture method, but which law school has the best lecturers.
VI. BENEFITS OF MERGING THE LEGAL EDUCATION APPROACH OF
CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW TRADITIONS
A. A Possible Combination of Legal Education Styles and the
Utility of the Case Method in a Comprehensive Civil Law
Education
In the Cambridge Symposium on the Teaching of Law, in
1952, the celebrated professor Henry Batiffol summarized the
meeting advocating for a combination of lecture method—
commonly used in Civil Law schools—and case method—mostly
used in Common Law schools. He invited law schools in
Common Law countries to explain more the law in class and Civil
Law professors to introduce the case method in their teaching.114
Evidently, influences and permeability between legal systems
should be strongly encouraged. Legal education is an area where
cross-influences between Common Law and Civil Law are not
only possible, but may also be extraordinarily beneficial.
The utility of the case method in a comprehensive Civil Law
legal education is extraordinary, because it can be really good to
carry out very diverse exercises and legal training, all of great
utility. For this goal could be important looking for the roots of
this methodology in its origins, experience and progress of Civil
114. See the transcripts of the Conclusions, in EISENMANN, supra note 16,
at 123.
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Law tradition, and borrowing its current uses and developments in
Common Law schools. That way, cases can be used in Civil Law
schools to let the students:
- employ rules and principles to different facts,
- analyze cases interpreting pertinent rules and looking
for different alternatives,
- identify and qualify facts and evidences,
- commit to the search and analysis of alternatives in a
situation,
- to select facts and principles,
- to analyze principles and rules and their application,
- to prevent consequences,
- to imagine solutions,
- to decide,
- to argue,
- to look for alternatives,
- to ask, listen to others,
- to change one’s or others’ mind when necessary,
- and, in conclusion, to integrate a deep knowledge and
understanding of the law, including its practical
aspects.
The case method can achieve these aims, giving life, sense of
reality and fortitude to the legal system. For the reasons given
above and some others that I may not develop in the context of this
paper, the combination of legal logic and prudential approach to
cases of a comprehensive legal education in Civil Law may favor
something in some ways better than Common Law education. The
reason is its unique contribution to the formation of a critical legal
mind, because this legal tradition can unify logic and a systematic
comprehension with a problem-solving oriented capability.
B. A Being that Tells Stories, and the Education as an Activity of
Central Human Interest
That way—without forgetting the readings of treatises and
handbooks, the study of codes, and good lectures—with the case
method it is possible to bring reality to the classroom, and to take
full advantage of the advise of Aristotle who wrote: “the things
we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them,
e.g. men become builders by building and lyre players by playing
the lyre.”115 That is the nature of man and the nature of law. We
are beings that tell stories, beings that hear stories . . . We become
115. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, II, chap. 1, 1103a 32-33.
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involved in the stories. And our best achievements arise when a
sharp mind joins a heart full of illusions and magic.
Proceeding in that mode, it is possible to feel the rewards of a
transforming education.116 Without a doubt, this method involves
more technicalities in legal education: it involves the direct and
ineffable experience of teaching and learning that transforms
people and helps persons to grow. It is a tool that truly empowers
people.117 It is something like a magical process, interlacing a
common achievement, a common space.118 Considered and
experienced in that way, education reveals itself as an activity of
central human interest.119
Most case method professors know that this methodology
produces a stimulating atmosphere that involves and educates the
students, and that stimulates and educates the professor too.120 As
Professor Christensen of the Harvard Business School said, this
method and atmosphere produces classes that are moments full of
enjoyment, a true “celebration of education.”
C. Achieve a Mixture of Legal Traditions as an Invaluable Service
to the Cause of the Law
In that line, to finish this work and before the conclusions, let
us read what Professor Cueto Rúa wrote more than 50 years ago,
in the last part of his section on the case method, in his excellent
book on the Common Law:
The education system of Civil or Roman tradition . . . may
contribute to the law universe with important pedagogical
elements to the solving of limitations and inconveniences
that the “case method” may present, especially regarding
the transmission of knowledge, the teaching of statute law,
and the building of a General Theory that integrate the
116. See Richard F. Elmore, Foreword, in EDUCATION FOR JUDGMENT (C.
Roland Christensen, David A. Garvin & Ann Sweet eds.), supra note 6, at ix-xix,
ix, xi-xii, xvi.
117. See Colleen Burke, Tulips, Tinfoil, and Teaching: Journal of a
Freshman Teacher, in EDUCATION FOR JUDGMENT (C. Roland Christensen et al.
eds.), supra note 6, at 37-67, 43, 58, 64-66; and Christensen, Premises and
Practices of Discussion Teaching, in id. at 15-31.
118. See FLEITAS ORTIZ DE ROSAS, supra note 110, at 1; and Michael A.
Berger, In Defense of the Case Method: A Reply to Argyris, 8 ACAD.
MANAGEMENT REV. 329, 332 (1983-2).
119. See David A. Garvin, Preface, in EDUCATION FOR JUDGMENT (C.
Roland Christensen et al. eds.), supra note 6, at xxii.
120. On the importance of a community of learning that supports a rigorous
intellectual analysis, see Christensen, Premises, in id. at 19-20.
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dispersion of cases. On the other hand, the [Anglo-Saxon]
case method may contribute in a valuable way to prevent
the lecture classes of the aridity that characterizes them,
giving to students a more convenient and accurate notion of
the legal reality, of the necessary skills to solve individual
problems, and of the instrumental, vital and human aspect
of the law.121
After that, this great master of the law concluded:
A good synthesis could produce highly rewarding results.
Such synthesis is worth a try, when considering the crisis in
legal education, which is acknowledged in the U.S., and
latent, even when not less real, in Argentina. He or she
who achieves such synthesis will have delivered a valuable
service to the cause of the law.122
The best of Europe and the best of America can be
recombined: the legal system, on the one hand, and a critical and
dynamic legal education, on the other hand. My hope with this
article is to contribute a new step in this direction.
VII. EIGHT CONCLUSIONS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CASE
METHOD AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION
This long journey can lead to eight conclusive elements,
which support the announcement and encouragement of a revival
of the case method in Civil Law education.
In the first place, this study shows that the case method is
suitable for serious scientific or scholarly work. The method of
case analysis is adapted to a multitude of arts and sciences, having
proved its merits in medicine, law, ethics, and business, and being
able to provide important services in many other academic
disciplines.
Secondly, we could see that case method is not a teaching
technique without lineage, just created in the laboratory of
pedagogues of the avant garde, a need to pass the sieve of the time
to demonstrate its relevancy and utility, but is rather connected and
nourished in an ancient educational tradition.
Thirdly, it can be pointed out that the case method has not
arisen ex nihilo from modern business schools.

121. See CUETO RÚA supra, note 3, at 329.
122. Id.

2010]

REVIVAL OF THE CASE METHOD IN CIVIL LAW

65

Fourthly, the case method did not develop from the teaching
of the Common Law, but has its roots in legal and ethical sciences
going back to the Antique Age and the Middle Ages.
Fifthly, I can affirm that the case method was somehow
applied in Roman Law, in the ius commune and in the ius
canonicum, and was applied too in the colonial law schools of
Hispanic America.
As a sixth conclusion, I can point out that the case method is
used, as a matter of fact, and with full success, in some law
schools in Europe and Latin America, and there is hope that the
Declaration of Bologna and a developing competition among the
best law schools is going to strongly encourage, in the near future,
this methodology across European legal education.
As a seventh conclusion, the case method is strongly related to
the dialectics, to the participatory methods rooted in the Socratic
style, to the diverse applications of casuistry and to the dispute of
texts or issues, all of them so characteristic of the first medieval
universities, and, outside universities, with apprenticeship as a
professional training system. For that reason, it can be affirmed
that the case method is related with some of the western culture
most characteristic pedagogic elements—culture that is the
adjunction of the Judeo-Christian vision, the Greek philosophy,
and the Roman Law—all of which it is deeply impregnated.
Lastly, it is possible to conclude in the eighth place that the
case method did not arise in the world of the Common Law,
featuring case law as an essential element, but was applied in some
ways in Roman Law, in the medieval teaching of the ius commune
and ius canonicum, in the colonial law schools, and is applied with
energy today in some houses of legal education of Europe and
Latin America. This indicates that it is not accurate to claim that
this methodology is inherent and definitively bound to systems
having judicial decisions as a primary legal source, namely the
Common Law tradition. On the contrary, it can be a fertile method
in other legal system such as the Civil Law tradition, helping to
reconnect with its genesis and its essence, reencountering the
original taste and flavor of the law.
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I dedicate this paper to the memory of Saúl Litvinoff, who
passed away in January 2010 at the biblical age of 84. He was in
the audience when I presented this paper to the Law Faculty at
LSU in February 2009. He took a very active interest in the
subject and posed difficult and critical questions that were only too
justified.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Leibniz and a Country at the Crossroads
In many respects Louisiana is a country at the crossroads. Here,
the outgoing trade from the Mississippi Valley meets with the
incoming trade from South America. Here, French and Spanish
culture and lifestyle have met and still meet with what is regarded
as the typical American way of life. In particular, Louisiana’s
legal system combines elements of civil and common law. Not
surprisingly, Louisiana as a mixed jurisdiction1 has been termed a
1. Generally on mixed jurisdictions see MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE:
THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY (Vernon Palmer ed., Cambridge University Press
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system “between the worlds”2 or even “the best of both worlds.”3
Indeed, law-wise the citizens of Louisiana may live in what
Leibniz,4 the great philosopher, lawyer and all-round scientist at
the beginning of the Age of Enlightenment, thought we all live in:
“the best of all possible worlds.”5 This is not the perfect world
without any shortcomings but the best one can expect–with the
least weaknesses.
B. A Global Sales Convention
On the global level and for the field of international sales
transactions, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods of 1980 (CISG) may come close to the
Louisiana model. In nuce and confined to sales law, the
Convention is–similar to the legal system of a mixed jurisdiction6–
equally an example of a combination and merger of influences
from the major legal systems.7 The CISG, its roots in different

2001); id. (ed.), First Worldwide Congress on Mixed Jurisdiction: Salience and
Unity in the Mixed Jurisdiction Experience: Traits, Patterns, Culture,
Commonalities: Salience and Unity in the Mixed Jurisdictions: The Papers of
the World Congress , 78 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (2003); MIXED JURISDICTIONS
COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND SCOTLAND (Vernon Palmer ed.,
Edinburgh University Press 2009); Jacques Du Plessis, Comparative Law and
the Study of Mixed Legal Systems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 477 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds.,
Oxford University Press 2006); MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE: PROPERTY AND OBLIGATIONS IN SCOTLAND AND SOUTH AFRICA
(Reinhard Zimmermann et al. eds. 2004).
2. Joachim Zekoll, Zwischen den Welten–Das Privatrecht von Louisiana
als europäisch-amerikanische Mischrechtsordnung, in AMERIKANISCHE
RECHTSKULTUR UND EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT 11 et seq. (Reinhard
Zimmermann ed. 1995).
3. Joachim Zekoll, The Louisiana Private-Law System: the Best of Both
Worlds, 10 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1 et seq. (1995).
4. Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibniz (1646 – 1716).
5. He explained this idea in his work Essai de théodicée (1710).
6. See supra note 1.
7. See also Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the
U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 23
INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 443, 452 (1989); for a comprehensive comparison
between the CISG and the sales law of Louisiana see Alain Levasseur, The
Louisiana Experience, in THE 1980 UNIFORM SALES LAW: OLD ISSUES
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legal traditions and the manner in which the Convention has
treated the various influences, is the subject of this paper.
C. Questions: Cross-influences, Contamination, Permeability–
Synthesis?
Which is the aim of the present paper? It will first trace the
divergent sources from which the Convention has borrowed and
then pursue the way in which these sources were used and merged.
As will be seen the questions of cross-influences, permeability or
even contamination (whatever that may mean in regard of law and
legal institutions) arise also within the scope of the CISG though in
a form somewhat different from the exchanges that comparatists
are used to observe between legal systems. And it shall be asked
whether the CISG can be regarded as a synthesis that bridges gaps
between the civil and the common law.
II. THE CISG AND ITS COMPARATIVE BACKGROUND
A. Aims of the CISG
The essential aims of the CISG are addressed in the Preamble
to the Convention. First, the unification of substantive sales law
shall remove legal barriers for international trade in order to
facilitate trade between merchants from different countries and to
promote international trade. Secondly, intensified international
trade “on the basis of equality and mutual benefit” is seen as an
“important element in promoting friendly relations among States.”8
The unification of substantive trade law is hoped to serve as a
means to keep peace among nations. Certainly the first of these
aims has been achieved while success of the second aim remains in
doubt.

REVISITED IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT EXPERIENCES 73 et seq. (Franco Ferrari ed.
2003).
8. See the text of the Preamble.

2010]

CISG—BEST OF ALL WORLDS?

71

B. The CISG’s Importance
The CISG has acquired undeniable importance in a number of
respects. Indeed, the Convention has become the most important
legal basis of today’s globalised trade. The CISG has been
accepted by many states, and what counts more in this respect, by
many economically important states. Thus far, 76 States from all
continents have ratified it, among them almost all major trading
nations. The CISG now governs most of the world’s trade (unless
the parties have excluded the application of the CISG).9 It is
estimated that at least three-quarters of global trade automatically
falls within the scope of the CISG.10 Also in practice, the CISG has
made its way: It is often applied and dealt with by international
case law–both by state courts and arbitration tribunals. By now,
there are several thousand decisions published in English11 from all
over the world resolving most if not all interpretation problems of
the Convention.12 Furthermore, the CISG has strongly influenced
legislation in many states. The Convention has become the most
influential source for legislation in the field of private law–both on
the national and international level. Particularly those states that
reformed their legal systems after the political change in the
beginning of the 1990s used the CISG as a model either for their
sales law or the general law of obligations.13 Most amazingly, even
the European Directive on Consumer Sales of 1999,14 which aims
at consumer protection, owes a lot to the CISG. Despite the
9. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods [CISG] article 6 allows the free exclusion of the Convention but requires
that this must be done clearly.
10. See Ingeborg Schwenzer, Einleitung, in KOMMENTAR ZUM
EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT–CISG 25 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg
Schwenzer eds., 5th ed. 2008).
11. At least in form of English abstracts; see in particular the databank
CLOUT (Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts), http://www.uncitral.org; and the
databank of Pace University, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu (last visited July 10,
2010).
12. Id. The 2010 CISG databank of Pace University counts more than
2,500 published decisions and estimates that double that figure exists.
13. See the reports in THE CISG AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEMS (Franco Ferrari ed. 2008).
14. Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on
certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees of 25
May 1999, O.J. no. L 171 of 7 July 1999, at 12 et seq.
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CISG’s devotion to international commercial sales and transactions
between merchants the drafters of the Directive saw fit to
incorporate verbal passages from central provisions of the
Convention as well as central structural elements.15 In addition,
the CISG was the model for international sets of principles like the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,16
the Principles of European Contract Law17 or the so-called Draft
Common Frame of Reference.18
For the science of sales law and generally the law of
obligations, the CISG is a constant fountain of inspiration. It
further contributes enormously to an international discussion and a
basic uniform understanding of contract problems, thereby forming
an international community of science and scientists.19
The Convention is the tree from which ever new branches
grow. Its importance for the practice of international transactions
as well as a cornerstone for national and international legislation–
both on sales law and the general law of obligations–can hardly be
overestimated.
C. Comparison of Legal Systems as Basis of the CISG
The Convention was not created out of the blue. It is the fruit
of intensive comparative work and long preparation. That leads
back to the origin of the CISG which is coupled with the rise of
comparative law as a discipline. The CISG’s beginnings date back
15. In particular the definition of non-conformity of the goods and the
essential structure of remedies (except the remedy of damages) was taken from
the CISG.
16. UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
2004 (UNIDROIT ed. 2004).
17. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW I & II (Ole Lando & Hugh
Beale eds. 2000); PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW III (Ole Lando et
al. eds. 2003).
18. PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE, Outline Edition (Christian von
Bar et al. eds. 2009).
19. A clear sign for this was the scientific conferences around the globe on
the occasion of the CISG’s 25th anniversary in 2005, which was celebrated for
instance in Paris, Pittsburgh, Singapore, Vienna and Würzburg. See Ulrich
Magnus, 25 Jahre UN-Kaufrecht, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES
PRIVATRECHT 96 (2006).
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to the late 1920s, when the unification of substantive sales law was
put on the agenda of the then just established international research
institute, UNIDROIT, in Rome.20 For this purpose, a small group
of most distinguished European comparatists was installed.21 The
“mastermind”22 behind the project was Ernst Rabel,23 one of the
most influential founders of modern comparative law.24 He
exemplified his functional approach of comparison and the search
for the best solution on the sales unification project in a way that
set standards still applicable today. The first draft of a uniform
sales law in 1935-36 benefited immensely from the thorough and
intense comparison of almost all legal systems of the time which
Rabel and his collaborators in Berlin had prepared and which was
published as “Das Recht des Warenkaufs” (“The Law of the Sale
of Goods”).25 The draft of 1935-36 already contained the basic
structure of the later Convention. Many of the early provisions
have survived and form part of the present CISG despite the fact
that a “first try” of sales unification in form of the Hague Uniform
Sales Law of 196426 proved a failure because only few states
accepted it.27
20. UNIDROIT (Institut international pour l’unification du droit privé)
[International Institute for the Unification of Private Law]) was established in
1926 as an institution of the League of Nations, the predecessor of the United
Nations. UNIDROIT accepted the sales unification project proposed by Ernst
Rabel in 1929.
21. The UNIDROIT Sales Committee consisted of the two English law
professors H.C. Gutteridge and Cecil J.B. Hurst, who represented the common
law in the Working Group; the two French professors Henry Capitant and
Joseph Hamel, representing the Romanic civil law jurisdictions; the two Swedes
Algot Bagge and Martin Fehr for the Nordic legal systems; and for the
Germanic civil law jurisdictions, the Germans Rabel as General Reporter and
Hans Ficker as secretary; see Ernst Rabel, Der Entwurf eines einheitlichen
Kaufgesetzes, RABELSZ 9, at 1 et seq. (1935).
22. Bernhard Grossfeld & Peter Winship, The Law Professor Refugee, 18
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 3, 11 (1992).
23. 1874–1955.
24. See Ulrich Drobnig, Die Geburt der modernen Rechtsvergleichung. Zum
50. Todestag von Ernst Rabel, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT
821 et seq. (2005).
25. Vol. I (1936, Nachdruck 1957), Vol. II (1958).
26. Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) and Uniform
Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF).
27. The two Hague Conventions had been ratified by only nine–mostly
Western European–states. After entering into force in 1972-1974, the Hague
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III. THE CISG’S BASIC STRUCTURE: COMMON LAW HERITAGE
The CISG can be, and often is, regarded as a compromise
between different legal systems.28 Indeed, in many CISG
provisions one can still identify certain traces of specific national
legal structures, rules or provisions. Nonetheless, it would be
wrong to classify the Convention as a mere compromise, let alone
one on the lowest common level. It was Rabel’s aim and vision to
find by comparison the best solution for each sales problem and
from these solutions form a body of its own.29 To a large extent
the CISG conforms to that ideal. Even though–unavoidably–most
of its provisions have a clear national origin, their inclusion in the
Convention and the commandment to interpret the CISG in an
autonomous way30 have freed the Convention from its national
backgrounds since long. When the following text traces the most
visible of these national influences it is not the aim to
‘renationalise’ parts of the CISG. On the contrary, the objective is
to show how legal institutes of specific national character were
merged and often modified to fit the purposes of international sales
transactions.
In addition, it has to be borne in mind that the solutions
achieved under the CISG correspond to a very high percentage to
those which national law would also reach.
A. The CISG’s Skeleton: English Common Law
It was already Rabel’s conviction that for practical purposes
the English common law structure of sales law was best suited for
the international unification of this part of the law.31 The CISG
Sales Law gained practical importance only in Belgium, Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands.
28. See CESARE MASSIMO BIANCA & JOACHIM MICHAEL BONELL,
COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES
CONVENTION, Introduction ¶ 2.2.1 (Giuffrè 1987).
29. See Rabel, supra note 21, at 6: “…(dass) die Eigentümlichkeiten, die in
den Landesrechten noch aus verschiedenen überholten Epochen verblieben sind,
ohne irgendwelchen Schaden und mit außerordentlichem Vorteil in einer
höheren Einheit aufgelöst werden können…”
30. See CISG Art. 7.
31. See Rabel’s comments on the first draft of a uniform sales law: Rabel,
supra note 21, at 45 et seq..; see also the many single solutions of sales problems
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follows in essence that structure. Only a few ingredients from
other legal systems have been added. In sum and simplified, the
structure is as follows: Each party is strictly liable for any breach
of the contractual promise it gave (so called unitary approach
because there is only one category of breach of contract; by
contrast the civilian jurisdictions distinguish between general
breach and special breach of warranty).32 Liability means that the
liable party must at least pay damages. The remedy of termination
of contract is available only if the breach is severe and
fundamental. An exemption from liability is confined to causes
outside the control of the party in breach. These main structural
elements shall be explained in more detail.
B. Liability for Breach of Contractual Promise
It has been the standpoint of the common law that a party is
liable for keeping its contractual promise in principle irrespective
of any fault, whereas the civilian tradition held the party liable for
a breach of contract only if the party was at fault. In the field of
sales law the common law followed its general approach of strict
liability but implied as warranties or conditions certain tacit
promises as to title, quality, fitness and conformity of the goods
sold.33 On the other hand, civil law, in the Roman tradition,34
applied a rather high fault threshold: Were the goods defective
or non-conforming, only fraud or breach of a special
guarantee sufficed for a damages claim.35 However, like in Roman
where Rabel states that the common law solution is the most practicable and
should be preferred; see as examples for many more Rabel, Das Recht des
Warenkaufs I 326, 329, 378, 452, 524 (1936, Nachdruck 1957).
32. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 488 et seq. (Tony Weir trans., 3rd ed. 1998,) ; Peter Huber,
Comparative Sales Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW,
supra note 1, at 956.
33. See English Sale of Goods Act 1979, sec. 12 et seq.
34. See REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 327 et seq. (Oxford University Press
1996).
35. Compare CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1645 (Fr.) (Seller’s knowledge of the
defects is required for the buyer’s claim for damages; the professional seller is,
however, irrebuttably presumed to know defects of the goods sold.); § 463
former German Civil Code (BGB, valid until 2002). The European Consumer
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law,36 the buyer of non-conforming goods could always reduce the
price or terminate the contract even if the seller was not at fault.
The CISG follows the unitary approach. It has merged the
different concepts to a certain extent. Its basis is the common law
approach; each breach of contract makes one liable irrespective of
fault.37 Only in extraordinary circumstances can exemption from
liability be claimed.38 The CISG further grants termination of
contract under rather restrictive conditions.39 But in contrast to the
common law, it maintains the civil law remedy of price
reduction,40 which is more or less unknown in common law.
C. Main Remedy: Damages
Common law regards damages as the usual and most practical
remedy for all kinds of breach of contract,41 while specific
performance is an exceptional remedy that steps in where damages
are insufficient to fully compensate the loss flowing from the
breach.42 On the contrary, civil law countries generally grant in
the first line a claim for specific performance and, as mentioned,
price reduction or termination of contract. As seen, the traditional
sales law of civil law countries awards damages very reluctantly.43
Here, the old adage caveat emptor had and partly still has some
truth in it.44
Sales Directive led to a change and adaptation of the German law of obligations
and of sales to the CISG and thus basically to the common law (except for the
remedy of damages).
36. Under Roman law the actio quanti minoris or actio estimatoria and the
actio redhibitoria were available; see MAX KASER & ROLF KNÜTEL, RÖMISCHES
PRIVATRECHT 234 et seq. (19th ed. 2008).
37. See CISG Art. 45(1)(b) and 61(1)(b).
38. CISG Art. 79.
39. CISG Art. 49 and 64.
40. CISG Art. 50.
41. See JOSEPH CHITTY, CHITTY ON CONTRACTS, 2 vols. (Hugh Beale ed.,
30th ed. 2008) at ¶ 26-001.
42. See English Sale of Goods Act 1979, sec. 52. For a comparative survey
on specific performance see ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 32, at 470–85.
43. See C. CIV. art. 1645 (Fr.); old BGB § 463 (since 2002 in Germany the
hurdle for contractual damages in sales cases has been reduced to simple fault,
which is presumed).
44. However, the presumption of the professional seller’s knowledge of
defects and the seller’s consequential liability in damages in French law has
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The CISG combines the two remedies: a party can claim
specific performance45 and damages (if there remains any
compensable loss after specific performance) or may freely choose
between the two remedies.46 However, as a bow to common law
the Convention allows courts, in particular those of common law
countries, to deny specific performance if they would decide to do
so in comparable cases under their domestic law.47 Fortunately,
this specific common law reservation does not play any significant
role in practice.48
D. Termination Only in Case of Fundamental Breach
In principle, common law allows a party, but not easily, to
terminate a contract. Under the English Sale of Goods Act 1979
with its later amendments, termination is available if the breach of
contract is a breach of a condition on whose strict fulfilment the
existence of the contract shall depend, or else is serious enough to
allow termination.49 Traditional civil law, on the basis of Roman
law, had been more generous with termination (in French, action
redhibitoire; in German, Wandlung) in sales cases. Were the
delivered goods defective, the buyer could always terminate the
contract.50
The CISG follows in essence the common law approach. To
allow termination the breach of contract must be fundamental.51
More or less that means that, from an objective point of view, the
provided considerable protection to buyers since long. By contrast, under
German law the buyer had to beware until 2002, because damages were only
due in case of seller’s fraud or breach of guarantee.
45. CISG Art. 46 and 62.
46. CISG Art. 45(1)(b) and 61(1)(b).
47. CISG Art. 28.
48. THE UNCITRAL DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (UNCITRAL ed, 2008,
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law/digests/cisg.html (last
visited July 10, 2010). Eighty-seven reports, only one U.S. decision dealing with
CISG Art. 28.
49. See in detail J.P BENJAMIN, BENJAMIN’S SALE OF GOODS ¶ 12-017 (7th
ed. 2006); MICHAEL BRIDGE, THE SALE OF GOODS 146 et seq. (Oxford
University Press 2nd ed. 1997) .
50. See C. CIV. art. 1644 (Fr.). German law entitles the buyer to termination
only after a fruitless ‘Nachfrist’ (BGB § 440).
51. CISG Art. 49 and 64.
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innocent party must have lost its interest in the contract and that
the other party could foresee such a result.52 Termination is
therefore a remedy of last resort (ultima ratio) that is not easily
available under the CISG.53
It is noteworthy that the European Directive on Consumer
Sales adopted the CISG approach and also reserved termination as
a remedy of last resort.54 All E.U. member states implemented this
in their law on consumer sales.55 Germany accepted this solution
to a certain extent even as its general law of obligations.56
E. Exemption from Contractual Liability
The far-reaching guarantee principle of contract law that is
characteristic of the common law requires nonetheless exceptions.
Under the rules on frustration a party is relieved from its own
obligations if performance became impossible due to
circumstances for which this party neither bore the risk nor was at
fault.57 The civil law countries know of similar reasons for
exemption.58 However, here the exemption provision plays a less
important role because these countries follow the fault principle,
although with many exceptions.59
The CISG, having adopted the common law position of
generally strict liability, also had to adopt an exemption provision:
A party is freed from its own obligation if the failure of
performance “was due to an impediment beyond his control” that
could be neither foreseen nor avoided.60 “Impediment beyond
52. See the definition in CISG Art. 25.
53. German Bundesgerichtshof 3 April 1996, CLOUT no. 171; Austrian
Oberster Gerichtshof 7 September 2000, CLOUT no. 428.
54. See Consumer Sales Directive Art. 3(5) and (6).
55. See the survey over all E.U. member states in Ulrich Magnus,
Verbrauchsgüterkaufrichtlinie, in IV DAS RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION,
(Eberhard Grabitz & Meinhard Hilf eds. 2007) A 15, Anhang at 1 et seq.
56. See BGB § 323(5). This provision excludes termination where the
breach is “unerheblich” (minor).
57. See in regard of sales contracts BRIDGE, supra note 49, at 131 et seq.
58. See C. CIV. art. 1148 (Fr.) (exemption for force majeure and act of a
third person); § 275 BGB (exemption for impossibility).
59. For a comparative survey see ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ,supra note 32 at 486–
515.
60. CISG Art. 79.
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control” includes force majeure in the sense of unavoidable natural
events but also acts of third persons and, according to the
prevailing view, even extreme economic hardship.61
IV. SPECIFIC U.S. TRAITS
A. The American Influence on the CISG
In the early stages of the unification process of sales law,
which already laid the grounds for the present structure of the
CISG and for its main policy decisions,62 the United States played
no major role.63 Nor did U.S. law have a significant impact on the
preparatory comparison of legal systems;64 the common law was
represented by English law and in the UNIDROIT working group
by English lawyers.65 However, in the further stages there was a
considerable U.S.-American influence on the preparation of the
CISG, in which the U.S. professors John Honnold and Allan
Farnsworth were particularly involved. Honnold had already
attended the conference in 1964 on the Hague Uniform Sales Law.
He then became the Secretary of UNCITRAL during the phase
(1969 – 1974) when the first CISG draft (on the basis of the Hague
Sales Law) was elaborated.66 He further led the U.S. delegation, of
which Farnsworth was also a member, at the Vienna Conference
that concluded the Convention in 1980. The Conference materials

61. JOHN O. HONNOLD & HARRY M. FLECHTNER, UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ¶
432.2, 627–28 (4th ed. 2009); see Schwenzer, Article 79, in KOMMENTAR ZUM
EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT–CISG, supra note 10, ¶ 30; Ulrich Magnus,
Article 79, in JULIUS VON STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH MIT EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN ¶¶ 22, 24 (2005).
62. See the first Draft of a Uniform Sales Law published in RabelsZ 9, 8
(1935).
63. However, Rabel reports that at one or few meetings of the UNIDROIT
Sales Committee Llewellyn was present. Rabel, supra note 21, at 4.
64. See RABEL, supra note 31, at 24 (paying throughout attention to the US
sales law but characterizing it as a close follower of English common law). By
the time Rabel’s (and his collaborators’) report was finished, the Uniform
Commercial Code of 1955 had not yet been prepared. The US Uniform Sales
Act of 1896 was mainly a copy of the English Sale of Goods Act of 1893.
65. See supra note 21.
66. See also HONNOLD & FLECHTNER, supra note 61, at VII.
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prove that the interventions of both had a considerable impact on
the decisions taken by the Conference.67
B. Seller’s Right to Cure
The most visible sign of the U.S.-American influence on the
CISG is the Convention’s right to cure:68 The seller is entitled to
put a defective tender right even after the date for performance has
lapsed if the cure is possible without delay and unreasonable
inconvenience for the buyer.69 This provision corresponds to some
extent to UCC § 2-508, whereas a formal statutory right to cure is
generally unknown to civil law countries70 and even to English
common law.71 This does not mean that these legal systems would
never take into account a seller’s offer to cure a defect. Under
estoppel or good faith considerations the buyer may even be

67. See JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW
FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES (1989) (also containing the minutes of the meetings
at the Vienna Conference).
68. See UTA GUTKNECHT, DAS NACHERFÜLLUNGSRECHT DES VERKÄUFERS
BEI KAUF- UND WERKLIEFERUNGSVERTRÄGEN. RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE
UNTERSUCHUNG ZUM CISG, ZUM US-AMERIKANISCHEN UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, ZUM DEUTSCHEN RECHT UND ZU DEM VORSCHLAG DER KOMMISSION ZUR
ÜBERARBEITUNG DES DEUTSCHEN SCHULDRECHTS (1997).
69. See CISG art. 48. The CISG predecessor, the Hague Uniform Sales
Law, contained already a similar provision which was inspired by the UCC. See
ULIS art. 44 (1964), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/culis.htm (last visited July 10, 2010).
70. See LANDO & BEALE, supra note 17, at 369 (containing a survey).
However, the Consumer Sales Directive mandates that all EU Member states
introduce a rule for consumer sales that the consumer must almost always grant
the professional seller who has delivered defective goods an additional period of
time (“Nachfrist”) to remedy performance. Although this is no right of the seller
but an obligation of the buyer it comes close to a right of cure. By its reform of
the law of obligations in 2002, Germany generalized this rule for all contracts
(BGB §§ 281(1), 323(1)). A civil law jurisdiction that had recognized by statute
a—rather limited—right to cure is Switzerland (see Schweizerisches
Obligationenrecht [OR] art. 206(2) (only in case of generic goods which had not
to be transported from another place)).
71. The English Sale of Goods Act 1979 does not contain a provision that
corresponds with UCC § 2-508. The work of Bridge (supra note 49) does not
even mention “cure.”

2010]

CISG—BEST OF ALL WORLDS?

81

obliged to accept such offer.72 However, that depends on the very
circumstances of the individual case and does not give the seller a
principal right to cure. Like the UCC, the CISG has introduced a
general right of the seller to cure. The details vary, however. The
CISG explicitly reserves the buyer’s prevailing right to avoidance73
while the UCC requires that the buyer has rejected the goods.74
Although the CISG regulation leaves some doubt as to the relation
between seller’s right to cure and buyer’s concurrent right to
avoidance, in practice the conflict between the two contradicting
rights does not matter very much.
Where the improper
performance is easily curable the breach will rarely amount to a
fundamental breach that allows avoidance.75
The CISG has used a statutory invention of U.S. law, however
in a modified form. Via the CISG the right to cure made its way
into the UNIDROIT Principles,76 the Principles of European
Contract Law77 and the DCFR.78
V. SPECIFIC FRENCH TRAITS
A. The French Influence on the CISG
Since the beginning of the efforts to internationally unify sales
law, French law was one of the legal systems whose solutions were
particularly taken into account. Equally, French lawyers were
always involved in the long legislative history of the present
Convention.79

72. See LANDO & BEALE, supra note 17, at 369 (containing a comparative
account).
73. See CISG art. 48(1).
74. UCC § 2-508(2).
75. See inMarkus Müller-Chen, Article 48, in KOMMENTAR ZUM
EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT–CISG, supra note 10, at ¶ 18.
76. See UNIDROIT Principles art. 7.1.4.
77. Principles of European Contract Law art. 8:104.
78. DCFR Art. III.-3:201.
79. See supra note 21.
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B. Claim for Specific Performance
The French Code civil is particularly explicit on the general
right of a contract party to claim specific performance if the other
party does not perform and if performance is possible.80 But
generally the civil law countries grant a claim for specific
performance.81 By contrast, in common law jurisdictions specific
performance is rather the exception.82
The CISG entitles the aggrieved party generally to request
performance.83 Where the seller has delivered non-conforming
goods the specific performance claim is somewhat limited: the
buyer can claim repair as far as it is reasonable under the
circumstances.84 According to its choice the buyer may also claim
delivery of substitute goods however only if the non-conformity of
the delivered goods amounts to a fundamental breach of contract.85
The CISG specifies and details the remedy of specific
performance generally available in civil law jurisdictions, yet
without forcing the common law jurisdictions to accept this
solution. This is the only situation where the substantive
provisions of the CISG allow a split solution for different legal
systems.
C. No Open Price Contract
A certain relic, not only, but mainly, of French law is the CISG
provision that an offer, in order to be valid, must fix the contract
price or contain at least a method to determine it, be it even
impliedly.86 Until the mid-1990s French law regarded an open

80. See C. CIV. art. 1184(2) (Fr.); Cass. civ., Dalloz 2005, IR 1504.
81. See the comparative survey by Lando & Beale, supra note 17), at 399 et
seq.
82. See supra III.C.
83. CISG arts. 46(1) and 62. But note the restriction of CISG article 28 (see
supra note 45 and the text therein).
84. CISG art. 46(3). In particular, noneconomic repair cannot be claimed.
See Müller-Chen, Article 46, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UNKAUFRECHT–CISG, supra note 10, at ¶ 40; Magnus, supra note 61, at ¶ 61.
85. CISG art. 46(2).
86. CISG art. 14(1).
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price contract in principle as invalid.87 But since 1994 this view
has changed. French courts now no longer strictly invalidate every
open price contract.88
The CISG still requires that the offer must allow the
determination of the price. It is, however, the clearly prevailing
view that the parties can conclude a valid contract without fixing
the price because the CISG allows the parties to vary every
provision,89 and certainly also the determinable price provision.90
It is therefore the parties’ full autonomy to validly conclude an
open price contract. Then, the current market price is considered
as the agreed price.91
Here, the CISG has adopted a policy decision that the
underlying national law later abandoned. But irrespective of this
national development, the CISG’s provisions appear flexible
enough to guarantee a reasonable solution.
D. Compensation of Foreseeable Loss
The CISG limits damages for breach in a specific way that
actually originates from France. Art. 1150 of the French Code
civil provides that the contractual debtor must compensate only
those losses that s/he foresaw or that could be foreseen at the time
of conclusion of contract unless the breach was wilful.92 This
provision of the Code civil of 1804 had some impact on the famous
English case Hadley v. Baxendale of 1854,93 which is the central
87. C. CIV. art. 1591 (Fr.) (prescribing that the price must be fixed, “Le prix
de la vente doit être déterminé et désigné par les parties.”).
88. See Cass. civ., JCP 1995 II 22371 (with note Ghestin); Cass. (Ass. pl.)
JCP 1996 II 22565 (with note Ghestin).
89. See CISG art. 6.
90. See HONNOLD & FLECHTNER, supra note 61), ¶ 137.6, at 211; Ulrich
Schroeter, Article 14, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT–
CISG, supra note 10, at ¶ 21 ; Magnus, supra note 61, at ¶ 33.
91. See CISG art. 55.
92. It must be noted that the general French rule of article 1150 is almost
inapplicable in French sales law because the seller who knows the defects of the
sold goods must compensate all losses (“tous les dommages et intérêts”). See C.
CIV. art. 1645 (Fr.). And since the professional seller is irrebuttably presumed to
know the defects (see supra notes 35, 44), he or she is always liable even for
unforeseeable losses if causation is established.
93. (1854) 9 Ex. 341.
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common law decision on contractual damages. It established the
rule that the debtor must recompense losses which were either the
natural result of a breach or which were or should have been in the
contemplation of the parties as a probable result of a breach (socalled foreseeability test).94 The main purpose of the rule is that
the debtor shall not be liable for too remote consequences of a
breach of contract but shall be able to oversee and calculate the
risk that s/he assumes with the contract.
The CISG has adopted the foreseeability test as a means to
reasonably limit damages.95 The Convention thus follows the
general French rule, though in its common law clothing. The
interpretation of the damages provisions of the CISG can—and
should—take account of this background, in particular to reveal the
purpose of the provisions. Nonetheless, the interpretation must be
autonomous and independent of the peculiar interpretation of the
respective rule in France, England or the U.S.
VI. SPECIFIC GERMAN TRAITS
A. German Influence on the CISG
The German influence on the CISG is essentially tied to the
name of Ernst Rabel. His first draft of 1935 already included the
two legal institutes that evidence a specific German origin: the
notice procedure and the “Nachfrist”.
There is also a certain German influence on the application of
the CISG at least for the first decade after the CISG internationally
entered into force (1988). For instance, in 2000, one-third of all
CISG decisions reported by CLOUT96 were German decisions.
This had the effect that leading German decisions were followed

94. To a certain extent the rules of Hadley v. Baxendale were brought into
statutory form in the English Sale of Goods Acts of 1893 and 1979. See Sale of
Goods Acts [SGA] §§ 50(2), 51(2), and 53(2)(1893/1979) and in the USAmerican UCC (§§ 2-714(1) and 2-715(2)).
95. See CISG art. 74; FLORIAN FAUST, DIE VORHERSEHBARKEIT DES
SCHADENS GEMÄß ART. 74 SATZ 2 UN-KAUFRECHT (CISG) (1996).
96. CLOUT (Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts) is the databank of
UNCITRAL primarily for CISG cases, available at http://www.uncitral.org (last
visited July 10, 2010).
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elsewhere and had, and still have, a considerable influence on the
interpretation of the Convention.97
B. Notice Procedure
The CISG requires the buyer to notify the seller if the goods
are defective and do not conform to the contract.98 Basically, it is
self-understanding and the normal course of dealing that a
dissatisfied buyer informs the seller of the ground for the
dissatisfaction.
However the CISG makes it incumbent upon the buyer to give
notice within a reasonable time because, without notice in correct
time and form, the buyer loses all remedies which s/he otherwise
could avail of.99 Furthermore, the reasonable time starts when the
buyer could have examined and discovered the defects. That
obliges the buyer who will not lose any remedy to examine the
goods. The CISG restricts the time for examination to “as short a
period as is practicable in the circumstances.”100 In order to
maintain his or her rights in respect of non-conforming goods, the
buyer must therefore rather promptly and carefully examine them
and must also notify the seller of any eventual defect within a little
longer time.101

97. A particularly prominent example is the U.S. decision in Medical
Marketing International v. Internazionale Medico Scientifica, S.R.L., No.Civ.A.
99-0380, 1999 WL 311945, at *2 (E.D. La., May 17, 1999). The decision
concerned the import of Italian mammography devices to the U.S. which did not
comply with U.S. safety standards. The U.S. court relied very much on a
decision of the German Federal Court (8 March 1995, NJW 1995, 2099) which
held that in principle the buyer bears the risk that the goods conform to safety
standards or other public law requirements in the buyer’s country. However, the
German court had also stated several exceptions. The U.S. court applied one of
these exceptions.
98. See CISG art. 39.
99. There are only two exceptions to that rule: where the seller knew or
could not be unaware of the defects (Art. 40 CISG) or where the buyer had a
reasonable excuse (CISG art. 44).
100. See Art. 38 CISG.
101. As to the time frames under articlesrt. 38 and 39 of CISG and the
international case law thereon, see the UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 48),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law/digests/cisg.html (last
visited July 10, 2010).
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This whole notice procedure stems from German commercial
law.102 There the commercial buyer is obliged to examine and
notify immediately and very precisely. Its main purpose is to clear
by a simple procedure within a short period whether or not the
transaction is completely finished. The CISG adopted the general
concept but softened the requirements of immediate reaction to,
and very precise description of, the defect. These requirements
were regarded as too harsh for international transactions between
parties who partly are unfamiliar with such strict practice.
Again, the CISG uses a specific national legal phenomenon but
modifies it in a reasonable way that secures fairness in
international sales transactions.
C. “Nachfrist”
Another quasi-procedural element of German law adopted by
the CISG is the so-called “Nachfrist.” Under German contract law,
if the debtor has not fully and correctly performed in time, the
creditor can set the following procedure in motion: s/he can fix an
additional (reasonable) period of time for performance; if even
then the debtor does not perform, the creditor is entitled to
terminate the contract.103 If the additional period, the “Nachfrist,”
has lapsed without success, then, in principle, the weight and
seriousness of the breach no longer matter except where the breach
is minor (“unerheblich”).104 Almost always the creditor can thus
achieve a right of termination by setting a “Nachfrist.” The
“Nachfrist” procedure avoids the uncertainties that one can
encounter if termination exclusively depends on the
fundamentality of the breach, because rather often it will be
doubtful whether or not a breach is fundamental. To declare the
contract terminated is then a high risk for a party because the
unjustified termination is itself a fundamental breach of contract
entitling the other party to termination. The “Nachfrist” is a simple
and generally fair mechanism to clear that situation.

102. See German Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB] [Commercial Code], § 377.
103. See BGB § 323.
104. BGB § 323(5). In practice a breach is minor if the costs to remedy it
are less than 10% of the contract price; See Christian Grüneberg, § 323 ¶ 32, in
BGB (Otto Palandt ed., 69th ed. 2010).
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The CISG follows the German “Nachfrist” concept partly but
not fully. The CISG limits the effect that the unsuccessful lapse of
an additional time period has – to transform a non-fundamental
breach into a fundamental one – to specific breaches, namely to the
total non-performance of the parties’ basic obligations.
Concerning the seller’s duties, it is only in the case of non-delivery
of the goods105 where a “Nachfrist” can lead to a right of
termination.106 For all other breaches which the seller commits,
the additional time period as such is no means to automatically
convert a non-fundamental breach into a fundamental one.107
Concerning the buyer’s duties, the “Nachfrist” mechanism applies
to the non-performance of the obligation to pay and to take
delivery of the goods,108 but not to other duties.109 The reason for
this elective use of the “Nachfrist” procedure is the CISG’s
underlying decision to preserve the contract as far as possible and
reasonable, primarily in order to avoid unnecessary costs for
international transportation of the goods. Therefore, a party shall
not be entitled to convert a minor, non-fundamental breach into
one that justifies termination by mere lapse of additional time
unless the other party has done nothing–neither delivered nor paid
nor taken the goods.
Again, it can be observed that the CISG did not fully copy a
national solution but collected ingredients from a national law as
far as regarded useful for international sales transactions.
VII. REJECTION OF SPECIFIC NATIONAL TRAITS
So far we have seen how the CISG merged elements from
different legal systems. Some of these elements were peculiar,
even characteristic, for certain legal systems. It is equally
105. This generally means total non-delivery. In case of partial nondelivery the right of termination–after the unsuccessful lapse of a Nachfrist–
covers only the lacking part. See CISG art. 51(1).
106. See CISG art. 49(1)(b).
107. See HONNOLD & FLECHTNER, supra note 61, ¶ 305, at 437–38; MüllerChen, Article 49, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT–CISG,
supra note 10, at ¶ 15; Magnus, supra note 61, at ¶ 21.
108. CISG art. 64(1)(b).
109. See HONNOLD & FLECHTNER, supra note 61, ¶ 354, at 503; Günter
Hager & Felix Maultzsch, Article 64, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UNKAUFRECHT–CISG, supra note 10, at ¶ 8; Magnus, supra note 61, at ¶ 22.
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interesting to identify which national peculiarities the CISG
consciously set aside and excluded from its scope.
A. No Consideration Doctrine
One of the most famous and intriguing characteristics of the
common law is the doctrine of consideration.110 Under this
doctrine, one-sided promises for which nothing is given or
promised in exchange and which are not made in form of a deed
are regularly enforceable.111 In the field of sales contracts, it is not
the sales contract itself that can be unenforceable because of lack
of consideration. In a sales contract there are always mutual
promises that constitute consideration. Here, problems with
consideration can occur with the revocability of one-sided offers
and with the parties’ agreement on the modification of the
contract.112
The civil law jurisdictions do not require a
consideration although they developed some other means113 to
restrict the validity and enforceability of promises to deserving
cases.114
The CISG has done away with consideration. Two of its
provisions make this clear.115 Although consideration can be
regarded as a question of contract validity which is in general
outside the scope of the CISG,116 its Art. 16(2)(a) and Art. 29
explicitly regulate a one-sided offer and modification of the
contract and do not require consideration for their binding effect.
It was also the intention of the drafters of the CISG to exclude the

110. See Chitty, supra note 41, at ¶¶ 3–001 et seq.
111. A deed is a specific form of signed writing with seal or attestation of
the signature. The deed must further be delivered to the other party.
112. See the leading case Stilk v. Myrick, (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1168.
113. In French law a valid contract requires a “cause” (see C. CIV. arts.
1131–1133 (Fr.)). German law requires notarial form for the validity of certain
contracts (in particular the purchase of land and the promise of gifts). See BGB
§§ 311b, 518.
114. For a comparison, see ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 32, at 388–99; E.
Allan Farnsworth, Comparative Contracts Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 908–10.
115. See CISG arts. 16(2)(a) and 29.
116. See Id. art. 4(a).
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consideration doctrine for the whole Convention.117 This doctrine
therefore has no place under the CISG.118
Here, the CISG was bold enough to abolish a time-honoured
though disputed legal institution that is part of many national laws.
B. No Parol Evidence Rule
The common law tends to be stricter than the civil law with
written contracts. The so-called “parol evidence rule” of the
common law prohibits in principle that oral (parol) evidence by
witnesses or other extrinsic evidence is adduced to prove content
of the contract that is contrary to the written text.119 Such proof is
not admissible although there are rather many exceptions.120 In
civil law jurisdictions a written contract may also raise the
presumption of its completeness and correctness; however, this
presumption is regularly rebuttable by any means of proof.121
Even clearer than with respect to the consideration doctrine, the
CISG abolished for its scope of application the parol evidence rule.
Article 11, sentence 2 of CISG provides that a contract “may be
proved by any means, including witnesses.”122 This formulation
applies even if the contract is in writing.123 The clearly prevailing
view is that the formulation excludes the parol evidence rule.124
117. See Commentary of the Secretariat to article 27 paragraph 2 (CISG
article 27 of the Draft was the later article 29), available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-29.html (last visited
July 10, 2010).
118. See Samuel K. Date-Bah, Article 29, in COMMENTARY ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW. THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION, supra note
28, at ¶¶ 1.3, 2.1; HONNOLD & FLECHTNER, supra note 61, ¶ 204.4, at 307;
Schroeter, Article 29, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT–
CISG, supra note 10, at ¶ 4; Magnus, supra note 61, at ¶ 6.
119. See Kim Lewison, THE INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS 85–91 (4th
ed. 2007) (for an extensive commentary on the parol evidence rule in England).
For the US, see UCC § 2-202.
120. See Lewison, supra note 119, at 85.
121. See for Germany BGH NJW 1980, 1680; BGH 2002, 3164.
122. CISG art. 11.
123. See Schroeter, Article 11, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UNKAUFRECHT–CISG, supra note 10, at ¶ 13; Magnus, supra note 61, at ¶ 11.
124. Calzaturificio Claudia s.n. v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd., No. 96 Civ.
8052(HB) (THK), 1998 WL 164824, at *4 (S.D.N.Y, Apr. 7, 1998); MCCMarble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova d’Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d
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Again, the CISG rather boldly sets aside a rule that enjoys
widespread application and trusts that greater freedom with respect
to the proof of contracts will better serve international sales
transactions.
C. No Délai de Grâce
French law allows the judge to fix an additional period of time
during which the debtor may perform (délai de grace means
“period of grace”).125
The CISG explicitly excludes such
126
possibility.
The purpose of the exclusion is to secure legal
certainty and foreseeability for the contracting parties.
The délai de grâce of French law do not fit for commercial
transactions between professional people. The CISG therefore
rejected them.
D. No Løfte Theory
An internationally rather disputed issue is the question of how
binding offers should be.127 In this respect, the Nordic countries128
which are deemed to form a separate legal family129 take a
particularly outspoken stance. They generally regard an offer as
binding and irrevocable (according to the so-called løfteteorie).130
1384, 1388–92 (11th Cir. 1998); Mitchell Aircraft Spares, Inc. v. European
Aircraft Service, AB, 23 F. Supp. 2d 915, 919–22 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Filanto SpA
v. Chilewich International Corp, 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
See also HONNOLD & FLECHTNER, supra note 61, ¶ 110, at 164–65; Martin
Schmidt-Kessel, Article 10, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UNKAUFRECHT–CISG, supra note 10, at ¶ 13; Magnus, supra note 61 ¶ 16; but see
Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American Business Center,
Inc., 993 Fed.2d 1178, 1182–84 (5th Cir. 1993) (interpreting contractual
provisions under Texas law).
125. For the termination remedy, see C. CIV. art. 1184(3) (Fr.); for payment
obligations, which could include the obligation to pay damages, see C. CIV. art.
1244–1 (Fr.) (introduced in 1991; however, the former article 1244 contained a
similar provision).
126. See CISG arts. 45(3) and 61(3).
127. For a comparison see ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 32, at 356–64.
128. They include Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.
129. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 32, at 276–85.
130. See Nordic Contracts Act §§ 1–3, 7; Joseph Lookofsky, The
Scandinavian Experience, in THE 1980 UNIFORM SALES LAW. OLD ISSUES
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Also under German law an offer is generally irrevocable if not
otherwise indicated. The offeror is bound for a period within
which an offeree could regularly answer.131 The opposite position
is taken by the common law, where an offer without consideration
is not binding even if it says that it is irrevocable.132 However, no
matter from which position one starts there is always a problem of
time. The free revocability position must nevertheless fix a point
of time when the revocability of the offer ends (normally by its
acceptance). Likewise, the irrevocability position must fix a point
of time when the irrevocability ends because an offeror cannot be
bound endlessly.
The CISG starts from the standpoint that an offer is always
revocable.133 But it reduces this position considerably. If the offer
indicates explicitly or implicitly that it shall be irrevocable, then it
cannot be revoked.134 The same applies if the offeree was justified
to rely on the offer as irrevocable and acted in reliance on it.135
The CISG regulation on revocability of offers was one of the
reasons for the Scandinavian countries136 to ratify the CISG only
partly, namely without the Convention’s Part II on the formation of
contracts (Art. 14 – 24).137 Art. 92 allowed this reservation.
Recently the Scandinavian countries have renounced their
reservation against Part II.
The CISG produced here more than a mere compromise. It
takes a reasonable middle position between the extremes of full

REVISITED IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT EXPERIENCES. VERONA CONFERENCE 2003,
supra note 7, at 95, 104; JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY , UNDERSTANDING THE CISG 52–3
(3d ed. 2008).
131. BGB § 145.
132. See the comparative survey in ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 32, at
356–64.
133. CISG arts. 15(2) and 16(1).
134. Id. art. 16(2)(a). This is in line with the CISG’s disregard of the
consideration doctrine.
135. Id. art. 16(2)(b).
136. Iceland did not use the reservation possibility of CISG article 92.
137. See Ulrich Magnus, The Scandinavian Reservation Under Art. 92
CISG, in CISG PART II CONFERENCE. STOCKHOLM, 4 – 5 SEPTEMBER 2008 59 et
seq. (Jan Kleineman ed. 2009).
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irrevocability and full revocability that in practice did not raise
problems.138
E. No General “Nachfrist” Procedure
It has already been mentioned that the CISG adopted the
German “Nachfrist” mechanism not as a general concept but only
partly where seller or buyer do not at all perform their most basic
obligations.139 The CISG proceeded here in a selective way.
VIII. SHORTCOMINGS?
A survey on the CISG’s position between common law and
civil law must also ask whether the Convention leaves deplorable
gaps or suffers from unacceptable shortcomings.
A. Law of Important Countries Not Taken into Account?
A first critique could be raised that the Uniform Sales Law is
the fruit of comparison mainly between the common law, French
law and its descendants, and German law and its descendants. It
could be said that important contemporary legal systems like the
laws of Brazil, China or India have not been taken into account.
However, this critique neglects to consider that the laws of the
mentioned countries have been strongly influenced by the common
law, French and German law, and by the CISG itself.
The most evident example is India, where the English
introduced the Indian Sale of Goods Act of 1930, which is a copy
of the English Sale of Goods Act 1893. Still today Indian courts
refer to English precedents concerning sales law or other issues of
law. Brazil’s civil code to a considerable extent contains elements
of French and German law.140 Rabel’s comparative survey always
138. The UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 48, reports three cases concerning
Art. 16 CISG, available at:
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law/digests/cisg.html (last visited July
10, 2010). All three cases do not focus directly on the revocability issue.
139. See supra VI.C.
140. See José Maria Othon Sidou, Brazil, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW B-48 et seq. (René David et al. eds.
1972). The new civil code of Brazil of 2002 preserves the influence of the BGB.
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included Brazilian law.141 Finally, China’s modern sales law, the
Contract Act of 1999, shows a rather close vicinity to the CISG.142
It would be thus an ill-founded critique that the CISG’s
solutions disregard important contemporary legal systems.
B. Not in Line with Modern Sets of Principles?
Another critique that can be raised is that the CISG is not in
line with the modern UNIDROIT Principles and Principles of
European Contract Law (PECL). Indeed, these sets of principles
are of a younger age than the CISG, therefore the CISG could not
take into account their solutions. However, although there are
differences between the CISG and the two sets of principles,143 in
most respects the solutions do not vary. This is no surprise; the
CISG was the most important source of inspiration for these sets of
principles.144 Indirectly this is also largely true for the Draft
Common Frame of Reference which in part is based on the
PECL145 and thereby again on the CISG. Today, the principles can

See, among others, Véra Fradera, La traduction francais du Code civil brésilien,
REVUE INERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 773, 775 (2010).
141. See Rabel, supra note 31, at 22 et seq.
142. See Bernhard Vetter von der Lilie, DAS CHINESISCHE VERTRAGSRECHT
IM RECHTSVERGLEICH MIT DEM UN-KAUFRECHT UND DEN GRUNDREGELN DES
EUROPÄISCHEN VERTRAGSRECHTS 63 (2008).
143. See generally Harry M. Flechtner, The CISG’s Impact on International
Unification Efforts: The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law, in THE 1980 UNIFORM
SALES LAW. OLD ISSUES REVISITED IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT EXPERIENCES.
VERONA CONFERENCE 2003, supra note 7, at 176–87 (containing tables of
concordance); Ulrich Magnus, Die UNIDROIT Principles und die Wiener
Kaufrechtskonvention, in THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES 2004. THEIR IMPACT ON
CONTRACTUAL PRACTICE, JURISPRUDENCE AND CODIFICATION 57 (Eleanor
Cashin Ritaine & Eva Lein eds. 2007).
144. See MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACT LAW: THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 305–06 (3d ed. 2005); Flechtner, supra note 143;
Magnus, supra note 143; Stefan Vogenauer, Introduction, in COMMENTARY ON
THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
(PICC) ¶ 22 (Stefan Vogenauer & Jan Kleinheisterkamp eds. 2009).
145. See PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE, supra note 18, at 30.
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serve as an aid for interpretation of the CISG146 unless the CISG
deliberately left gaps that then have to be filled by the applicable
national law.147 There is thus a certain mutual influence between
the CISG and the sets of principles that keeps the CISG à jour.
C. Loopholes
Theoretically, the CISG leaves no loopholes because any gap
has to be filled by the general principles underlying the CISG and,
in their absence, by the applicable national law.148 In practice, it
cannot be denied that there are some points of uncertainty for
which an explicit solution in the CISG would be preferable. The
most deplorable omission is that the CISG does not itself
determine the rate of interest for sums due under the
Convention.149 For various reasons this question was deliberately
left open. It is unfortunate that only in order to answer this
frequent question it is necessary to determine the applicable law
for the contract at hand, a procedure that the Convention in all
other important and frequently relevant respects avoids.
Nonetheless, by redress to national law the CISG provides for a
though less comfortable solution.
Further points which could be regarded as loopholes are the
lack of specific rules on the incorporation of standard terms, on
letters of confirmation and on the well-known battle of forms. But
despite this lack, courts have been able to find reasonable solutions
for all these problems within the CISG and its underlying general
principles. The courts have inferred from CISG Art. 8, 14, 18 that
the incorporation of standard terms requires that the terms have
been made sufficiently available to the other party, generally by
sending them.150 Likewise, the problem of silence on a letter of
confirmation can be, and has been, solved within the CISG.
146. On few occasions, courts have done that. For a general account of the
use of the UNIDROIT Principles in court practice see Vogenauer, supra note
144, at 37 et seq.
147. See CISG art. 7(2).
148. Id. art. 7(2).
149. See id. arts. 78 and 84(1).
150. See, e.g., German Federal Court 31 October 2001, Internationales
Handelsrecht 2002, 14; for an exception see Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof 31
August 2005, Internationales Handelsrecht 2005, 31.
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Except where there exists a respective practice between the parties
or an international trade usage151 that silence on a letter of
confirmation makes the content binding, the Convention does not
allow such effect.152 Finally, the CISG also enables a reasonable
solution for the battle of contradicting standard forms. The fairer
and more modern solution neutralizes and invalidates the
conflicting terms at least if the parties began to perform their
contract (knock-out rule). In effect, CISG case law confirms this
view.153
Though it could appear desirable that the CISG contained more
explicit rules in certain respects, it has to be stated that the
Convention allows reasonable solutions for the problematic points.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
A. CISG Not Perfect but Best of All Possible Worlds
In law it is particularly naïve to expect that regulations be or
even can be perfect. Codifications will always have their
shortcomings, be it only due to change of time and convictions
since their enactment. But given this fact and in the light of the
practice under the CISG, this Convention can be regarded as a
relative optimum. It is a codification that allows for reasonable
solutions of most sales problems. Its certain vagueness in some
respects secures on the other hand the necessary flexibility. In
Leibniz’s view the CISG probably would be the best possible
world of sales law.

151. According to article 9 of CISG such practices and trade usages must be
given preference.
152. See the decisions cited in the UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 48,
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law/digests/cisg.html
(last visited July 10, 2010); see also HONNOLD & FLECHTNER, supra note 61, ¶
120.1, at 173–74; Schmidt-Kessel, Article 9, in KOMMENTAR ZUM
EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT–CISG, supra note 10, at ¶ 22; Magnus, supra
note 61, at ¶ 27.
153. See, e.g., French Cour de cassation, Droit d’affaires 1998, 1694;
German Bundesgerichtshof, Internationales Handelsrecht 2002, 16; German
Oberlandesgericht Köln, Internationales Handelsrecht 2006, 147; Austrian
Oberlandesgericht Linz, Internationales Handelsrecht 2007, 123.
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B. Conclusions for Comparative Law
The CISG is an example and probably the best one that by
intense comparison of law solutions–and their worldwide
understandable expression in a transparently structured
codification–can be found that assembles advantages of different
legal systems and largely avoids their disadvantages. The CISG
proves that contradictions and differences between legal systems,
in particular the gap between common law and civil law (how deep
this gap may ever be regarded) can be successfully overcome. The
CISG evidences further that this bridging of gaps is not only
theoretically possible but also that it works in practice. If an
international convention witnesses the value and need of
comparative law, the CISG is the best witness. The more intense
the comparative preparation of international instruments, the better
the outcome.
C. Is Global Harmonization Still Utopia?
For some, global harmonization of law is no aim, but a
nightmare. However, for international sales transactions the CISG
already brings us close to global harmonization of that part of the
law. Those concerned with legal problems of transborder sales in
reality–attorneys, judges, arbitrators–do not appear to reject this
development, just the contrary.154 In specific fields such as
154. It has now been documented by the many commentaries, textbooks,
articles, etc. on the CISG written by practitioners, that, while in the beginning of
the sales unification and even for a certain period after the CISG came into
force, legal scholars and theoreticians almost exclusively dominated the
discussion. See, e.g., COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW. THE
1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION, supra note 28; the first edition of
KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT–CISG (von Caemmerer &
Schlechtriem eds, 1990) [now Schlechtriem & Schwenzer eds.] to which only
very few practitioners contributed). Only German examples of comprehensive
works exclusively written by practitioners are for instance: Wilhelm Albrecht
Achilles, Kommentar zum UN-Kaufrechtsübereinkommen (CISG), in
GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR ZUM HANDELSGESETZBUCH MIT UN-KAUFRECHT
(Ensthaler ed., 7th ed. 2007); BURGHARD PILTZ, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT.
DAS UN-KAUFRECHT IN PRAXISORIENTIERTER DARSTELLUNG (2d ed. 2008);
URS VERWEYEN, VICTOR FOERSTER, & OLIVERTOUFAR, HANDBUCH DES
INTERNATIONALEN WARENKAUFS. UN-KAUFRECHT (CISG) (2d ed. 2008);
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international sales the Utopia of a global law that Rabel envisioned
evidently can be realized to a large extent.

WOLFGANG WITZ, HANNS-CHRISTIAN SALGER,
INTERNATIONAL EINHEITLICHES KAUFRECHT (2000).
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This essay begins with a consideration of two anxieties about
courts that are common to the civil and common law traditions: a
worry about illegitimate judicial law making, and a worry about
judicial bias. It will then move to the contribution legal theories
might make in dealing with these shared anxieties, with a focus on
a position that draws on the two largest contestants: natural law
and legal positivism. It will end with an indication of the further
distance that theory needs to take us before these worries about the
judiciary can be effectively tackled.
I. THE TWO ANXIETIES
The civil and common law systems both raise a question that is
well known. How is it possible to combine the acknowledged fact
that courts often make fresh law with the belief that the legislature
is the site for law making with which democracies are most
comfortable? Courts create new law as frequently as they deliver
answers to questions which codes, statute and/or previous judicial
interpretations of a body of norms leave open. How can the
democratic suspicion of this law making capacity be given its
proper place while acknowledging the undeniable fact of judicial
* Professor, School of Law, University of Essex, United Kingdom.
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creativity that takes place every time a need to interpret the law is
placed before the court?
This dilemma accompanies the other one indicated at the
beginning: how can one identify and cope with judicial bias? The
latter is more of a practical than a fundamental concern when we
are dealing with straightforward corruption of the judicial office.
But it becomes a more complex and elusive defect when we try to
track down what can be called unintentional bias. Here we need to
tease apart legitimate moral and political convictions that judges
must bring to bear on many open questions of law from those
moral and political beliefs that, if allowed to sway judgement, we
condemn as an abuse. The hunt for judicial bias is, in its easier
version, a hunt for bad faith: watching out for the judge who hides
his or her moral and political objectives beneath a set of principles
that appear to be neutral. The more troublesome situation,
however, arises when judges are of good faith. The latter believe
in all honesty that they are deploying a principle impartially as
they reason towards a result, but an observer can spot the fact that
despite good intentions the decision is deploying a principle that
should not be brought to bear without, at the very least, being
voted on by the people at large.1
II. CURES
A. Positivism
One popular way of guiding people through these dilemmas is
proposed by legal positivism. This takes the view that moral and
political impartiality within a legal system is achieved via relying
on value free sources of law. That is, if we have a stable and
shareable way of seeing what the existing law is, whatever else
separates us in moral and political belief, then this terrain can
serve as a benchmark for seeing when judges have overstepped
their limits by being unduly creative, and we can then also see
when bias–albeit unintentional–has crept into what they are doing.
What the existing law says at present, says the positivist, must be
rigorously separated from considerations of what the law ought to
be in the future.
Given the anxieties that we are focused on here, it is useful to
flag two variants of positivism that are relevant. One can be called
a two-stage model. According to this, a properly functioning legal
1. Sheldon Leader, Impartiality, Bias, and the Judiciary, in READING
DWORKIN CRITICALLY 241-268 (Alan Hunt ed. 1992).
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system contains rules and principles giving guidance to judges
enabling them to identify the existing law. They must attend to
this guidance, without bringing to bear any view about what they
want law to be in the future. That is a second stage activity, which
must be rigorously separated from the first. If a judge allows his
forward looking preferences about what future law should look
like to color his perception of what the existing law says, then he is
doing a particular sort of damage: he is allowing his preferences to
be smuggled into what looks on the surface like a description of
the present law. The losing party is then told that he has broken
the law as it is, when in reality, says the positivist, he has broken
the law that the judge would like to put in place–well after the
action for which the defendant is brought before the court. The
loser is, in short, being retroactively punished.
The work of HLA Hart tries to show us when this abuse
happens.2 A rule of recognition, he argues, exists in all legal
systems worthy of the name. This rule reports the converging
views of legal officials about where existing law is to be found:
about how certain norms can be picked out from the forest of
maxims, customs, and convictions we live by in society. That
which is identified in this way can be stably recognised as existing
law–a candidate for application in a fresh case. If it turns out that
the candidature fails–that a new case is not clearly or satisfactorily
covered by existing law–then the judge is, Hart argues, entitled to
proceed to the next stage of adding to the body of law with a fresh
decision.
We are not told by this variety of positivism what the proper
scope for judicial creativity is at that next stage. Hart confines
himself to the task of avoiding mystification: barring the judge
from delivering a solution to what he pretends, or honestly but
mistakenly believes, to be the existing law when he is actually
shaping the law in the way he wants it to develop in the future.
This positivist tries to offer a solution for the two anxieties with
tools that yield clarity. Once we are clear about the stage at which
the judge is applying existing law and the stage at which he is
making fresh law then at least we are able to engage, says the
positivist, in a useful debate about the proper dimensions of the
judge’s adventures at the second stage. Without this protocol in
hand, the positivist insists, we will not be able to reach that debate
because the judge will not be able to see, at any point in time,
when she has identified existing law and when she is
unconsciously drawing on her vision of the future.
2. HERBERT LIONEL ADOLPHUS HART, CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
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A second variant of legal positivism goes further, and does so
in a way that is relevant for present purposes. According to this
species, the law enacted, particularly in the form of a code, is
‘complete.’ This does not mean that the code is complete in the
sense that it already contains all answers to the questions that it
may be used to answer: it is not a claim that the enacted law is
normatively omniscient, containing already all answers to any
possible questions put to it. It is instead a different thesis: that the
enacted code already contains the answers to all open questions of
law appropriate for courts to use as they apply the instrument. If
the answer is not to be found, and a solution is nevertheless
needed, then legislative amendment of enacted law is appropriate,
not a change in the law introduced by judge.
This brand of legal positivism is therefore much more
prescriptive about the role of courts than is the first. Judges must
confine themselves to looking for existing law to apply to fresh
cases, and if the code or statute does not contain the answers, then
for judicial purposes the matter is finished. The code commands
him or her to deliver a solution that reflects the fact that the
plaintiff does not have the law on her side, and hence that the
defendant cannot be made to suffer on the basis of a solution that
the judge thinks would be the right one to offer. If full justice is
not achieved in such a case, because people like the defendant
should, for moral reasons, be held accountable for what they did,
then we are told that the solution is to be delivered at another time
and in another place: where the will of the people is registered.3
Future defendants of this type can then be caught by fresh law, and
if the people will a retroactive application of law to the defendant,
making him guilty now for what he was not liable for back when
he did what he did, then Hart tells us that we are at least remaining
clear that this is what is happening.
B. Natural Law
Natural law proposes a quite distinct cure for the two anxieties
we are focusing on. However, it is important to start by noticing
that the natural lawyer’s position takes as its point of departure a
belief that is actually shared by positivists. That is, natural
lawyers start with a conviction that we must rigorously distinguish
existing law from the law to be shaped by man in the future.
Natural lawyers do this, as do the positivists, in order to prevent
3. For a recent statement of this view, extending beyond codes to the
interpretation of constitutions, see JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND
DISAGREEMENT (2001) passim.
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people from being punished by rules that pretend to be existing
law, but falsely so. Here, however, the means used to reach this
objective are radically different. The existing law, says the natural
lawyer, is at certain crucial points quite separate from anything
human beings can enact. It is binding law, but is so because of the
force of the values that all valid legal systems must embody,
failing which they do not qualify as legal systems.4
The difference between these two orientations–as bulwarks
against undue judicial creativity and against judicial bias–is that
the positivist will allow the judge to rely on a moral, political, or
economic principle that might be highly divisive within the polity–
and to do so under the mantle of applying the existing law–only if
that principle has been imported into the legal system by a past
legal event: constitutional enactment, legislation, or previous
judicial decision. If he cannot do that, then he will be changing
the law as a judge–which the first but not the second species of
positivist will allow. The natural lawyer, by contrast, waits on no
such past enactment of positive law: a judge might bring to bear a
moral principle that is strongly controversial within a particular
polity, but if he can show this principle to flow from natural
morality rather than a contingently existing positive moral code, he
will not be altering but rather giving effect to existing law.
C. An Intermediate Theory
Both positivism and natural law carry their own frustrations
when trying to work with them in order to respond to our two
anxieties about courts. A general treatment of those shortcomings
is not relevant here. It is, however, possible to draw on both of
these traditions, and via this synthesis to find a different way of
responding to the two concerns. The first point to notice in
building an alternative strategy is that it is necessary to jettison the
positivist injunction to the judge to confine herself to a source that
will itself provide the appropriate values that apply in a given case.
It is possible to rely on sources, but it is an illusion to think that
these stand in front of the judge ready for inspection, independent
of her views about what the law should be. The reason is that
what counts as a source of law is itself the product of deploying
moral values. For example, the judge might accept the injunction
to ‘follow precedent’ in a common law system, but this injunction
does not tell him whether to opt for recent developments in
4. For a secular example of this position, see LON FULLER, THE MORALITY
(rev. ed. 1969).
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collateral areas of the law, or to give priority to the direct line of
cases that deal with the subject matter at hand. Doing the latter
might yield one result in a case, while doing the former might lead
to the opposite result.5 In the civil law tradition, deciding what the
Code ‘says’ is a product of first deciding on the weight to give to
e.g. the enactor’s intentions, developments in later social
conditions, etc.
We also need to revisit the claim that a piece of enacted law
can be complete. If this means that the judge is not to draw on
values lying outside of those that have already been enacted, then
again this does not look adequate. It is a variant of the positivist
mistake about sources. The completeness thesis claims that a
divisive moral, political, or economic principle may well be part of
the existing law, but only if they are first enacted into the system
by an authoritative step taken by the legislature, in the form of,
say, a code. That simply reproduces the view that what counts as
part of the code can be identified in a value free way. If it is true
that there is no way of construing a source, such as legal precedent
without deciding, in the light of moral or political principle, what
scope and weight to give to different branches of precedent, then
the assignment of that scope and weight must come from values
that lie outside of any given set of precedents. The same point
applies to a code. A code cannot generate from within itself the
values that will guide those interpreting it when they must decide
what weight to give to each of its features. If it tries to do this–by
giving a schedule of answers to all questions about its proper mode
of interpretation–there must be a prior commitment of the
interpreter to accept this protocol as binding: that is itself a
commitment that must come from outside of the code itself.
This is not just a dry point of conceptual housekeeping. It can
color judicial attitudes of deference to any given code. Why
should any particular judge accept the injunction to stay within the
values already announced in the code, and to rely on legislative
amendment of that code if she is not happy with what she finds?
Why should she not take it on herself to supply what she is
convinced is missing, and would make the code better? Courts are
often willing and indeed should override the letter and spirit of any
single piece of enacted law in order to achieve a larger coherence,
as well as a result that corresponds to the best normative position
that the judiciary can in good faith deploy.
This last point is central to one of the better-known
theorists occupying this intermediate position, Ronald Dworkin.
5. For an example, see, R v Lemon (1979) 1 All ER 898.
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Dworkin’s view is particularly worth exploring–both for its merits
and its shortcomings–as helping to see what common and civil law
traditions can do to cope with the two anxieties about judicial
power.
III. DWORKIN’S POSITION
When a judge reaches an answer to open question of law, he or
she is properly confined to ‘finding’ appropriate answers within
the existing law, argues Dworkin. But this not same sense of
‘finding’ an answer as is deployed by the natural lawyer, nor by
the species of positivist who believes that the enacted law is
complete in the sense identified above.
Some initial definitions will help here in order to pin down
what is meant by judges finding rather than creating law:
Settled law: This is a collection of valid statements of law, as
in the report that a given system provides 1, protection against
unwarranted use of trade secrets; 2, against publication of an
author’s work without his or her consent; 3, against circulation of
photographic images of someone; and finally 4, that it provides a
general right to privacy.6 These examples divide into two types:
explicit and implicit propositions. Imagine that the explicit
propositions are 1 through 3, but not 4.
The first three statements are true because of enactment by an
authoritative source: judges in previous cases, legislation, or an
enacted code. The statement that there is a right to privacy within
the settled law, by way of contrast, is not true because of any
specific enactment. It is instead a right that has emerged over
time. It stands to the explicitly enacted rights as a genus stands in
relation to distinct species. The latter have enough in common to
allow them to be grouped together into a generic class. The genus
contains elements that enable us to understand each of the separate
species more comprehensively and effectively than is possible if
each species is grasped separately. Thus, Warren and Brandeis
offered their famous demonstration that the right to privacy
formed part of the existing law by showing that it emerged from
the more narrowly defined range of explicit rights in the set made
up inter alia of rights 1 through 3. To posit the existence of the
right to privacy allowed them to understand and to justify a range
of explicit rights, even if it is not formally announced by the courts
or legislature or constitution.
6. This is a well known set of examples drawn from the analysis of the right
to privacy by Warren and Brandeis. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
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Implicit propositions of law are built up out of earlier legal
events, which enact the more narrowly defined norms in the
system. These implicit elements allow us to link a range of
differently grounded answers to past questions of law and also to
provide a generic category or principle under which a fresh case
can be subsumed.7
Finding and making law by judges: Judges can make law in
the course of their decisions in one of two ways: they might add to
the explicit elements in the system, adding, for example, an
extension or a narrowing to the coverage or a given rule. This
happens frequently and routinely. Or, they might add to the body
of implicit propositions within the system. This is very rare, but
can and does happen.
Judges can find law in two corresponding senses: they might
find an existing explicit norm; or they might ‘find’ an implicit
norm. In doing the latter a judge may conclude that while there is
no explicit law governing a new situation, there is implicit law
governing it because the generic principles that make most sense
of the previous explicit norms lead coherently to this situation
being covered as well. It should be noted that when a judge finds
the law in this second sense he or she is constructing a rationale
for previous explicit norms post hoc: that is, a fresh and more
comprehensive principle is substituted for the one which in fact
grounded the particular, more narrowly grounded norm.
A. Dworkin’s Argument
A way of rendering Dworkin’s position is to say that judges
may add to the body of explicit law, but in doing so they should
stay faithful to the body of implicit law. Within this constraint, the
judge is entitled to extend the coverage of implicit law on grounds
of coherence. If, for example, he or she can unify the solutions
from past enacted law under the mantle of a right to privacy, then
even if not expressed that way before and even if earlier law was
actually grounded on different principles, the law is properly
extended in this way.
How do a judge’s moral convictions fit into this picture? If the
building up of an implicit part of the law was simply a matter of
reporting what explicit law says, and then of reporting the areas in
7. Another example, drawn from civil law, could be the emergence or
liability for unjust enrichment, implicitly drawn from decisions on a provision in
the French civil code requiring the restoring of money ‘paid when no debt was
owing.’
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which distinct branches of that law overlap such that the new
implicit principle is a notional lowest common denominator, then
there is no room for moral judgement. It is a matter of description,
however complex that description might be. But this misconstrues
the demands of this approach. In constructing a plausible implicit
part of the law, there are various ways in which the construction
can happen. If we go back to the right to privacy, the area of
overlap between the explicit parts of the law identified by Warren
and Brandeis converges on the proposition that one has, as they
put it, a “right to be left alone.” But there is a good deal more that
has to be decided about the nature of the entitlement to be left
alone before it can function as an implicit part of the system. We
have to know if it is a right that can be overridden relatively easily
by, say, an employer who wants to tap telephones because he
wants to know if personnel have critical attitudes toward
management that could make a difference to corporate
performance, or if he can only legitimately tap those telephones if
he reasonably suspects some graver harm, such as employee
frauds. In other words, decisions have to be made about the
character of the right: about its relative weight against competing
rights; about the character of the interests it is best suited to
protect; about its availability against interference by private as
well as public bodies; etc.
These characterising decisions are themselves moral and
political. They are not dictated by the character of separate parts
of explicit law, and cannot be extracted by seeing where those
separate simply overlap. Moral values have to be brought to bear.
They are choices that cannot flatly contradict the values that
explicit law is grounded on, but they can fill out those values in
ways that are unexpected by the authors of past legislation,
constitutions, or legal decisions. They must, as Dworkin puts it,
‘fit.’8
This intermediate position, and the form it takes in Dworkin’s
theory, would easily find himself in the shoes of the civilian jurist
as depicted by Julio Cueto-Rua, “...every case should be
considered as an example of a class; the class, species of genus;
the genus as a species of another genus of a hither degree of
generality; and so on until very general and basic concepts are
finally defined.”9

8. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) passim.
9. Julio C. Cueto-Rua, The Future of the Civil Law, 37 LA. L. REV. 646, 647
(1997).
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B. Critique
How well has intermediate theoretical position responded to
the two anxieties that our systems share: the concern to place
limits on judicial law making, and the concern to achieve moral
and political impartiality? Insofar as Civil Law holds to belief in
the completeness of Codes in the form examined–a preference for
legislative amendment over judicial development of the law–then
this is a constraint that Dworkin would be likely to reject. So, it
seems, would many civilians. But how far are they willing to go
in Dworkin’s direction? The ideal judge for Dworkin legitimately
reaches across all elements of enacted law, all codes and all case
law, to achieve harmony between them. The guardian of the
keystone principles, on this approach, should be the judiciary.
This seems to complement Cueto-Rua’s argument that the civilian
approach leads the system to keep pushing for coherence across
domains of law “...until very general and basic concepts are finally
defined.” Such coherence is not, and cannot be, in the ultimate
control of legislatures.
Such a conclusion might raise difficulties about democracy in
a particular way. Concerns about the undemocratic nature of
judicial power arise from two related directions. One has to do
with the problem of majority rule and minority rights, asking how
far it is legitimate to frustrate the former in order to protect the
latter. Linked to this, however, is another less well publicised
problem that is relevant to the issues dealt with in this essay: what
weight is to be given to an understanding of law as an expression
of will and law as an instantiation of principle?
To rely on the will of the people when interpreting the law is to
accept that ‘this is the law because they want it this way and the
fact that they have expressed their preference deserves respect.’
To rely on principle is to reach for results that are due respect not
because the fit with the wishes of a particular body, but because
good convincing reasons, independent of those wishes, can be
given to show that this solution is defensible. Dworkin is inclined
to allow principle to have a dominant role in the polity.
That dominant role makes sense when we are dealing with
single fundamental values, and asking about their coherent
extension. It is more of a problem when we have to assign
priorities to–or otherwise combine–competing values, all prima
facie fundamental and each backed with competing fundamental
rights. Here, the relevant considerations unfold in more complex
ways. Courts are best placed to deal with these competing rights
when the exercise of one will have a very damaging effect on one
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and will make a marginal impact on the other. For example,
exercising ones right to free speech under an opponent’s bedroom
window seems intuitively to call for an adjustment of the former in
order to do less damage to the latter.
However, there are some situations where both of the right
holders can have their backs to the wall: one or the other must
win, leaving the loser with little room for an alternative way of
exercising their right. The winner takes all. The parties find
themselves in this situation if, for example, a small business is in
financial crisis, and has to work on Sundays: can it legitimately
require its employees to work those days when their church
explicitly requires Sunday attendance? Can an employee be put in
this position when he or she does not have a realistic prospect of
finding an alternative job? If someone’s only prospect of proving
her partner’s violence is to adduce private correspondence in court,
should the right to privacy give way to the right to bodily safety?
If a doctor has to choose between killing one of two Siamese twins
or letting both die, how should he proceed?
Here it may be that the clash of values is close enough that we
need a decision that is respected just because it has been rendered
in good faith, and not because we happen to be convinced by the
strength of the principles adduced in support of it. It may be too
close a call for the latter approach. Of course, these clashes may
first surface in front of a court, and the court must do its best to
decide given the urgency of the situation. But it would be better if
the priorities between basic rights here could be guided at least by
principles given to us by other law making organs: organs such as
legislatures where law as an expression of will finds a greater
place. Ultimate clashes of value, such as here, should better be
proactively dealt with–wherever realistic to do so–by legislatures.
IV. CONCLUSION
The civil and common law systems share worries about
judicial power and seem to entertain similar solutions to those
worries. Each is legitimately frustrated by the proposals that
natural law or legal positivism offer. Both can potentially make
use of the intermediate theory sketched here. Civilian and
common lawyers, in their daily work, put a challenge to that
theory: they force it to answer the large questions about the
division of powers between judiciary and legislature via the more
narrow and detailed questions that arise when basic rights compete
with one another in concrete cases. The common need to get these
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answers right overshadows anything that might separate the two
systems.
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There are several common features of the legal profession and
legal education in China and Japan.1 Both China and Japan have
traditionally focused on teaching legal knowledge to undergraduate
and graduate students rather than providing professional skills
education; however, since the end of the twentieth century, legal
education in the two countries started to fundamentally change
both institutionally and pedagogically.2 The first part of this paper
will describe the basic characteristics of legal education embraced
in China and Japan as traditionally continental countries. The
second part will introduce the trend of reforms of legal education
in the two countries since the end of last century. In part three and
four we will make some comparisons on the approaches to reforms
of legal education in the two countries. The fifth part will depict
the endeavors of the pedagogies for nurturing lawyers provided in
new law schools or Jurist Programs in the two countries. The last
1. For additional information regarding legal education in China and Japan,
see RAISING THE BAR: THE EMERGING LEGAL PROFESSION IN EAST ASIA (Alford
ed. 2007); Yooncheol Choi, The Reforms of Legal Education and Bar
Examination in South Korea, 6 THE JURIST (Renmin University of China Law
School 2009); Matthew S. Erie, Legal Education Reform in China Through
U.S.-Inspired Transplants, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 60 (2009); Huang Jin The
Structure
Of
Legal
Education
In
China,
available
at
http://www.aals.org/2000international/english/china.htm (last visited July 10,
2010); Suzuki Ken, At Crossroad for Japanese Law School System, 6 THE
JURIST (Renmin University of China Law School 2009); Judith A. Mcmorrow,
Introduction to U.S. Legal Education and Preparation for the Practice of Law, 6
THE JURIST (Renmin University of China Law School 2009); Annelise Riles &
Takashi Uchida, Reforming Knowledge? A Socio-Legal Critique of the Legal
Education Reforms in Japan, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 3 (2009); Takahiro Saito, The
Tragedy of Japanese Legal Education: Japanese ‘American’ Law Schools, 24
WIS. INT'L L.J. 197 (2006); Shiho Seido Kaikaku Shigikai (Justice System
Reform Council), 2001 Recommendations of the Justice System Reform
Council –For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, official
translation
available
at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html (last visited July
10, 2010); Wang Weiguo A Brief Introduction To The Legal Education In
China,
available
at
http://www.aals.org/2000international/english/chinaintro.htm (last visited July
10, 2010); Ding Xiangshun, The Reform of Legal Education in East Asia from
the Perspective of Comparison, 6 THE JURIST (Renmin University of China Law
School 2009); and Hou Xinyi, Modern Legal Education in China, 31 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 293 (2006).
2. See Setsuo Miyazawa et al., The Reform of Legal Education in East Asia.
4 ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 333 (2008).
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part will concentrate on the opportunities and challenges that the
legal educators are facing after drawing the key features of
different approaches in terms of education reform.
I. CONTEXT AND GOAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN CHINA AND JAPAN
China and Japan trace their legal systems to the influence of
western continental legal systems, including Germany and France.
The development of codes in China and Japan and the growth of
their economies created a demand for new legal talent. The
discussion below will highlight the features of legal education in
the two countries and provide the context for further discussion.
A. China
With the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, China began
to reconstruct her legal system and the expansion of legal
education has been rapid and dramatic. There were only two
functioning law institutions at the end of the Cultural Revolution in
1977. 3 There are over 620 today, and there has been a
corresponding rapid increase in the number of law students in the
past 30 years. By the end of 2007, there were 290,000 full-time
undergraduate students, 44,000 full-time and part-time master level
postgraduate students, and 7,000 full-time and part-time doctoral
students registered in the above mentioned institutions.4 Although
coexisting with diploma programs, correspondence courses,
television education programs, etc, the mainstream in China’s legal
education system is the four-year undergraduate program (LL.B.)
offered by law institutions affiliated with public universities, which
admit high school graduates through a National Admission Test.
At the postgraduate level, there are LL.M. and doctorate programs,
3. See ZENG XIANYI & ZHANG WENXIAN, ZHONG GUO FA XUE ZHUAN YE
JIAO YU JIAO XUE GAI GE YU FA ZHAN ZHAN LUE YAN JIU 65 (High Education
Press 2002) (Zeng Xianyi is Dean Emeritus of Renmin University School of
Law and Chairman of the China Legal Education Society. Professor Zhang
Wenxian is Deputy Chairman of the China Legal Education Society. Both are
prominent law professors who are playing an important role in the development
of legal education in China.).
4. See Zeng Xianyi, FaxueJjia yu Sanshinian Hu huang Chen jiu:Rencai
Zhanlue Tuidong Fazhi Zhongguo, CHINA COMMENT 2008 at 63 (Special
Edition, Democratic Politics 2008).
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which are academically oriented and mainly aimed at nurturing
future scholars. In 1996, an additional postgraduate was created:
the Juris Master (J.M.), which was originally modeled on the
American J.D. program.5
The target of legal education in the four-year program is to
teach legal knowledge and provide a general education for students
rather than train future lawyers. It is a general arts education
program and in principle a theoretical study of the law, lacking
practical training.6 Law students are required to fulfill at least 16
core legal courses and non-law courses such as foreign languages,
physical education, even political theories like Marxism and Deng
Xiaoping theories. 7 Most graduates serve as public employees,
businessmen or women, etc, that may or may not relate directly to
the practice of law. LL.M. and doctoral programs are originally
academic-oriented programs and divided into separate sub
disciplines (majors) such as jurisprudence, legal history, civil law,
criminal law, procedure law, business law, international law,
military law, environmental and natural resources protection law;
however, most graduates have careers outside academic circles.
There is no institutional connection between the formal legal
education in higher education and the pathway to taking the bar
examinations. Historically, there have been few professional
requirements for Chinese judges, prosecutors, and lawyers. It was
not until 1986 that the national lawyer’s professional qualification
examination was implemented. Even for judges and prosecutors
between the years 1986 and 1995, there were still no qualifying
exams. In 1995, the Judges Law and Procurators Law were
changed to require the internal staff of the courts and prosecutor
offices to take a national qualifying examination. In 2001, the
Judges Law, Procurators Law and Lawyers Law were amended to
add the provision that judges and prosecutors also needed to take a
unified qualification examination. The unified national judicial
examination has been administered annually since 2002. The only
5. See Setsuo Miyazawa et al., supra note 2, at 335.
6. Id. at 336.
7 . The 16 core courses are jurisprudence, Chinese constitutional law,
administrative law and procedure, Chinese legal history, civil law, civil
procedure, criminal law, criminal procedure, commercial law, intellectual
property, business law, public international law, private international law,
international business law, labor law and social security, and environment law
and the protection of resources.
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educational requirements to qualify to sit for the unified national
judicial examination are that one holds an undergraduate degree or,
in some economically deprived regions, completes a shorter, threeyear college education.
There are no legal educational
requirements, so about one half of those who have passed the
examination do not have any formal legal education.8
B. Japan
In Japan, modern legal education was established during the
1870s in the period of Meiji and reformed after World War II.
There are nearly 100 undergraduate law faculties, with
approximately 200,000 students.9 Since their introduction in the
late nineteenth century, though, these undergraduate law faculties
have never been considered as part of the educational process for
future lawyers. 10 Law faculties have functioned as general
education programs to produce a workforce for business,
government, and other walks of life. An undergraduate law degree
(LL.B.) is not required for one to take the national bar
examination, which was established in 1948. As in China,
undergraduate legal education in Japan is a general arts education,
and therefore, social science courses are mandatory. Compared to
China, however, postgraduate legal education is less representative
and focuses on nurturing scholars for law faculties.
To become a judge, public prosecutor, or practicing attorney,
one must usually pass the bar examination, and complete the
training at the Legal Training and Research Institute for one and a
half years (two years for those who entered the Institute prior to
1998). Before 2006, the old system of legal education and training
of lawyers in Japan consisted only of taking the national bar exam
and participating in an apprenticeship administered by the Supreme
Court. Under this system of selection of lawyers, anyone is
8. There are no official statistics released. That information, nevertheless,
has been disclosed at meetings where the author attended in his capacity of
member of the research group for the national bar examination set by the
Ministry of Justice. Professor Huai Xiaofeng, president of the national bar
examination, disclosed that in 2004 the pass rate for applicants without formal
legal education was 2% higher than the one for those applicants with formal
legal education.
9. See Setsuo Miyazawa et al., supra note 2, at 340.
10. Id.
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qualified to sit for the examination, but those who have completed
the study of liberal arts required for obtaining the bachelor's degree
are exempt from the first phase of the examination, which is
regarded as a qualification test.11 Because completion of formal
legal education is not a requirement, a large number of people take
the national bar examination and most of them also attend crammer
schools where they concentrate on exam skills education.
Therefore, although most of those who pass the bar examination
are actually graduates of undergraduate (or postgraduate) law
faculties, their legal education is provided to a significant degree
by crammer schools. 12 This has led to the double schools
phenomenon (a trend of going to two schools, the university and
the preparatory school) that was criticized to be a waste of
educational resources and as merely acquiring the techniques
needed for passing the examination “rather than a sound education
by legal educators in Japan.”13

11. The bar examination consists of two examinations (i.e., first and second
examinations).
The first examination is conducted to determine whether the examinee has a
sufficient level of cultural knowledge and academic skills to take the second
examination. Those applicants that have completed the study of liberal arts
required for obtaining the bachelor degree in university are exempted from this
first examination.
The second examination is comprised of a written (Q&As and essays) and
an oral test. The Q&As are on the Constitution of Japan, the Civil Code, and the
Penal Code. The essays and the oral test are on the Constitution of Japan, the
Civil Code, the Penal Code, the Commercial Law, an optional subject on
procedural law, and an optional subject on other laws. Since 2000, the optional
subjects have been abolished, and the essays are on the six subjects of the
Constitution of Japan, the Civil Code, the Penal Code, the Commercial Law, the
Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure; while the oral test
is
on
five
subjects,
excluding
Commercial
Law.
See
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/0620system.html (last visited July 10,
2010).
12. See Setsuo Miyazawa et al., supra note 2, at 341.
13. See Peter A. Joy et al., Building Clinical Legal Education Programs in a
Country without a Tradition of Graduate Professional Legal Education: Japan
Educational Reform as a Case Study 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 417 (2006).
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II. LEGAL EDUCATIONAL REFORMS
IN CHINA AND JAPAN SINCE 1990S
Since the end of the twentieth century, legal education in China
and Japan started to experience reform both institutionally and
pedagogically. A common feature of those changes was the
introduction of postgraduate professional law schools to existing
undergraduate legal education or replacing undergraduate legal
education with postgraduate professional law schools.14
In China, legal educational reform started from the middle of
the 1990s, when the educational authority initiated the J.M., which
is similar to the J.D. from American law schools. This program is
offered to students without requiring them to major in law during
their undergraduate studies. From 1996 to 2009, the number of
law schools approved to hold a J.M. program increased from eight
to 115, and the number of enrolled students increased from 425 to
40,000. Since its introduction, a total of 50,000 students have
received their J.M. degrees.15
In Japan, in 2001 and upon recommendation of the
government, the Justice System Reform Council (JSRC) 16 was
created. The JSRC called for a complete overhaul of legal
education in Japan and the creation of new “professional” law
schools that would “bridge theoretical education and practical
education” and provide students with the opportunity to acquire the
specialized legal knowledge, lawyer skills, and professional values
“necessary for solving actual legal problems.” The JSRC defined
law schools as “professional schools providing education specially
for the training for the legal profession.”17Amongst the goals of
JSRC are: (a) to create a three-year program; (b) to ensure
14. See Setsuo Miyazawa et al., supra note 2, at 333.
15. See Zeng Xianyi, Zhong Guo Fa Lv Shuo Shi Zhuan Ye Xue Wei Jiao Yu
de Chuang Ban Yu Fa Zhan, 3 JURIST REVIEW 113 (Renmin University Law
School 2007).
16. The JSRC is a panel body created by the government under the cabinet
from July, 1999 to June, 2001, for discussing and clarifying the issues and
direction of the judicial reform in Japan. On June 12, 2001, the JSRC presented
its recommendations for a comprehensive reform of the justice system to the
cabinet and the reform was implemented by the Japanese government.
17. See Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council-For a
Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html (last
visited July 10, 2010).
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diversity by admitting students from a broad range of academic
disciplines and students with real-world experience; (c) to enhance
critical and analytical skills, creativity, and skill in advocacy
through small classes (less than 50 students), with extensive use of
interactive discussion (rather than one-way lecture); (d) to bridge
theory and practice, partly by hiring a substantial number of
adjunct faculty members; (e) to achieve quality control by
chartering standards, periodical third-party accreditation after
chartering, and other measures of accountability; (f) to practice
strict grading and evaluation of students; and (g) to provide a
“thorough education such that a significant ratio of successful
graduates (e.g., 70 to 80%) can pass the new exam,” so that
“students can concentrate on their coursework.”18
As part of the reforms in Japan, 68 new Japanese professional
law schools (Houka Daigakuin) opened their doors in April 2004,
and there were 74 new law schools by April 2008. The annual
enrollment of students is over 6000.19
With the establishment of new law schools, the new national
bar examination (which only admitted graduates of new Japanese
law schools) was established in 2006. The current national bar
examination and the new Japanese law examination will coexist
during the period 2006 to 2011. In 2011, the new national bar
examination will completely replace the current one (old bar
examination), which means basically only graduates from Japanese
law schools will be qualified to sit for the bar examination and to
practice law in Japan.
III. WHY MODELED ON AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS?
SOME COMPARISONS ON BACKGROUND AND MOTIVE
Some scholars view the reforms in the two countries as the
introduction of elements of the American system of legal
education. 20 American-style professional education has had an
impact on the reforms of legal education in these two countries;
therefore, it is better to make an analysis on why the two countries
introduced American legal education elements as the direction of

18. See Setsuo Miyazawa et al., supra note 2, at 343.
19. Id. at 346.
20. Id. at 343.
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the reforms and how American professional legal education
systems affected the new systems in China and Japan.
The motivations and inspirations for initiating the reforms of
legal education in the two countries are different. Nevertheless,
since the late 1990s, both in China and Japan emerged demands for
numerous legal talents with high quality. The knowledge-oriented
legal education could not meet the demand for nurturing
competitive legal talents in the newly complicated legal services
environment.
In China, the authority described the motivations of
establishing the J.M. degree in the official approving document,
and stated:
With the development of the socialist market economy and
the deepening of reform and opening to the outside world,
the legal matters relating to all kinds of economic activities
and social development and social stability is getting
complicated, specialized and international in terms of scale
and level, thus a large number of high quality professionals
and managements talents, especially a number of high level
legal practical and managerial legal talents who may meet
the need of market economy and legal construction, are
required in the legislature, judiciary, prosecution and legal
service. But the current legal graduate education and the
situation of the legal profession can not meet such need as
following: first, generally the graduate education is still
academic-oriented and far away from the practical
requirement; second, the scale of graduate education can
not meet the increasing demand in terms of quality and
quantity from practical circles.21
Since the late 1970s, China has begun to take the policy of
reform and opening up, by reconstructing its legal system. In the
past 30 years, there has been rapid and continuous economic
growth in China. Meanwhile, legal matters have become
increasingly complicated leading to a rapid and substantial increase
in legal needs and a demand for high-level legal talent. Thus, the
21. GUAN YU ZAI WO GUO SHE ZHI HE SHI BAN FA LV ZHUAN YE SHUO
SHI XUE WEI DE JI DIAN YUAN ZE YI JIAN (Commission of Degree of State
Council, May 12, 1994). See ZHONGGUO FALV SHUOSHI ZHUANYE XUEWEI
JIAOYU DE SHIJIAN YU TANSUO 10 (Huo Xiandan ed. 2001).
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need arose for a legal education program at a postgraduate level
that could produce a large number of high-level talents to work in
practice. 22 But obviously as traditional lecture-oriented courses
could not meet the demand, some officials in the Ministry of
Justice joined with scholars to submit a report in 1994 proposing to
introduce an American-style legal education. Afterwards, a
committee jointly with the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of
Education, as well as some prominent scholars was established for
the preparation of a new program. Although this new program is
modeled on the American J.D. program, it was named Jurist
Master because it is equivalent to a master degree in the Chinese
degree system. Throughout this process, the Ministry of Justice
played an important role in pushing the adoption of a new legal
education program and is still involved in the approval and
supervision in J.M programs. In China, usually the administration
of education, not administration of justice, controls the legal
education. The two ministries jointly approving and supervising
the J.M. programs shows the determination of bridging education
and practice: so that law graduates may meet the demand of legal
practice.
Whereas in China reformation originated with the government,
in Japan the pressure came from within the business community,
especially from Kendanren (Federation of Economic
Organizations), which has been the most powerful interest group in
postwar Japan. In May 1998, Kendanren proposed to establish
postgraduate professional law schools as a measure to increase the
number of better-educated lawyers with a broader background.23
Such proposal was adopted by the then governing Liberal
Democracy Party (LDP). LDP’s proposed report for
comprehensive reform, issued in June 1998, led to the
establishment of the Justice System Reform Council (JSRC), under
the cabinet on July 27, 1999. The composition of JSRC also
indicated the impact and concern from society: seven of the 13
members of JSRC were appointed from outside legal circles. In
the recommendation submitted by JSRC on June 12, 1999, JSRC
called on a comprehensive reform to meet the demand to access to
justice for Japanese citizens. In order to access justice, a greater
number of practicing lawyers was required, more than those Japan
22. See Setsuo Miyazawa et al., supra note 2, at 336.
23. Id. at 342.
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had to offer at the time. Hence, JSRC prioritized an increase in the
number of lawyers, setting a goal to triple the number of new
lawyers by 2010 and recommending the establishment of law
schools at a postgraduate level by 2004 as a centerpiece of the new
system.24 In the JSRC recommendation, the system of selection of
lawyers was criticized because lawyers (including judges and
prosecutors) were selected by a single method–the national bar
examination administered by the Ministry of Justice. The
disconnection between bar examination and legal education in
universities implied a waste of social resources, which in turn led
to a lower quality of future lawyers.
Since the systems could meet the demand of increasing a large
number of lawyers with high quality needed in a transformed
society, a new system that was designed to educate a large number
of lawyers with high quality legal talents emerged in 2004 in
Japan.
Both in China and Japan, increasing the number of high quality
lawyers became the motivation and goal behind creating new law
schools, which also contributed to the introduction of an American
influenced legal education. However, different from the demand
of increasing the number of lawyers (addressed by the Economic
Organization in Japan), was the discussion in China relating to
increasing the number of high quality legal professionals. This
discussion in China remained within the legal circles of the country
and the introduction of a new legal education system was
conducted by the internal documents issued by the Chinese
Ministries of Justice and of Education. It is obvious the reform of
legal education and the establishment of Japanese law schools
emerged within the context of comprehensive reform initiated by
the cabinet and stipulated by laws passed by the legislature. The
reaction to the demands for creating a new legal education system
and the approaches that introduced an American type legal
education determined partly the contents and characteristics of the
new legal education systems in the two countries.

24. Id. at 340.
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IV. EXTENT OF SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE AMERICAN LAW
SCHOOLS AND THE J.M. PROGRAMS AND JAPANESE LAW SCHOOLS
Although the designers of the new legal education systems
claimed they modeled or took as reference the American-style
legal education, the characteristics are quite different from
American law school. Therefore, a comparison with American law
schools becomes crucial for observing the new legal education
systems in the two countries.
The J.M. program allow students from diverse backgrounds at
undergraduate level to study law in their postgraduate law schools,
which is quite similar to the American system. However, different
from the four LSAT subjects in the United States, the scope of
subjects for the admission test includes law subjects such as
Chinese legal history, constitutional law, civil law, criminal law,
etc. The diversification of law students in Japan is implemented by
admitting students who major in non-law degrees in undergraduate
studies. But quite different from China, and similarly to the United
States, Japan’s Ministry of Education authorized two organizations
to administer aptitude tests for law school applicants. These tests
exclude the subjects of law, and law schools are allowed to choose
either of them as the standard for admission. Students who achieve
a good score on either or both of these tests and obtain a good GPA
in their undergraduate studies are admitted to Japanese law
schools. In China, many scholars criticized that it does not make
sense to test the legal knowledge of those who have not yet studied
law, but there are no signs of change to the current way of testing
and offering admission.25
Unlike the U.S. law schools, the new J.M. program (or new law
school system) is based on the old undergraduate-oriented legal
education systems in China and Japan. Therefore, the new
programs have to deal with the graduates who have already
obtained LL.B. degrees.
In China, J.M. programs recruit two types of students: full-time
students and part-time students from 1995 to 2009. Only those
who were non-law majors could be qualified to apply as full-time
students and sit for the admission examination. But for those who
25. Wang Jian, Zhongguo Falv Shuoshi Jiaoyu de Chuangban Fazhan yu
Chengjiu: 1996—2006, 5 LAW AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 59 (2007); and Fang
Liufang, Falv Shuoshi Jiaoyu Mianlin de Sange Wenti, 1 THE JOURNAL OF
CHINA UNIVERSITY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW 101 (2007).
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have working experiences and apply for the part-time program,
even law major undergraduates, are eligible. Nevertheless, since
2009, the Education Administration decided to extend the scale of
J.M. programs and even those who major in law as undergraduates
are permitted to apply for full-time J.M. programs. This raised a
new problem of how to teach students who have different
backgrounds and various levels of legal knowledge. In Japan, the
length of studying terms differed based on the backgrounds of
students: two-year programs for law major students and three-year
programs for non-law major students as undergraduates. But even
graduates from law schools are required to pass a legal ability
examination to test whether the ability of the examinee on legal
knowledge is eligible for the two-year program. Students who fail
the exam have to attend the three-year program in law school
although they may have completed their undergraduate legal
education.
To reach the goal of educating highly qualified lawyers or legal
talents, the new J.M. program or new law schools have to find
qualified faculty with real world experience practicing law. But
different from American law faculty with practical experiences,
Japanese and Chinese law professors rarely have practical
experience outside the classroom. To resolve such a problem, the
Japanese legislature passed a law in which judges and prosecutors
are dispatched to teach at Japanese law schools for some time
when their positions are suspended. However, there are no
complete changes in the teaching faculties in Chinese J.M.
programs and the old academic-oriented faculty members are still
the main teaching body in J.M. programs. Therefore, although
some changes in pedagogies emerged, the new J.M. program does
not distinguish from the old legal education system in China.
However, in Japan, lined up with practical legal education, the
government set up many guidelines regulating new law schools.
These guidelines include: limitations on class size, and the
initiation of new practical curriculum; these regulations have made
the new Japanese law schools more independent.
Since 2006, and as part of a systemic comprehensive reform in
Japan, the new bar examination–to which only graduates from
Japanese law school are allowed to sit–coexists with the old bar
examination system. In 2011, and once the old examination that
everyone can sit is cancelled, those applicants who have never
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graduated from a Japanese law school will have to take a special
examination in order to obtain qualification to sit at the new
(predictably limited) bar examination. In China no changes
connected with the qualification for the bar examination have been
produced by the creation of the J.M. program. The system for
obtaining legal professional qualification is still separated from
legal education. There are no limitations for applicants on whether
they have finished formal legal education, for sitting for the unified
professional examination. There are no institutional connections
between legal education (even in the J.M. program) and bar
examination in China, and hence this is different from the new
Japanese law schools and American law schools.
From the comparison of institutional changes between
Japanese law schools and Chinese J.M. programs, we may
conclude that the system of Japanese law schools is much closer to
the American legal education than the Chinese J.M. program. The
J.M. program does not bring new elements into the Chinese legal
education system except the diversity of backgrounds for J.M.
students.
V. PEDAGOGICAL CHANGES FOLLOWING THE REFORMS OF LEGAL
EDUCATION IN THE TWO COUNTRIES.
China and Japan share many similarities in legal education.
The goal of legal education was not traditionally to nurture legal
professionals. Most applicants who successfully pass the bar
examination are law graduates and the demands from legal circles
also require law institutes to conduct skill education, combining
theory and practice.
Although the approaches on the legal education reforms in
China and Japan are different, the goals for the new programs are
similar. Both seek to foster highly specialized professionals with
social responsibility, which means building new teaching
methodologies. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century,
both countries started to take some measures to teach law students
legal skills rather than doctrinal education.
The main
methodologies of teaching lawyering skills in China and Japan are
emerging in J.M. programs and Japanese law schools.
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A. Simulation and Moot Court Programs
In both China and Japan, the simulation teaching method is
used widely in lecture and seminar classes. To encourage students
to master lawyering skills, law schools in China usually provide
context to simulate the true case and use a moot courtroom for
simulation training. Some law schools organize moot court
competitions as a student activity rather than a credit course.
Sponsored by grants, some top law schools have even organized
national moot court competitions, such as the Jessup International
Law Moot Court Competition organized by Renmin University
School of Law.
In Japan, simulation combined with case method and seminars
has been adopted in the traditional law faculties gradually. Since
2004, they are widely used in the new Japanese law schools.26
B. Internship and Externship
Externships are required for law students with a high GPA in
China. Students are typically assigned to institutions relating to
law enforcement or judicial organs, such as courts and offices of
prosecutors at all levels, in addition to law firms as well as
governmental agencies to observe legal practices.
However, because of the rapid increase in the number of law
schools, some schools cannot provide opportunities and platforms
for externships for all law students. Furthermore, due to the lack
of supervision by experienced faculty members or lawyers, the
effect of an externship depends on law schools and the supervisors,
and hence, does not play an important role in legal education.
C. Clinical Legal Education
Clinical legal education was introduced into China and Japan
in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Educators in the two
counties are starting to be convinced that clinical legal education
can help train law students on the lawyering skills and values
necessary for the delivery of high-quality legal services into the
new century.

26. See Peter A. Joy et al., supra note 13, at 441.
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In September 2000, with the support from the Ford Foundation,
clinical legal education programs based on the American model
were offered by seven top law schools in China. In addition, as of
January of 2009, 87 law schools in China opened clinical legal
education courses as selective two or three-credit courses.27
In Japan, with the establishment of the new J.D. program,
clinical legal education has been transplanted into the new legal
education system as an important approach to help Japan transform
its legal profession. According to a study of 2006, from the 74
new Japanese law schools, as many as 52 schools claim to offer
clinic courses. Though some of these law schools have only
externship programs, a majority of the law schools offering clinical
courses have adopted a combination of legal clinics, simulation
courses, and externships. Among these, there are ten law schools
that are known to have established in-house law offices on
campus.28
VI. FACING THE FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF
LEGAL EDUCATION IN CHINA AND JAPAN
In China and Japan, the demand for high-level legal talents in
the development of a global market economy is the motivation and
inspiration for the reforms of legal education and the legal
profession. As mentioned above, the legal education systems in
these two countries are in a transitional process from the tradition
of lecture-oriented to more professional and more skill-oriented
education. How to train law students to master lawyering skills
and have law students with practical abilities enter into the legal
community is becoming critical to complete these goals, for this
reason, the J.M. program in the Chinese and the Japanese law
schools was introduced as one important step of nurturing better
trained lawyers.
Nevertheless, in China, neither the J.M. program nor other
programs like undergraduate law programs and LL.M. programs
relate to obtaining legal professional qualification, either for the
purposes of taking the bar exam or for demonstrating that the
27. See the contents of the official website of the Committee of Chinese
Clinical Legal Educators (CCCLE), available at www.cliniclaw.cn (last visited
July 10, 2010).
28. See Peter A. Joy et al., supra note 13, at 446.
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student acquired lawyering skills. If students intend to take the bar
examination, they focus heavily on the doctrinal courses.
Therefore, even if law schools provide some lawyering skills
education for students, these kind of courses are not considered as
important as some basic courses like civil law, procedure laws, etc.
which are tested in the national bar examination. In China, there
are no mandatory courses of lawyering skills in the curriculum of
law schools.
In Japan, due to the great number of approved new law schools
and the low pass rate of the national bar examination, students at
law schools have to struggle with the examination after graduation
as the first step to becoming a lawyer. It is not surprising that
students also focus on all examination skills or knowledge that
helps them pass the national bar examination.29
The critical element of expanding lawyering skills is to
convince students that, not just the bar examination, but also skills
training is important for becoming a lawyer. Better training will
help in their future performance. In my view, the development of
lawyering skill education in both China and Japan must come from
those who design the bar examination and from the legal
educators. For China, the legal educators have to redesign the goal
of legal education to give greater importance to training lawyers
and should include required courses in practical skills along with
those providing doctrinal legal knowledge. The bar examination
process must consider whether to grant law graduates only the
privileges to sit for the examination. The bar examiners should
also consider whether there are ways to evaluate, not only
knowledge, but also skills. 30 Japan similarly has to face
adjustments in its bar examination, especially if the bar passage
rate does not improve.31
We can expect resistance because of the concern that law
schools will become university-based versions of crammer schools,
geared only towards passing the national bar examination. Law
schools also are facing some difficulties from inside and outside in
providing an education on lawyering skills. Unlike in the United
States and many other countries, in China and Japan there is no
29. See Setsuo Miyazawa et al., supra note 2, at 459.
30. See Zeng Xianyi, Gouzhu Faxue Jiaoyu yu Sifa Kaoshi de Xinxing
Hudong Guanxi, 4 CHINA LAWYER 18 (2002).
31. See Setsuo Miyazawa et al., supra note 2, at 459.
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established pool of experienced practitioners to serve as practical
law professor. Law professors usually hold practical experience in
contempt. Law schools have no pressure to attract experienced
lawyers to join the law faculty. In Japan, many new law schools
have recruited a selection of talented attorneys to join the faculty,
although these new members have not yet been fully integrated
into the faculty. 32 The U.S. experience also indicates that
expanding skills and clinical courses is more expensive because
classes need to be smaller to allow time for close supervision and
feedback.
In addition, the support from the bench and bar is important for
the development of lawyering skills training and clinical legal
education. In the U.S., a model student practice rule helped pave
the way for students to practice law. In China and Japan, the status
of student representation of clients in clinical legal education is
uncertain. There is a need for a student practice rule. Lawyering
skill training will not develop in both countries without legislation
permitting students to practice or without a willingness on the part
of judges, prosecutors, attorneys, and bar associations to permit a
greater number of students to be involved in legal representation.
Although the two countries are facing difficulties in conducting
professional education, opportunities also exist and more people
are convinced that lawyering skill education is highly effective in
educating future attorneys. The acceptance of the U.S. graduate
school model shows that some common legal skills exist beyond
legal systems and lawyering skill education is possible in East
Asia. The rapid development of legal clinical education in the two
countries is a good opportunity.
We can expect that the need for better trained lawyers will only
continue. First, the transition of legal practice is creating a need
for high quality legal skills. In China and Japan, the legal system
is becoming more and more adversarial. The lawyers increasingly
have to question witnesses in the court, and therefore have to
master advocacy skills. Second, law schools and law students also
demand more lawyering education. The rapid development of
legal education in the two countries has caused some chaos, but
has also brought a hard competition. Only the law schools that
may provide high quality education may survive and only law
students with high professional ability may get labor opportunities
32. Id. at 457.
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in the future. Therefore, the market mechanisms will likely affect
how both countries provide legal education in the future. Third,
private organizations and law firms have started to explore the new
way of legal skill education. International foundations have started
to sponsor more programs relating to lawyering skill programs.33

33. For example, since 2000, the Ford Foundation in China has provided the
China Clinic Legal Program. A joint program with the China Advocacy
Institute has conducted advocacy skill training in over 50 law schools over the
past four years. In addition to law schools, the trend of lawyering skills
education provided by private agencies initiated by practicing lawyers is also
developing in China.

PRESS FREEDOM IN INDONESIA:
A CASE OF DRACONIAN LAWS, STATUTORY
MISINTERPRETATION, BUT STILL ONE OF THE
FREEST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Nono Anwar Makarim*
I. Summary .................................................................................. 131
II. Introduction............................................................................. 135
III. Stretching Torts and Damages .............................................. 137
IV. Disregard of the “Public Interest” Defense ........................... 143
V. The Horse, The Rider, and The Law ...................................... 145
VI. Lex Specialis, or “Droit de Réponse”? ................................. 150
VII. Solutions, Comparatively Speaking ..................................... 152
VIII. Something Happened on the Way to Freedom ................... 156
IX. A Clause to Overturn All Clauses ......................................... 161
X. To Conclude ........................................................................... 165

I. SUMMARY
In assessing the state of press freedom in Indonesia, the keyword to look up is insult. It is listed as a crime in a special Title of
the Criminal Code the country inherited from its colonial past. The
word insult, or belediging in the original Dutch language is often
referred to in the Indonesian language as fitnah, an Arabic word.
In the Arabic lexicon, the word fitnah is linked to at least two
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references in the Holy Qur’an which define it as more cruel than
murder. Secular laws and religious condemnation lend legitimacy
to judicial intransigence to appeals for the removal of excessively
severe laws against insult. Prosecution, the judiciary, and the
majority of the Indonesian polity demand that the criminalization
of insult be maintained. Those on the other side of social critique,
which include all three branches of the state, want even harsher
punishments, stiffer fines, and larger damage awards. It is civil
society in the French meaning of the term, that is, the collectivity
of persons with individual liberty who objects to jailing critics.
Civil society in transitional democracies, constitutes a tiny minority
in urgent need of organization.
The civil suit against insult is begun by lodging a complaint
with the court. Civil Code Article 1372 allows the plaintiff to
claim real and verifiable damages, and damages for the restoration
of honor and good name. In addition, a defendant may also be
compelled to make public apologies. The article directly links the
civil code with the criminal code’s special Title XVI on Insult and
its 12 articles. The provisions under this title, articles 310-322, set
the size of fines and the terms of imprisonment. The filing of a
civil suit does not bar the public prosecutor from commencing
criminal proceedings against the defendant in the civil case if the
plaintiff had him reported to the police. The insulter may,
therefore, expect a series of punishments consisting of pecuniary
compensation for real damage, awards for restorative damages,
public apologies, criminal fines, and jail terms. Insult is a serious
matter.
In order to come within the scope of insult as defined in the
Criminal Code an accuser must deliberately direct an accusation of
certain facts to the person of the accusee. The civil suit will not be
admitted, and the accuser will escape criminal punishment, if he
has clearly acted in the public interest. The truth of the accusation
is of no importance, unless the accusation was motivated by a
public interest concern, in which case the judge may allow the
accuser to prove the truth of his accusation. These statutory rules
have not been consistently applied by the courts. In one case, an
editor wrote an angry piece sharply criticizing the installation of an
official as member of a city council notwithstanding the council’s
knowledge of the candidate’s involvement in two customs
proceedings. Public interest motive was clearly proven, and truth
of the allegation was established. The editor was sent to jail
anyway. On the other hand, failure to prove the truth of
accusations in other cases got the publications exonerated for
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reasons that they tried to cover both sides, and offered to respect
the insultees’ right of response. Not much guidance in terms of
predictability of the law here. The fact remains that a regime of
laws hostile to criticism, particularly when directed at government,
are retained in the old codes and the new statutes.
Among the restrictive provisions, three sets of laws stand out
as particularly hostile: the so-called hate-sowing articles 154-157,
the “major” lѐse majesté articles 134-137 of the Code regarding
insults directed at the president or the vice president, and the
“lesser” lѐse majesté articles 207 and 208 on insults to government
authorities. While the concordance principle had Indonesia take
over the Dutch codes lock, stock, and barrel, most of these
oppressive provisions are not to be found in the codes of the
Netherlands. They were tailor-made for the colony.
The hate-sowing articles made public expressions of feelings of
hatred, hostility, and contempt against established authority
punishable by imprisonment for up to seven years. These were
formal offences. The mere expression of those feelings is
sufficient for the prosecution to move in with indictments. These
articles were recently challenged in the Constitutional Court and
found to be in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed in the
Indonesian Constitution. The sound decision was a bit marred by
dicta expressing the Court’s relief that a new draft Penal Code
includes the very same provisions, this time as material offences.
Articles 134-137 of the Criminal Code were successfully
challenged as well. The articles protecting the president and vice
president from insults were found by the Constitutional Court to be
in contravention of the basic principle of equality before the law.
The provisions were declared unconstitutional and having no force
of effect, but then the Court proceeded to split both the president
and the vice president in two parts: The part of the individual
person has, like everybody else, recourse to Criminal Code articles
310 et seq when insulted. The presidential and vice presidential
person parts, however, were to remain protected by articles 207
and 208, the “lesser” lѐse majesté provisions in the code.
The principle of equality before the law was maintained by
pronouncing the government dignitaries subject to laws applicable
to everybody else, but promptly set aside this action by placing
them under the protective regulations for government authorities.
The issue with Criminal Code articles 207 and 208 is more
serious than was thought when the articles were simply thrown in
the grab bag of complaints filed with the Constitutional Court. Not
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only were they thought unfit to be placed in the codes of civilized
European nations and, therefore, absent from the Dutch Criminal
Code, they were also deliberately made to make it easier to
prosecute offences which are not punishable under Dutch law.
Criminal Code Article 207 withholds from offenders their right to
the defense of public interest, and removed the judicial discretion
to order offenders to prove the truth of their allegations. The
article which was specifically enacted for governing a subjugated
nation, conflicts with section 2 of article 312, a systemic part of
Title XVI, Book 2 of the Criminal Code. The section allows the
offender to present proof of his accusation against a government
official in the performance of his duties. Thus, a right granted by
law to offenders is revoked by way of choosing which law to apply
for one and the same offence. This is a violation of serious
proportions.
So far Criminal Code Articles 207 and 208 have not been
challenged in the Constitutional Court as a generically different set
of laws from other, equally oppressive provisions in the Criminal
Code. The articles have usually been lumped together with others
in the rush to request their collective repeal. In its decision on the
hate-sowing articles, the Court held the request for constitutional
review of 207 and 208 inadmissible because of a procedural
matter: the Court did not acknowledge petitioners’ legal standing
regarding the articles. In deciding the unconstitutionality of the
lѐse majesté articles, however, the Court gave a clear indication
that a request for constitutional review of Criminal Code Articles
207 and 208 would not be favorably received.
Judging from a number of decisions bearing on freedom of
expression, it seems that the Indonesian Constitutional Court has
decided to opt for the status quo rather than risk controversy. It
has consistently turned down opportunities to confirm change and
lead to a future of accountable governance. This avoidance of
change was not because there are no Asian examples of how courts
have adopted changes gracefully and responsibly. The Korean
Constitutional Court reasoned that too strict an implementation of
the requirement to prove truth and public interest would stifle
press freedom. The Japanese Supreme Court cautioned against
giving too much protection to the honor and good name of
government officials, and promotes the free flow of information
and opinion to enable the people to partake responsibly in political
decision-making. The Indonesian Constitutional Court chose to
maintain colonial and post-independence laws, which are inimical
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to freedom of expression. This was done by way of expounding on
a theory of requisite balances between rights and duties, between
the exercise of freedom and its limitation by the freedom of others.
Balances are conditions of rest. In a context of rapid change, it
conduces to abrupt changes, often violent, and always ill-prepared.
Draconian laws applied, within circumstances sometimes
described as systemic corruption, contribute to abuses of power,
selective prosecution, and miscarriage of justice. Notwithstanding
these serious obstacles to freedom of expression, Indonesia has
been listed as having one of the freest presses in Southeast Asia.
The Indonesian press is presently continuing its multilateral
engagement of the public, the state, and the courts. If the past is of
any guidance, change may have to be seized through careful
legislation and the ponderous processes in the conventional court
hierarchy.
II. INTRODUCTION
In 1941, a year before the Japanese armies routed the Dutch
military force in the then Netherlands East Indies, a middle-aged
well to do Chinese businessman absconded with a 19 year old girl
and carried on weeks of extra-marital activities with her. The daily
newspaper Keng Po took up the story in all its concupiscent
details.1 The rich man appointed a top litigator and sued for libel.
The defendant argued that the victim was only 19, while the
perpetrator had a daughter who was already 17. He also argued
that the despicable act could be construed as concubinage, a
practice forbidden by the Criminal Code, and yet fashionable
among men of means of a specific ethnicity. Keng Po was
promoting a newly emerging ethical movement called New Life,
and felt duty-bound to campaign against this disgraceful behavior.
The write-up was done for the purpose of defending the public
interest, the only excuse the Criminal Code allows to escape
punishment.
The court disagreed and held the newspaper liable for intrusion
into the plaintiff’s private life, adding that the salacious language
used in the coverage of the matter was improper. Ethical
movements must employ ethical words and phrases. Damages in

1. KENG PO, an Indonesian language daily newspaper in its editions of May
20 and 24, and June 10, 1939.
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the amount of f450 (four hundred fifty Dutch colonial guilders)2
was awarded to the plaintiff.3 At no time did the plaintiff contest
the facts stated in the newspaper coverage. The truth was
established, but truth is of little import and easily brushed aside as
insignificant in torts involving defamation. Proving the truth of an
allegation is not a right defendants have under either the Civil
Code or the Criminal Code. It is a favor the judge may bestow
only if the defendant alleges that it was public interest which
moved him to publicize the allegedly libelous statements. Judges
are not obliged to order defendants to prove their allegations even
if they were moved by considerations of public interest. Even
when public interest was accepted, and truth was established, the
defendant will still be punished.4 To establish a valid cause of
action it is sufficient for plaintiff to feel hurt by the allegation
made against him, and that it has done harm to his good name and
reputation.
Armed with the victory in the colony’s capital, the enthused
abductor proceeded to file a suit against a publication in the town
of Semarang covering the same matter. The Semarang court
awarded damages in the amount of f500 but startled the legal
fraternity when it held the writer, the editor and publisher liable as
joint actors in the commission of the offence.5 The decision
contravened consistently upheld rulings of the Dutch Supreme
Court that ex-article 1372 Civil Code damages claims:
(i)
are only admitted against defendants who deliberately
commit the offence,6 and that
(ii)
publishers can be held liable only if they have prior
knowledge of the libelous content of writings appearing
in their publications.7
2. When asked what f450 would be in today’s currency, octogenarians
interviewed recalled that it would probably buy three Raleigh 3-speed bicycles.
3. Raad van Justitie, Batavia First Chamber, August 22, 1941, Tijdschrift
van het Recht (“T”) 154, at 730-731.
4. See infra page 15 and note 36.
5. The Matahari case was referenced in the case report on the Batavia Raad
van Justitie (the Court of First Instance for Europeans and those who had
submitted themselves to the Civil Code by, in this case for instance, by claiming
a cause of action pursuant to Article 1372 of the code) decision, id. at 734. No
separate report on the case is available.
6. Hoge Raad, December 19, 1913, N.J. 1914, at 305 (as cited by the author
of the end-note to the Batavia court decision, writing under the initials of “v.
H.”).
7. Hoge Raad, April 9, 1926, N.J. 1926, at 525 (cited by the same author of
the above-cited end-note.).
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The precedents regarding this matter should by no means be
interpreted as barring damage suits against publishers in an
increasingly complex management structure of modern
newspapers. A negligent publisher can always be held accountable
for libel damages, but the suit ought to be brought on the basis of
his status as employer of the editor. The suit may be filed pursuant
to Article 1367 of the Civil Code which provides that employers
may be held liable for torts committed by their employees.8
Deciding on the choice between an Article 1367 cause of action
and a suit pursuant to Article 1372 has pecuniary consequences.
Courts insist that the measure of damages claimed under the tort
articles proper9 must be strictly confined to real and quantifiable
damage incurred. The fat prize is given to claims under Article
1372 which provides for both quantifiable and immaterial
damages.10
III. STRETCHING TORTS AND DAMAGES
Mr. Cohen lived in Amsterdam. He was in the printing
business. Sometime, in the early twentieth century, he managed to
persuade an employee of Mr. Lindenbaum, his business
competitor, to divulge company secrets in exchange for certain
promises. For an extended period of time Mr. Cohen became the
Dutch Supreme Court precedents may be applied to similar cases in
Indonesia pursuant to the so-called concordance principle. See Sections (1) and
(2) of Article 159 of the Law on the Governance of the State of the Netherlands
East Indies (Law of September 2, 1854, State Gazette of the Netherlands:
S.1854-2, State Gazette of the Netherlands Indies: S. 1855-2 jo 1).
Note also that almost all of the articles of the Indonesian Civil Code,
Commercial Code, Criminal Code, and Civil Procedural Code have their Dutch
code counterpart article numbers printed on the side of each page. Indonesian
law codes are basically old Dutch codes.
8. See “v. H.” end notes to the Batavia court report in T.154, at 735-737; “v.
H.” is thought to be the initials of the very prominent Criminal Law scholar
Professor W.F.C. van Hattum, co-author with Professor J.M. van Bemmelen of
one of the leading texts on Criminal Law, the 2-volume HAND- EN LEERBOEK
VAN HET NEDERLANDSE STRAFRECHT.
9. INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1365-1371.
10. INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1372:
The civil suit regarding insult aims at compensating the damage, and at
curing the loss suffered in honor and good name.
In the valuation thereof the judge shall pay attention to the degree of
grossness of the insult, besides the condition, status and the wealth of
the adversaries.
(the unofficial translation from the Dutch original is the author’s).
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recipient of lists of customers, the range of prices charged, and
contents of letters marketing Lindenbaum’s products and services,
all highly confidential information of the competitor’s business.
Mr. Cohen’s business flourished, while Mr. Lindenbaum’s
declined. The cause of this unfortunate course of event was soon
discovered, and Mr. Lindenbaum sued for damages under the civil
code’s general tort article 1401.11 On 18 March 1918 the Court of
Appeal in Amsterdam rejected Lindenbaum’s claim on the theory
that Cohen did not commit any act which was prohibited under the
law.12 The fault element, indispensible for the determination of a
tort, was missing. Lindenbaum appealed, and the Supreme Court
gave him what he wanted, and in the process shocked the Dutch
legal community.13 The core article for tort, literally an unlawful
act, Indonesian Civil Code Article 1365, required the presence of
the following elements:
(i)
the commission or omission of an act;
(ii)
the act is unlawful; hence the existence of a fault;
(iii) the act has caused harm to another person or property
owned by another;
(iv)
the harm is caused directly and immediately after the
Act;
The decision by the highest court in the Netherlands held that,
in addition to the aforementioned ingredients, tort could also be
established if the defendant’s action is:
(v)
in conflict with his obligation, or
(vi)
violates the principle of morality, or
(vii) contravenes the duty of care, or propriety in social
interaction towards other persons, or towards the
property of others.
The decision became a precedent in the Netherlands and,
through the concordance principle,14 was faithfully followed by
courts in Indonesia. It was occasionally, either by mistake or
11. The referenced article number is for the Dutch Civil Code (old); its
Indonesian counterpart is INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1365.
12. The Cohen-Lindenbaum case, Hooggerechtshof (court of appeal) of
Amsterdam, March 18, 1918, N.J. 1918, at 1094; see also A. PITLO, HET
VERBINTENISSENRECHT NAAR HET NEDERLANDS BURGERLIJK WETBOEK 218219 (3rd print. 1952).
13. The Cohen-Lindenbaum case, Hoge Raad, January 31, 1919, N.J. 1919,
at 161; it was said that the aim and consequence of the decision was like the
introduction of a new Book in the civil code. See also H.F.A. VÖLLMAR,
INLEIDING NEDERLANDS BURGERLIJK RECHT, N.V. 467 (Uitgevers-Maatschappij
W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, 1955).
14. See supra note 6.
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design, used by plaintiffs to expand the reach of the special tort of
insult. On May 24, 1999, one year after the fall of president
Suharto, Time Magazine came out with an issue covering the
financial exploits of a family who had been in power in Indonesia
for over 32 years.15 The coverage used terms and phrases such as:
(i)
Suharto Inc.
(ii)
How Indonesia’s longtime boss built a family fortune;
and
(iii) A staggering sum of money linked to Indonesia had
been shifted from a bank in Switzerland to another in
Austria, now considered a safer haven for hush bank
deposits.
The family sued Time for libel. The case was thrown out by
both the court of first instance16 and the court of appeal.17 The
Supreme Court, however, overruled the lower courts’ decisions
and awarded damages in the staggering amount of Rp. 189
trillion.18 In its decision, the panel of Justices19 adopted plaintiff’s
argument that the lower courts failed to take sufficient note of
plaintiff’s brief in their reasoning for rejecting the cause of action.
Lawyers for the plaintiff filed their double-barreled claim by using
the general tort article 1365 concurrently with the special tort
article 1372 on insult. Civil Code Article 1365 was resorted to for
its expansive reach pursuant to the 1919 Dutch Supreme Court
decision.20 Obviously, Article 1372 was employed not merely
because it is the legally designated basis for defamation suits, but
more importantly because it allows plaintiff to claim both
quantifiable and verifiable damage, and whatever amount of
money it takes to restore the good name and reputation of the
victim. Having taken advantage of the wide reach of torts pursuant
to Cohen vs Lindenbaum, plaintiff proceeded to substitute the
doctrine of objective criteria for the strict requirement under
Criminal Code Article 310, to prove that the defendant had
15. Major-General Suharto seized power in March 1966 and was forced to
step down in 1998.
16. Suharto v. Time Inc., Central Jakarta District Court, June 6, 2000,
Decision No.338/PDT.G/1999/PN.JKT.PST.
17. Suharto v. Time Inc., Jakarta High Court, March 16, 2001, Decision
No.551/PDT/2000/PT.DKI.
18. Suharto v. Time Inc., Supreme Court, August 30, 2007, Decision No.
3215K/PDT/200. The Rp.-US$ exchange rate at the time was approximately
Rp.10.000,- to the US$.
19. The panel consisted of a military judge, acting as chairman of the panel,
and two religious court judges.
20. See supra note 11.
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committed the defamatory act deliberately.
The doctrine
originated in the cause-and-effect theory of the general tort. It was
alleged that the modern theory of objective criteria has superseded
the ancient dolus and animus injuriandi concepts of the Criminal
Code. The objective criteria theory would have the actor liable if
he was aware that the impact of his deed would result in a specific
effect on the victim. In the heat of an international campaign
against corruption, it wasn’t easy to assess the specific effects of an
investigative report on a fallen leader who had been ill for some
time.21 Domestic and international coverage of the accumulated
wealth of Suharto’s family prior to Time’s May 1999 issue had
been widespread and intensive with no noticeable reaction from
either Suharto himself or his family.22
The Supreme Court almost paraphrased plaintiff’s brief,
overruled the lower courts’ decisions, took over the matter, and
awarded damages in the exact amount demanded by plaintiff.
Upon judicial review a different panel of judges of the same court
overruled the decision, and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions.
The court held that Time fulfilled norms governing the activities of
21. Suharto has been in ill health before his forced retirement.
BBCIndonesia.com reported on May 19, 2006 that the fallen leader has had
intensive testing done during a 3-day stay (July 9-11, 1996) at the Heart Center
in Bad Oeyenhausen, Germany; he suffered a light stroke on July 20, 1999 and
was rushed to the hospital, and since then had been in and out of hospital for
bleeding intestines, appendicitis operations, pace-maker implant, lung infection,
difficulty in breathing, and high fevers. In August 2002 the Indonesian Supreme
Court ordered the suspension of court proceedings against Suharto pending an
examination on his condition of frequent lapses of memory, emotional flare-ups
due to irritation caused by incapacity to express thoughts in words, and speaking
difficulty reducing communication to 4 words at a time. See on the late
president,
IndonesiaNow
BlogSpot,
available
at
http://theindonesianowulasan.blogspot.com/2008/01/jejak-soeharto-di-rumahsakit.html (last visited July 10, 2010).
22. Note that the Time publication at issue was the investigative report
appearing in its Volume 153, No. 20, of May 24, 1999. That was preceded by
the daily MERDEKA on September 15, 1998 likening Suharto to the Pharaoh
depicted in religious texts as the epitome of evil and sinfulness; the daily
KOMPAS on November 17, 1998 carrying a report that the assembly of all
university rectors in the country demanded the tracing of Suharto’s assets; the
newsweekly magazine GATRA on August 15, 1998 had a caricature on its cover
depicting a drowning Suharto in a basket with US$100 bills and the caption in
big letters Assets of Cendana [i.e. Suharto’s private residence] in Switzerland
and Austria; THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW A Monopoly is Forever
(February 26, 1987); THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (April 6, 1998):
SUHARTO Inc.; Things Fall Apart, THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW
(May 13, 1999); and many more publications.
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the press, and the content and wording of the coverage were within
the scope of journalistic ethics. It concluded that the investigative
report in question did not meet the requirements for it to be
adjudged an unlawful act.23 The Judicial Review panel, headed by
Chief Justice Tumpa, indicated that the May 24, 1999, Time issue
should be seen within the context of the national anti-corruption
campaign. The court stated that the media’s depiction of former
president Suharto as a target of investigation must not be deemed
an intent to defame. It was the People’s Consultative Assembly,
the nation’s highest political authority, which passed a resolution
mandating the investigation of the former president.24 The Court
finally ruled that defamation suits should be exclusively filed
under Civil Code Article 1372.25 That seems to confirm the
communis opinio doctorum that for tort without deliberateness the
plaintiff is directed to seek remedies offered by Civil Code Articles
1365-1371, and that suits against deliberate insults are dealt with
by Civil Code Articles 1372-1380, with specific reference to
Criminal Code Articles 310 et seq. It has led scholars to refer to
Civil Code Articles 1365-1371 as the lex generalis of tort, and
Articles 1372-1380 as the lex specialis26 for the specific tort of
insult.
The distinction is of special importance for pecuniary and
procedural purposes. Under Civil Code Articles 1365-1371,
plaintiffs may only sue for damages which are quantifiable and
verifiable. These must be real, calculated in detail, and supported
by evidence. The general tort articles do not support claims for
immaterial damages unless the tort resulted in a death or
permanent disability.27 Claims for immaterial damages to restore
23. The Supreme Court’s Judicial Review decision is cited as
No.273PK/PDT/2008 of April 16, 2009.
24. PEOPLE’S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION (Ketetapan,
sometimes abbreviated as Tap) No. XI/MPR/1998 of November 13, 1998.
25. This view finds considerable support in the leading texts on private law.
See C. ASSER, HANDLEIDING TOT DE BEOEFENING VAN HET NEDERLANDS
BURGERLIJK RECHT, Derde Deel – Verbintenissenrecht, Tweede Stuk: De
Overeenkomst en de Verbintenis Uit de Wet, bewerkt door Mr. L.E.H. Rutten,
N.V. Uitgevers-Maatschappij, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle (1954), at 619.
26. Jan de Meij, Freedom of the Press and Defamation in the Netherlands,
unpublished paper submitted at Law Colloquium 2004: From Insult to Slander,
Defamation and Freedom of the Press, Jakarta, July 28-29, 2004.
27. INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1370 and 1371 allow for claims for loss of
support for the family of the victim of a tort resulting in death, and for claims for
the loss of livelihood in case the victim is incapacitated for life due to injuries
sustained as a consequence of the tort.
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the victim’s good name and reputation must be based on an action
against insult, and the suit must be based on Civil Code Articles
1372-1380.
Another feature of importance in distinguishing the lex
specialis of the tort of insult from the general tort provisions, the
lex generalis, is that the former is not self-contained within the
private law system. In order to define insult, one has to consult the
Criminal Code. Historically, Civil Code Articles 1365-1380 were
part of the original civil code which was promulgated in 1847.28
But articles 1372-1380 were substantially amended in 1917 linking
them closer to the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedural
Code.29 The amendments were announced in the State Gazette
which promulgated the Dutch Criminal Code in the colony.30 Six
of the 9 articles on defamation have clear links mentioned in the
articles with the Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes.31 Only
two of the general tort articles share this feature.32 Finally, the
most obvious distinction between the general tort of Civil Code
Articles 1365-1371 and the special tort articles 1372-1380 is that
the former insist on the presence of the element of fault, culpa,
while the latter come into motion upon proof of dolus,
deliberateness, the animus injuriandi.
Note that the Court of First Instance, adjudicating the Suharto
vs. Time suit, found no cause of action in its decision on June 6,
2000, and that the Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s
judgment on March 16, 2001. There was a wait of no less than 6
years before a Supreme Court panel overturned the lower courts’
decisions, and awarded a spectacular Rp. 1 trillion damages to the
plaintiff. In the meantime, another celebrated case was making its
way to court.

28. STAATSBLAD (State Gazette) 1847 No. 23.
29. Reference to the changes are provided (between brackets) in lines before
the texts of articles 1372, 1373, 1375-1377, and 1380.
30. STAATSBLAD 1917 No. 497.
31. Explicit references, at the end of the wording of the article, are called
schakel bepalingen (linked provisions) to either the criminal code and the
Criminal Procedural Code are to be found in INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1372,
1373, and 1376-1379.
32. INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1365 on general tort refers to criminal code
article 382bis on unfair competition or fraudulence in competition, introduced
through STAATSBLAD 1920-556, quite possibly in response to the CohenLindenbaum decision, while INDONESIAN CIV. CODE 1368 (on liability of
owners of animals for harm done by the animals) stipulates a link to criminal
code article 490 regarding the control of dangerous animals.
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Big fires, in traditional bazaars, in Indonesia are almost always
followed by the construction of modern shopping centers,
supermarkets, and malls. The fires are as a rule preceded by failed
negotiations to persuade existing tenants to move to temporary
quarters pending the completion of their new, and more expensive
shops in the newly built premises. There has always been a
suspicion, but no proof, that the developers somehow had
something to do with the fires. In 2003 a major fire broke out in
Pasar Tanah Abang, probably one of Southeast Asia’s largest
garment and textile markets. Tempo, the leading national
newsweekly, covered the fire and mentioned the name of a
developer with close links to the army as a party who was highly
interested in a new Pasar Tanah Abang project.33 Sensing the
hidden accusation, and irritated by the use of certain terms in the
coverage, the developer sued for libel. The Central Jakarta Court
of First Instance agreed with plaintiff that the investigative report
was libelous, and awarded damages in the amount of
Rp.500.000.000,- (five hundred million rupiah),34 and a penalty of
Rp.300.000,- (three hundred thousand rupiah) for each day of
delay in paying the awarded sum. The court also ordered the
placement of a public apology in several newspapers with a
national circulation.35 The defendant appealed, and the High Court
overruled the lower court’s decision and took over the adjudication
of the matter. The court rejected the damages claim for reasons
that plaintiff had not submitted detailed and convincing
quantification in arriving at the claimed amount. The Court also
ruled that Tempo had correctly balanced out its freedom of
expression by providing for the citizen’s right of response.36 In
2005, the Indonesian Supreme Court rejected plaintiff’s appeal and
affirmed the High Court’s decision.37
IV. DISREGARD OF THE “PUBLIC INTEREST” DEFENSE
In order to be successful with a suit for material and immaterial
damages under Civil Code Article 1372, a court of law must
33. THE WEEKLY TEMPO (March 3-9, 2003).
34. Equivalent to US$53,000 at the rate prevailing in June 2010.
35. Tomy Winata vs Tempo, Decision of the Central Jakarta Court of First
Instance, No.233/Pdt.G/2003/P.N. Jkt.Pst., on March 18, 2004.
36. Decision of the Jakarta High Court No.314/PDT/2004/P.T. DKI, dated
September 3, 2004.
37. Decision of the Supreme Court No.903K/PDT/2005, dated February 9,
2006.
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establish that the defendant’s act meets the requirements set forth
in Criminal Code Articles 310 et seq. The act must be:
(i)
deliberate;
(ii)
an assault against the good name and reputation of the
victim;
(iii) an accusation of a certain fact;
(iv)
with the clear aim to publicize the fact.
Pre-independence court decisions had borne out that for the
printed media the requirements set out above under items (i) and
(iv) were deemed met by the mere fact of publication.38 Although
the public interest motive is the only way to escape punishment,
the concept is underdeveloped due to the scarcity of decisions
establishing guidelines. Public interest is known more for what it
is not, than what it is. During the colonial era, court reports have
recorded only one case where defense of public interest was
successful.39 The matter involved an editor of a daily newspaper
published in Surabaya, a major harbor city in East Java. The editor
allowed two unsigned articles to appear in his paper warning
readers that a city council member scheduled to be installed was
facing two customs suits, and should never be admitted to sit on
the council. Notwithstanding the warnings the installation was
carried through. This prompted the editor to release a harsh article
criticizing the government department. The colony’s highest court
rejected the prosecution’s count of defamation, but affirmed the
lower court’s finding that the editor afforded the offender, the
writer whose identity the editor refused to disclose, with the
opportunity to publish the punishable article. The public interest
excuse was admitted, but the editor received a 3-day jail sentence
for being an accessory to the offence committed by the
unidentified offender. In addition for being locked up for 3 days,
he was charged the costs of the proceedings in both the lower and

38. None of the court decisions cited in this essay raised the issues of
deliberateness and publicity which are central to a determination whether a
criminal code article 310 “insult” was indeed committed. There is solid
doctrinal support for this position in HAZEWINKEL-SURINGA, INLEIDING TOT DE
STUDIE VAN HET NEDERLANDSE STRAFRECHT 584 (15 ed., updated by J.
Remmelink, 1966), and II T.J. NOYON, HET WETBOEK VAN STRAFRECHT 256257 (6th ed., updated by G.E. Langemeijer, 1954).
39. Hooggerechtshof (the highest court in the colony) van NederlandschIndië, Second Chamber, Decision July 30, 1924 regarding the defamation of a
public authority or complicity to it, on appeal regarding the defense of having
acted in the public interest, T.121, at 451.
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the appeals courts. Truth and the public interest were not
considered judicially sufficient reasons to let him walk free.
V. THE HORSE, THE RIDER, AND THE LAW
The term pers delict or “press offence” does not constitute a
separate class of offences within the Indonesian criminal law
system. Most of the offences termed pers delict are general
offences committed by persons, including journalists, writers,
editors, and publishers. Most of the provisions curtailing media
freedom are to be found in the Criminal Code.40
Using the pen-name Multatuli,41 Eduard Douwes Dekker,
wrote Max Havelaar, or The Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading
Company, a novel dealing with plunder, oppression and extortion
of the Javanese by their feudal masters. The book, first published
in 1860, accused the colonial authorities of knowing about the
mistreatments, and yet choosing to do nothing against it.
Translated in 34 languages, an English version came out in 1868.
It was reported that a shiver went through Europe when the book
appeared.42 The author lost his job in the colonial administration,
and wrote many letters to friends and editors. One of those letters
contained the following famous phrase: “Insulinde43 is a
magnificent horse. Its rider is a thief.”44
One Sunday morning at 09:00 on September 3, 1922, the Indies
Social Democratic Party convened a congress, at the Oriental
Movie Theatre, in the West Javanese town of Bandung. There, on
40. Criminal code articles 61 and 62 on requirements to be met if editors
and publishers are to be exempted from prosecution; Criminal code articles 207
and 208 on insults directed to state authorities (the articles release the judge
from an optional obligation of granting the right of defendants to prove their
allegations); criminal code articles 310-328 defining insult, libel, slander,
deliberateness, and the punishments for committing the offence; criminal code
articles 155-157, the so-called hatred-sowing articles against statements,
writings, posters containing expressions of hatred, hostility, and contempt
against government, or ethnic, religious, and racial groups; criminal code article
160 prohibiting the advocacy of civil disobedience.
41. Latin for I have suffered much.
42. The first English translation from the original manuscript was done
by Baron Alphonse Nahuijs, Edmonton & Douglas (Edinburgh, 1868);
see
a
Dutch
edited
version,
available
at
http://cf.hum.uva.nl/dsp/ljc/multatuli/havelaar/index.html (last visited July 10,
2010).
43. A poetic name for Indonesia, the largest archipelago in the world.
44. Letter written to G.J.A. Boulet, April 5, 1876, published in volumes of
collected writings of the author cited as VW XVIII, at 333.
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the door handle of the movie house, young party enthusiasts hung a
white cardboard with precisely that phrase written in big letters.
The prosecution moved to indict on the basis of Criminal Code
Article 154, the so-called hate-sowing article. Article 154
prohibits people from publicly expressing hatred, hostility, and
contempt against government, or population groups in the colony.
The subsequent articles add the requirement of intentional
publicity, and expand the target audience to population groups
distinguished by race, religion, ethnicity, descent or nationality.
The court found the phrase insulting. It also found the presence of
elements required under article 154, including the aim to publicize
or increase exposure in view of the location of the cinema on a
busy public road by the town square.45 The defendants were fined
f300, which was convertible to a 2-months jail term if the
offenders failed to pay up within two months of sentencing. On
appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s judgment.46
Article 154 of the Criminal Code used to read “. . . whosoever
arouses or promotes feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt . . .”
That was indeed how it read in the Dutch Criminal Code. In 1918,
at the behest of the then Dutch Minister of Colonies, changes were
made to the colony’s version of the provision. It was then made to
read “. . . whosoever expresses feelings of hostility, hatred, and
contempt . . .” The change did away with the requirement of
evidence of the prohibited arousal and promotion. The erstwhile
material offence was turned into a formal offence. Henceforth, it
was enough for a person to merely express the forbidden feelings,
for that person to be sentenced to a jail term up to a maximum of 7
years. It was only on July 17, 2007, and 62 years after
independence, that the Constitutional Court declared Criminal
Code Articles 154 and 155 in contravention with the human rights
guarantees in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.47
Emerging from a different era in the evolution of perceptions
about government and the state, the Indonesian Criminal Code
carries provisions which are excessively hostile to the media.
Articles 207 and 208 stand out as being particularly ill-disposed to
45. Raad van Justitie Batavia, Second Chamber, April 6, 1923, T. 120, at
496-500.
46. Hooggerechtshof, Second Chamber, June 6, 1923, T. 120, at 496 and
500-501.
47. Constitutional Court Decision No. 6/PUU-V/2007. The Decision was
limited to criminal code articles 154 and 155. The request to find the notorious
criminal code articles 207 and 208 (insults against public authorities)
unconstitutional was rejected.
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freedom of opinion and social critique. The articles deal with
insults directed against government agencies, and dispense with
the basic principle that only natural persons are capable of feeling
insulted. Fictitious persons, like the limited liability, can make
insulting allegations through members of its board of
management,48 and can even incur damages caused by defamatory
remarks at their expense. However, the cause of action does not lie
with the special tort of insult, but rather with the general tort
regime of Civil Code Articles 1365-1371. With Criminal Code
Articles 207 and 208, we have a corporate entity called
government, or its agencies capable of feelings thought to be
invested exclusively in the human person.
Early 1938, the colony was feasting. The Royal House of
Orange-Nassau was expecting the birth of Princess Beatrix, and
the daily newspaper Keng Po was at it again. It published an
article under the heading of For the Knowledge of the Resident of
Serang.49 A Resident was the highest Dutch colonial authority in
the residency, a region which would now be equivalent to either a
province, or half of it, depending on the area’s economic
importance to the colonial administration. The article told the
story of festivities prepared, by the Bupati,50 of Pandeglang in the
town square using local bamboo and manpower without paying for
either. The poor villagers, already living a subsistence life, were
sunk deeper into poverty, but nobody dared to protest because the
order was given by the Bupati himself. The article ended with the
sentence: “If that were true . . . why make the people sad when
jubilation is in order for the House of Orange-Nassau?”51
Criminal Code Article 207 was used by the prosecution
because the article does not afford the judge with the prerogative
of allowing the defendant to prove the truth of his allegation. The
use of the article was intimated in private to the scholar who wrote
the end note to the law report on the decision as de rigueur among
prosecutors in the colony.52 The court of first instance rejected the
48. As with employer’s liability for tort committed by employees, the
limited liability company may escape liability for a director’s libelous act if the
act was committed outside the scope of work for which the director was
contracted to perform.
49. The Keng Po (Pandeglang) case, Raad van Justitie Batavia, November
3, 1938, T. 149, at 67.
50. The Bupati is the highest ranking authority in the hierarchy of the local
indigenous bureaucracy.
51. See supra note 46.
52. Id. at 74.
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application of Criminal Code Article 207 for the simple reason that
the insult was directed to the person of the Bupati, not to the
Netherlands Indies administration as a body.53 The court ruled that
Criminal Code Article 310 was the more correct article to apply to
the matter at hand. The prosecution was not satisfied and appealed
to the colony’s highest court. On November 29, 1938, the colony’s
Court of Appeal, Second Chamber in Batavia, ruled that the lower
court had erred in its opinion that the insult was directed to the
person of the Bupati , and not to the organ of the administration: “.
. . Wasn’t the aggrieved party called the Regent of Pandeglang?,”
the court queried. “. . . It was indeed directed to a person, to be
precise. But it is a person equipped with a public authority!”54
Article 207 applied. Seventy years passed. Insulinde, the
magnificent horse had become independent. The colonial rider
had been chased away. He didn’t take 207 with him. The new
rider likes it.
In October 2007, a writer by the name of Bersihar Lubis wrote
a piece for the Tempo Daily criticizing the burning of banned
books per order of the Attorney General.55 The heading of his
article was “The Story of the Dumb Interrogator.” Lubis wrote
about the interrogation by prosecutors of a certain Joesoef Isak,
publisher of novels written by the left-leaning author Pramoediya
Ananta Toer. Isak recounted to Lubis the reason given him by the
prosecutor why he was summoned for the interview:
“Pramoediya’s books have the smell of Marxism . . .” The
prosecutor later intimated that he actually carried out the summons
and interview because his superior wanted him to. Personally he
liked Pramoediya’s books. To this Isak commented to Bersihar
Lubis that a decision on the basis of a command is dumb. It was
the inclusion of this word, dumb, in his article that got Lubis into
trouble. The prosecutor’s office in the Depok district reported the
matter to the police. Eight months later Bersihar Lubis attended
his trial at the Depok court of first instance for insulting a
government agency. The court found him guilty of libel and
sentenced him to a jail term of 1 month with a probationary period
of 3 months, a considerably lighter punishment than the 8 months
demanded by the prosecution.56 Both parties appealed, and the
53. Id. at 65-68.
54. Id. at 69.
55. KORAN TEMPO, March 17, 2007.
56. The Bersihar Lubis case Decision, The Depok Court of First Instance,
February 20, 2008 (unpublished).
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High Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.57 At the time of
writing this essay, the case is still on final appeal at the Supreme
Court.
Bersihar Lubis and friends challenged the constitutionality of
the jailing provisions in the criminal code before the Constitutional
Court, particularly in the face of Indonesia’s constitutional
provisions protecting the freedom of expression and freedom from
fear.58
The request was for a material review of the jailing provisions
of Criminal Code Articles 310, 311, and 316. The petitioners also
requested a review of the constitutionality of Criminal Code
Article 207 due to its implication of the privileged position granted
to government agencies before the law, a violation of constitutional
principle of equality before the law. In its decision on August 15,
2008 the Court found each and every petitioned criminal code
articles in accord with the Constitution upon the following
reasoning:
(i)
no freedom may be exercised without limitation;
(ii)
freedoms may be limited by considerations of public
order, moral and public health, national security, rights
and reputation of others, and limitations based on
necessity in a democratic society, on the condition that
the limitations must be prescribed by law;
(iii) “The need for separate protection of public officials in
the exercise of their duty (is warranted) because in their
function, besides involving the subjective element of
the individual person of the official, there is also an
objective element of the institution which requires
credibility, authority, and capability in order to
effectively perform their public duties.”59
(iv)
the request relating to the preference of fines over
incarceration has to do with the judicial application of
the law, not with its constitutionality.60

57. Mr. Hendrayana of the Press Legal Aid Institute told the author that on
May 24, 2010 the High Court affirmed the Depok District Court (Court of First
Instance) decision.
58. Request for review dated May 7, 2008 listed by the Court Registrar on
May 12, 2008 under registration Number 14/PUU-VI/2008, corrected on June 3,
2008.
59. Constitutional Court Decision Number 14/PUU-VI/2008, August 15,
2008, at 286.
60. Id. at 287.

150

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 3

The decision contrasts unfavorably with the views of the
commentator expressed in the End Note to the decision of the
colonial Hooggerechtshof (Second Chamber) of November 29,
1938 in the Keng Po (Pandeglang) case.61 Commenting on the
Court’s support for the use of Criminal Code Article 207 by the
standing magistrate to catch offences which according to the
Dutch Criminal Code are not punishable, Professor W.F.C. van
Hattum declared that such a position contravenes the very system
of criminal law. He referred to Criminal Code Article 312 Section
2 which provides that when a government official is accused of a
certain fact in the performance of his duties, the law allows the
accuser to prove that fact. It violates this system if that right to
prove the accusation is withheld by prosecuting the accuser
pursuant to a statute not written for this case. The law was
introduced exclusively to cover cases of insult which are not
punishable according to Dutch law. The distinction between insult
to the person and insult to the authority of the person is not only
difficult to discern, it is also not acceptable if offenders of article
207 are not guaranteed the right of not being punished if they acted
in the public interest. The right to critique is to some extent
guaranteed under article 312 section 2. “. . . If this guarantee is
rendered worthless by simply disqualifying the application of
article 310, and replacing it by article 207, we would be taking
another step on the road to the police-state.”62
VI. LEX SPECIALIS, OR “DROIT DE RÉPONSE”?
For over four decades, the Indonesian press suffered closures
of newspapers and imprisonment of journalists under either
oppressive dictatorships, or harsh treatment by the law. The day of
liberation came, or so it was widely assumed, when a new press
law was promulgated in 1999.63 The law states that under no
circumstances will there ever be any closures of newspapers by the
state.64 Any measure which has the effect of curtailing the
freedom of the press will be fined.65 Victims of libelous
publications have the right to respond, and the media publishing
the libelous allegations have the obligation to fulfil that right.66
61. T. 149, at 71-74.
62. Id. at 74.
63. Law No. 40 of 1999 Regarding the Press.
64. Id. at Article 4, Section (2).
65. Id. at Article 18, Section (1).
66. Id. at Article 5, Sections (1) and (2).
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The law also establishes a Press Council to act as a watchdog of
ethics of journalism.67 The government, the media, and parliament
celebrated the law as the lex specialis for all possible offences
committed by the media. The Press Law was widely hailed as
governing all activities of the print media and, therefore, rendering
inapplicable all other laws relating to the press. In the ensuing
debates, it was mentioned that even if no consensus can be reached
about its lex specialis status the matter can be settled simply by a
Supreme Court Circular declaring it to be so.68 The courts
disagree, and rightly so.
The Press Law of 1999 was never meant to function as a selfcontained and exclusive regime governing the media. It is by no
means a collection of primary rules on a specific matter demanding
priority over secondary rules provided by a lex generalis. The law
itself in two instances, one in the body of the text, and another in
its official elucidation refers to other laws as still applicable.69 A
cursory examination would also show that the Press Law bears
some resemblance with the nineteenth century Reglement op de
Drukwerken,70 a piece of legislation normally referred to in legal
texts as the droit de réponse. It provides a right for victims to
respond to defamatory press coverage.71
An interesting decision on this matter was issued by the
Batavia Court of First Instance72 on March 7, 1935.73 The court
ruled that the droit de réponse of Article 19 of the Reglement op de
Drukwerken aimed at providing the victim of libelous acts with an
opportunity to defend himself within the forum of the offender by
way of a response to reach the same readers. A complaint filed
with the court, in the matter of an insult, on the other hand, merely
aims to enable the state to prosecute a punishable act which, absent
67. Id. at Chapter V, Article 15.
68. KOMPAS DAILY, July 19, 2004, at 7.
69. Article 19 of Law No. 40 of 1999 provides that all provisions of law
bearing on the press which were still in effect at the time the Press Law was
promulgated will remain so insofar as they do not conflict with, or have not been
replaced by new laws arising out of the Press Law. The official elucidation of
article 12 of the law stipulates that criminal liability is still governed by the
criminal code.
70. Regulation on Printed Matter, STAATSBLAD 1856-74, after being
reduced from 35 to 10 articles.
71. Id. at article 19.
72. The court known as Landgerecht was, much like the Raad van Justitie,
the court of first instance for Europeans during the German occupation of the
Netherlands.
73. T. 142 at 773.
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a complaint would not be possible. The droit de réponse and the
filing of a complaint with the court are two causes which may be
pursued independently from each other. The filing of a complaint
with the court in no way bars the plaintiff from making use of his
right to reply.74
There may well have been a time when the belief prevailed that
the Reglement op de Drukwerken was some kind of a special law
applicable to special offences, sometimes called pers delicten or
press offences, committed by a special group of people such as
writers, editors, publishers, and even printers. The Reglement
itself was a solid 35-articles piece of legislation when it was issued
in the mid-nineteenth century. Looking at the regulation now
shows that 16 of the 35 articles were withdrawn, while 9 articles
were repealed with the entry into force of the Criminal Code.
Punishable offences committed by the printing press, which were
originally in the Reglement, were taken out and put in the Criminal
Code. The measure was probably motivated by the difficulties in
defining press offences. To be sure, it represents a certain group of
offences, but as a law category it is considered too limiting to
deserve the attribute of a lex specialis. Offences committed by
using the print media are only part of a larger category of offences
involving, among others, public disclosures of thoughts and
feelings. Press offences strictly relate to the means of such
disclosures, not to the punishable offence of the disclosure itself.
Articles in the Criminal Code prohibiting disclosure of secrets, for
instance, cannot be categorized as press offences as understood by
the law. Neither publicity, nor the public exposure of a thought is
required under those articles. The 9 articles removed from the
Reglement op de Drukpers were not considered press offences
proper, but were offences of a more general nature which could be
committed through the print media.
VII. SOLUTIONS, COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING
Most code provisions on defamation are more or less similar in
civil code countries in Asia, be they Germanic or French in origin.
In South Korea, both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme
Court have chosen the creatively path-breaking route to respond to
the changing times. On June 24, 1999 the Korean Constitutional
Court pronounced that the standard of scrutiny in the
criminalization of libel should be more strictly applied when the
74. Id.
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victim is a private person rather than a public figure, and the matter
alleged is of private rather than of public concern.75 Matters of
public concern, thus the Court, have to do with the public right to
know, in order for the public to responsibly participate in political
decision-making in a democracy. The Court underscored the
chilling effect of criminal libel law on freedom of the press:
If the requirement of libel defenses (truth and only for
public interest) under the Criminal Code are too narrowly
applied, the scope of criminal sanctions will expand and
press freedom will shrink. If criminal punishment is used
to preclude criticism and debates about matters of public
concern, freedom of the press will be suffocated and the
balancing scale will be tipped too far towards reputational
protection.76
In both Korea and Japan, “truth and the public interest” are
formidable defenses against Criminal Code punishment. In a
decision dated February 27, 2004 the Korean Supreme Court held
that a defendant is not liable if there is proof of the truth of his
allegation, or the belief that the accusation is true notwithstanding
the absence of evidence.77 This applies even if there is only a
reasonable ground to believe that the defamatory allegations are
true. The burden of proof, however, remains with the media.
Similarly, the Japanese Supreme Court held in a case decided
as early as June 25, 1969 that the defendant needs only to prove
that the statement was made under the mistaken but reasonable
belief, based on reliable materials and a reliable source, that it was
true.78 Statements made in good faith are not actionable because
they do not indicate a criminal intent on the part of the publisher.
The Japanese also made a couple of conceptual refinements.
The ‘truth’ defense concept, for instance, applied only in cases
where defamation was inflicted on public figures. The private
75. Cited as “Constitutional Court, 97 Honma 265, June 24, 1999,” in Kyu
Ho-youm, Press Freedom and Defamation in South Korea, , unpublished paper
submitted at Law Colloquium 2004: From Insult to Slander, Defamation and
Freedom of the Press, Jakarta, July 28-29, 2004, at 26.
76. Id. at 27-28.
77. Id. cited as “Supreme Court 2001, Ta 53387, February 27, 2004”, at 25.
78. The Yukan Wakayama Jiji case, cited as “23 Keishu 975, Supreme
Court, June 25, 1969” in Masao Horibe, A Draft on Defamation and Freedom of
the Press in Japan, unpublished paper submitted at Law Colloquium 2004:
From Insult to Slander, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, Jakarta, July 2829, 2004, at 25.
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person-public figure dichotomy was removed from its black-andwhite realm. In 1981 the Japanese Supreme Court held that even
the private behavior of a private person could be of public concern
depending on the nature of the person’s social activities and the
extent of his influence in society.79 The decision concerned
improprieties carried out by a Daisaku Ikeda, honorary chairman
of a Buddhist lay organization, towards two women members of
the organization.
Japan’s doctrine of popular sovereignty, a prominent principle
in the nation’s constitution, provides the rationale for the reduced
protection of public officials against allegations thrown at their feet
because they are “servants of the whole community” and,
therefore, subjected to the people’s will to hire or fire.80 The
doctrine is of particular interest because most national constitutions
carry the same principle, but very few gave it the legal
interpretation as far-reaching as Japan’s.
The Indonesian judiciary is timid, cautiously conformist, more
conventional, and less progressive compared to their East Asian
counterparts. They prefer not to lead. In this regard, the
Constitutional Court is more consistently so, while the Supreme
Court occasionally issues a serendipitous decision or two. The
latter’s decision on the Suharto vs. Time review matter81 was both
painful, since the Court had to censure its own decision,82 and
clear-sighted. It annulled the Supreme Court decision of August
30, 2007, viewed Time’s coverage within the context of national
campaigns against corruption, saw no intention of Time to defame
Suharto mainly because the People’s Consultative Assembly in its
resolution had mandated the investigation of Suharto’s assets. A
major issue it cleared up was that suits for damages due to insults
must be exclusively conducted pursuant to Civil Code Article
1372.
Compared to the image of valiant resolve emerging from the
Time review decision, the outcome of one of the many Tempo
matters came across as listless. In March 2003, in the wake of the
Tempo coverage of the big fire at Pasar Tanah Abang, the office of
the weekly news magazine was visited by a group of angry people.
The editors of the magazine felt themselves threatened and
79. Id. at 24-25, the Gekkan Pen. Case, cited as “1000 Hanrei Jiho 25,
Supreme Court, April 16, 1981.”
80. Id. at 26.
81. Supra note 23.
82. Supra notes 18, 15, and 16.
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reported the matter to the police. Coming out from the police
station, a senior editor explained to the media who were gathered
outside that Tempo demanded the attack to be fully investigated,
lest the country would fall into the hands of gangsters. The
businessman whose employees paid the visit to Tempo’s offices
felt insulted and filed a suit under Civil Code Article 1372 against
the senior editor, the daily newspaper Koran Tempo which
reported the senior editor’s statement, and the company publishing
the newspaper.83 The damages demanded ran up to Rp. 1 billion
for actual damage incurred, and Rp. 20 billion for restoring good
name and reputation.84 Additionally, plaintiff demanded that
defendants issued public apologies in 4 daily newspapers,
including the defendants’ newspaper, the attachment for security
purposes of the residence of the senior editor and the newspaper’s
office spaces, and a daily late performance penalty of Rp.10
million. The court of first instance found the defendants guilty of
the tort of insult, rejected the plaintiff’s damages claims because of
insufficient precision in itemizing, calculating the amount
demanded. The court lifted the attachment of the senior editor’s
residence, but ordered the defendants to issue the public apologies
with the claimed daily late performance penalty.85 The Jakarta
Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision, but the senior
editor lodged an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court rejected
the appeal,86 and Chief Justice Harifin Tumpa suggested that the
editor offer his apologies to the plaintiff.87 The Supreme Court
decision vacated the Rp.1 billion fine, and reduced the daily Rp.1
million penalty for performance delays.
Lawyers for the
defendants were quick in their response that a Judicial Review will
be lodged with the Supreme Court. Harifin Tumpa, Chief Justice
83. Tomy Winata vs Gunawan Mohamad (the senior editor), KORAN TEMPO
(the daily newspaper), and P.T. Tempo Inti Media Harian (the publisher of the
daily newspaper).
84. The Rp.:US$ exchange rate in 2003 was between Rp.8897,20 (January)
and Rp.8487,75 (December) according to x-rates.com, available at
http://www.x-rates.com/d/IDR/USD/hist2003.html (last visited July 10, 2010).
85. Decision of the East Jakarta Court of First Instance
No.180/PDT.G/2003/PN.JKT.TIM (unpublished).
86. No reports were available of either the High Court decision, or the
Supreme Court rejection of the appeal. The information about the appeal and
rejection of the appeal was published in VIVA NEWS of August 13-14, 2009,
available
at
http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/82892ma_tak_gunakan_uu_pers; and http://nasional.vivanews.com/news/read/82694goenawan_mohamad_ajukan_peninjauan_ (last visited July 10, 2010).
87. Id.
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of the Supreme Court, was asked why he chose not to reprimand
the lower courts for not consulting the Press Council in arriving at
their decisions,88 as he recommended in a recent instruction.
Justice Tumpa answered that no instructions were issued, only an
appeal. Judges should not be told what law to apply as that would
violate judicial independence, he said. When asked what was to be
done when lower courts refused to comply with the appeal, he
referred to the institution of the judicial review as a last resort.89 It
never came to that. The last news heard about the case was that
plaintiff and defendants got together on October 6, 2009, had
dinner, and made peace.90
VIII. SOMETHING HAPPENED ON THE WAY TO FREEDOM
A focus on the work of the Constitutional Court produces glum
perspectives not only because of its authoritarian proclivities
evident in their decisions regarding the Blasphemy Law,91 the
Pornography Law,92 and maintenance of the Film Censor Board.93
Reading through the detailed and timely produced reports of
decisions it was not easy to suppress a sense of déjà vu. The tone
in these decisions was paternalistic, gentle but steely, and
convincingly set on a course of rolling back liberties perceived as
having gone too far. The court meticulously maintained a clinical
separation between the law on the books and its interpretation and
enforcement by the police, the prosecution and the courts.
Indonesia’s Constitutional Court perceives its mandate to be
limited to the constitutional review of positive law. The decisions
impart the impression that no consideration was admitted of the
general context within which the protected laws have been, and
continue to be interpreted and enforced. That general context
88. On December 30, 2008, Chief Justice Harifin Tumpa issued Supreme
Court Circular Letter No. 14 to all courts in Indonesia in which he recommended
the judiciary to consult the Press Council on whether certain acts were or were
not defamatory, and seek to mediate the conflict in accord with the provisions of
the Press Law.
89. VIVA NEWS, August 14, 2009.
90. TEMPO INTERACTIVE, October 7, 2009, available at
http://www.tempointeractive.com/hg/nasional/2009/10/07/brk,20091007201319,uk.html (last visited July 10, 2010).
91. Constitutional Court Decision Number 140/PUU-VII/2009, April 12,
2010.
92. Constitutional Court Decision Number 10-17-23/PUU-VII/2009, March
25, 2010.
93. Constitutional Court Decision Number 29/PUU-V/2007, April 30, 2008.
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discloses a field of abuses of power, arbitrary and selective
enforcement of the law, and miscarriages of justice within a
general atmosphere of corruption, collusion, and nepotism.
On the Corruption Perception Index list compiled by
Transparency International for 2009, Indonesia occupies the 111th
position on a list of 180 countries. The country shares the spot
with Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Kiribati, Mali, Solomon Islands, and
Togo. The recent exposures of widespread case brokerage
activities involving the judiciary, the prosecution, and the police,
have singled out the latter as the most corrupt institution in the
country. Its latest exploit consisted of jailing a whistle-blowing
police general, and the fabrication of indictments against two
deputy heads of the Corruption Eradication Commission.94 Two
prosecutors and a judge were indicted for brokering a tax evasion
case involving US$1.6 million. The judge confessed to having
received bribes to the amount of US$ 5,000.95 The head
prosecutor at the Attorney General’s office investigating a big
corruption matter was caught red-handed receiving a bribe of
US$660,000.96 To add spice to the context, on and around
November 5, 2009, Chief Justice Mohamad Mahfud Md. of the
Constitutional Court, ordered the Corruption Eradication
Commission to deliver tapes to the Court the contents, of which
had been circulating through mobile phones and computers. The
4.5-hour tapes, recording conversations between prosecutors, the
police and a judge, were played in a court and exposed a
conspiracy involving the law enforcement institutions and the
person accused of siphoning off cash from a failed bank which was
being bailed out with government money. The conspirators
fabricated a bribery case against two deputy heads of the
Corruption Eradication Commission. Coming out of the court
room, Chief Justice Mahfud was interviewed and caught on TV
saying how sad it was for him to witness law enforcers being
controlled like animals by financiers. In retaliation against the
playing of the tape, and saying unkind words about the police, the
entire police contingent on personal guard duty to the Chief Justice
and his family was withdrawn the next day.
94. THE JAKARTA GLOBE, October 5, 2009; THE JAKARTA POST, June 14,
2010.
95. THE JAKARTA POST, April 21, 2010; THE JAKARTA GLOBE WEBSITE,
April 14, 2010.
96. Nurlis E. Meuko, Misteri Aliran Dana Joko Versi Bibit, VIVA NEWS,
October 1, 2009, available at http://korupsi.vivanews.com/news/read/93712misteri_aliran_dana_djoko_versi_bibit (last visited July 10, 2010).
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The nine justices of the Constitutional Court do not work in a
vacuum. The very same context is a continuing source of concern,
worry, and fear for the ordinary citizen at the other end of
enforcement. It is this fear that they brought to the Court when
they asked for protection from the harshness, uncertainties, and
abuses of colonial laws which are frequently interpreted and
applied by less than caring police and the standing magistrature.
Almost without exception, they have been turned away emptyhanded. To wit, they have asked whether jailing journalists was
not too excessive considering that they already have to suffer the
obligation to abide by the victim’s right of response, the hefty
damages awards under Civil Code Article 1372, and the fines
mentioned in Criminal Code Articles 310 et seq. Perhaps the
jailing provisions could be found to be violating the freedom from
fear protected by the constitution? The Court would have none of
it.97 They asked the Court whether it was possible at all to stick to
the principle of equality before the law, and do away with the
colonial lèse majesté clauses and have the law treat insults directed
to the president and vice president the same way as insults aimed at
the citizen. The Court seemed a bit moved, and bent over
backwards to split the president and vice president in two. One
part is to be the person of the president. If the person feels
insulted, that part can resort to Criminal Code Article 310 et seq
like everybody else. The presidential part of the person, however,
is directed to Criminal Code Article 207, a no less colonial piece of
legislation than the abrogated lèse majesté articles.98 The decision
assumes that a presidency is susceptible to feelings of being
insulted.99 None of the petitions, however, mentioned that the
article violates the criminal law system. Nor did anybody raise the
matter of a step-wise walk in the direction of the police state which
concerned the writer of the end-note to the Keng Po (Pandeglang)
case in 1938.100
97. Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 14/PUU-VI/2008, August
15, 2008.
98. These would be Criminal Code Articles 134, 136bis, and 137. See infra
page 20-21 for a scholarly comment on the popularity of criminal code article
207 by colonial prosecutors.
99. But see, the Keng Po (Pandeglang) case, at infra pages 18 and 19 ; one
of the leading texts in Criminal Law insists that insult can only be inflicted
against a natural or biological person, a principle faithfully maintained in all
articles in the entire title XVI by consistently using the word “somebody” to
designate the victim of the insult and, as a consequence thereof, by using the
term “the deceased” in criminal code article 320 and 321.
100. T.149 at 74.
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The dissenting opinion to the decision offered some interesting
observations. It saw the president as distillation of the Indonesian
people so that the president is actually a personal manifestation of,
and represents the dignity and grandeur of the people (the personal
embodiment and representative of people dignity and majesty).
The opinion wanted more splits in the president, and produced
the president as a Head of State, a Head of Government, a
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and a Chief Diplomat,
all these functions are stipulated in the constitution, the implication
being that each part of a president may have different feelings of
being insulted. The dissent also quoted dicta allegedly cultivated
by the U.S. Supreme Court which the dissenting judge interpreted
as a refutation of the principle of equality before the law: The
principle of equality does not mean that every law must have
universal application for all who are not by nature, attainment or
circumstances in the same position, as the varying needs of
different classes of persons often require separate treatment.101
No citation was given for the U.S. Supreme Court quotation. It
could either be taken out of context, or refer to differentiation
rather than discrimination. To allow maternity leave to women
and not to men is a recognition of difference, not a discrimination.
A legal system granting a right to some but not to others is
discriminative, as would be a law the breach of which is
punishable to the man-in-the-street, but not to journalists.
Granting the right to a public interest defense against accusations
of libel when the victim is a private individual, but withholding it
when the target of the insult is a government official is
discrimination.
To some, the description of a president, as the “distillation of
the people” conjures images of a dictatorship.102 The last time
Indonesia had a president called the voice of the people, the show
ended up in the most horrendous bloodbath the nation has known
in its modern history.103 The lèse majesté articles in the Indonesian
101. Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 013-022/PUU-IV/2006,
at 74.
102. It also brings back recollections about the phrase “All animals are
equal, but some animals are more equal than others” in GEORGE ORWELL,
ANIMAL FARM (1945).
103. On September 30, 1965 a heavily armed contingent of the palace guard
murdered almost the entire general staff of the army. The support of the
Indonesian Communist Party, the largest party outside the Sino-Soviet bloc, was
thought to be evident from editorials in the People’s Daily, the party’s agitprop
organ, and the almost immediate nationwide formation of Revolutionary
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Criminal Code were repealed in form, but promptly replaced in
essence. Criminal Code Articles 134, 136bis and 137 were
declared unconstitutional and devoid of force and effect. The
Constitutional Court replaced them with Criminal Code Articles
310 et seq and 207. The opinion of the slim majority of the
justices of the Court that there is no place in a democratic republic
with popular sovereignty for articles which contradict the principle
of equality before the law was not reflected in the decision.
Criminal Code Articles 154 et seq prohibit expressions of
hostility, hatred, and contempt towards the government of
Indonesia, hence the name hate-sowing articles. The petition to
declare the articles unconstitutional included the request to review
article 107 on rebellion, articles 160 and 161 on instigations to
disobey government measures, and articles 207-208 on insulting
government agencies.
Legal standing of petitioners were
recognized only in the case of the hate-sowing articles. The court
found the petitioners wanting of legal standing for the remaining
articles. The decision was passed by a thin majority of five to four.
The hate-sowing articles were to be scrapped because they are
formal offences, because they lend themselves to arbitrary
interpretation by the authorities, and because critique tended to be
easily qualified as an expression of hostility, hatred and contempt.
The decision pointed out that the Dutch Minister of Justice himself
stated that the hate-sowing provisions were meant to apply to
colonial communities, and definitely not fit to be taken over by the
realm in Europe. It is interesting to note that the majority thought
the articles irrational because it is just not possible that citizens of
an independent and sovereign country could be hostile towards
their own state and government. Nevertheless, the Court hailed the
government’s testimony which stated that the same provisions
have been maintained in the new draft criminal code, this time as
material offences.104

Councils. Within weeks the Party’s organization was paralyzed by massive
uprisings of non-communist political forces under the protection of army
elements. The resulting witch-hunt and massacres claimed the lives of people
estimated at between 60,000 to 200,000 men and women.
104. Constitutional Court Decision Number 6/PUU-V/2007, at 77-79.
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IX. A CLAUSE TO OVERTURN ALL CLAUSES
After its second amendment, the Constitution of Indonesia105
was said to contain a world-standard Bill of Rights.106 Chapter XA
on Human Rights contains 10 human rights clauses. It reads as if
the entire contents of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had
been condensed into one chapter and bravely inserted in the
Constitution. The way the clauses have been and continue to be
interpreted by the judiciary, however, have been a source of
serious concern to Indonesian as well as international rights
organizations. A recurrent theme in rejecting applications for
judicial review of oppressive criminal code provisions is the
didactically prescriptive balancing of rights and obligations, and
the consequent limitation of human rights. It is considered the
state’s duty to protect persons whose rights are violated by the
exercise of the freedoms of other persons. The nine human rights
articles in the Indonesian Constitution seem to be at the mercy of
Article 28J at the end of the list which allows their limitation by
statutory enactment.107 Of tremendous support to the potential
roll-back of rights provided by this clause is the similar clause in
Article 19 Paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”).108
Considerable support for
maintaining the oppressive anti-defamation laws is derived from
105. Resolved at the Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly
(“M.P.R.”) on August 18, 2000.
106. Simon Butt & Firmansyah Arifin, Corruption and the Judiciary in
Indonesia,
in
POLICY
BRIEFS
2
(2008),
available
at:
http://www.aigrp.anu.edu.au/publications/briefs.php (last visited July 10, 2010).
107. Indonesian Constitution, Chapter XA, Article 28J, Section (2):
In exercising his rights and freedoms, every person is obliged to submit
to limitations stipulated by law aimed exclusively to guarantee the
recognition of- and respect for the freedom rights of other persons and
for the satisfaction of just demands in accordance with moral, religious
values, security, and public order considerations in a democratic
society.
108. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 19,
Paragraph 3:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are
provided by law and are necessary:
a. For respect for the rights and reputations of others;
b. For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals.
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the translation of the term slander into the Indonesian language by
the word fitnah, a word of Arabic origin defined by the Qur’an as
an act more heinous than murder.109 The severity of punishment
for defamation in the secular codes thereby obtains solid
endorsement and legitimacy in religious doctrine. In independent
Indonesia, Fitnah and sedition are widely felt to be deserving of
more severe punishment, larger damage awards, bigger fines, and
longer jail sentences than was ever meted out by colonial
judiciaries.
It is not true that the Indonesian political elite has mobilized a
broad move to roll back freedoms which were already granted.
Restrictions on freedoms have always been present either by
products of colonial legislation, or by laws passed by rubber-stamp
parliaments under dictatorships during some 40 years, as well as
laws made in the everlasting so-called transition period towards
full democracy.110 It is this law-making aspect of the past, which
Harold J. Berman referred to as the law-based state, known in
Indonesia as the Rechtsstaat, or the system of Rule-by-Law, to
distinguish it from a system of Rule-of-Law.111 The unintended
implication of this distinction is that freedoms are more rooted in
the rule of law state, and that these are mostly found in common
law countries. The identifications, however, do not fit reality. The
109. THE HOLY QUR’AN, Surah 2, Al-Baqarah, verses 191 and 217.
110. President Sukarno dissolved the Indonesian Constituent Assembly,
seizes power on July 5, 1959, and established the national-democratic stage of
his revolution. On March 11, 1966 it was Suharto’s turn to wrest away power
from President Sukarno, and sets up a military dictatorship that lasted until
1998;
111. Harold J. Berman, The Rule of Law and the Law-Based State
(Rechtsstaat), With Special Reference to the Soviet Union, in TOWARD THE
“RULE OF LAW” IN RUSSIA? POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN THE TRANSITION
PERIOD especially n. 11 (Donald D. Barry ed. 1992). Jeffrey Kahn explains the
Rule–by-Law as a consequence of the doctrine of representative democracy with
parliament being the exclusive actualizers of sovereignty of the people. Laws
made by elected representatives of those who hold the exclusive sovereignty of
the nation hold the supreme authority in the state. The legislature being an arm
of the state holds monopoly power over the making of laws. The executive state
enforces, while the judiciary implements. The concept is clinically neutral from
value judgments on the exercise of power by the state. Hence, Nazi Germany
was a Rechtsstaat, as was Stalin’s Soviet Union. “There is no substantive
prescription beyond the positivist procedural requirements of rule by laws.” See
JEFFREY KAHN, FEDERALISM, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN
RUSSIA 54 (2002). The Rule of Law, on the other hand, is the system which
does not accept the state as the exclusive fountainhead of law. In common law
states the depoliticized courts have acted as a major source of law and what
Kahn called other normative standards.
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countries in Western Europe are rechtsstaat countries, yet their
states are not only subject to state-made laws, but to judge-made
laws, international law and tribunals as well. Closer to Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore, both wedded to the common law system,
generate many complaints about “the blatant use of the criminal
law as a political instrument . . . harsh laws which censor public
opinion. . .” and then again “. . . established practice of Singapore
which routinely uses defamation and contempt charges against
foreign journalists and opposition politicians.”112 Much like
Indonesia, the legal infrastructure to restrict liberties already exists
in both Singapore and Malaysia. It is the heritage of colonial times
to which is added a newly set of enacted statutes after
independence to lend a local flavor to “foreign” legislation.113
In Indonesia, the inundation of the Constitutional Court with
petitions demanding the review of laws deemed obstructing the
free flow of information, opinions and critique stems from a
complex mental perspective. There is the thought ingrained in the
back of the professional mind by decades of experience at the
hands of dictatorship that the only threat to freedom of the press is
the closure of publications. Such was indeed the single deadly
measure the military regime unleashed unto critical media. The
euphoria which accompanied the passing of the Press Law 114 by a
parliament liberated by the fall of a dictator,115 brought the wrong
impression that the law will take care of all existing and potential
dangers confronting journalists and the media. Finally there was
the mixture of indignation, surprise, and panic at being faced by a
plethora of lawsuits filed by plaintiffs, some of whom would not
normally command the respect of the community, yet managed to
persuade the judiciary to mete out stiff sentences and large awards.
It was this complex of feelings, thoughts, and circumstances which
moved petitioners to demand constitutional reviews of laws
112. Kanishka Jayasurya, The Rule of Law and Regimes of Exception in
East Asia, Working Paper No. 96, Asia Research Center, Murdoch University,
July 2000, at 3.
113. For a treatment on the subject during the military dictatorship in
Indonesia, see Daniel S. Lev, Colonial Law and the Genesis of the Indonesian
State, 40 INDONESIA (Oct. 1985). Referring to the take-over of oppressive
colonial legislation by an independent Indonesia, Lev wrote: “It is not simply
that such legal provisions have been retained, but that their retention implies the
same understanding of political prerogative from which they originated,” id. at
73.
114. Law No.40 of 1999.
115. General Suharto was deposed in the wake of the monetary crisis of
1998.
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deemed hostile to press freedom. The Constitutional Court
rejected most of the demands, and acceded to some because other
laws, no less hostile, are or will be substituted for the statutes to be
repealed.
Human Rights Watch issued a most recent report on the state
of freedom of expression in Indonesia.116 It is a scathing
indictment against an excessively oppressive criminal defamation
law regime, and a willing law enforcement apparatus to pursue the
accuser rather than investigate the offence the plaintiff is accused
of. The report complains that in the hands of financially and
politically powerful personalities, criminal anti-defamation laws
become destructive implements against critique and opposition.
These laws are more susceptible to abuse and manipulation,
particularly when employed by government officials with
investigative authority backed by financially strong parties. The
Information & Electronic Transaction Law117 was singled out as
particularly hostile with its threat of imprisonment of up to 6 years,
a fine of up to Rp. 1 billion, and a possible pretrial detention.118
The bad conditions of freedom of the press in Indonesia seems
to be somewhat shared by its neighbors. Despite its bad report
card, Indonesia is deemed to have the freest press in Southeast
Asia by Reporters Without Borders. On its worldwide press
freedom index for 2009, Indonesia was given a score of 28.50,
over and above its neighbors. Eritrea stood at the bottom of the list
with a score of 115.5. Scandinavian countries and Ireland were on
top of the list and rated 0 (zero). It must have been a satisfying
sight for the Indonesian government to watch Indonesia leading its
neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in press
freedom.119

116. See, Turning Critics into Criminals, The Human Rights Consequences
of Criminal Defamation in Indonesia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May 3, 2010,
available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/05/04/turning-critics-criminals
(last visited July 10, 2010).
117. Law No.11/2008 on Information & Electronic Transaction.
118. A petition for constitutional review of two articles in the law submitted
by citizens was squarely rejected by the Constitutional Court in its decision
Number 50/puu-VI/2008, on May 5, 2009.
119. On the Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index for
2009, Indonesia scored 28.50, above the Philippines (38.25), Thailand (44),
Malaysia (44.25), and Singapore (45). See, Press Freedom Index 2009,
available at http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2009,1001.html
(last visited July 10, 2010).
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X. TO CONCLUDE
The road to freedom meets a dead-end at Constitution junction.
The Indonesian Constitutional Court is not ready to lead the nation
on the way to reform. The Court is resolved to maintain laws on
the books which were promulgated for the security and ease of law
enforcement in a colony. The Court also held on to statutes which
were enacted after independence by authoritarian regimes and
compliant parliaments. The only way out is to muddle through the
conventional judicial process and cope with its capricious
outcomes. That is not an easy task. There is no discernible
method in the way courts arrive at their decisions. This makes it
very difficult to navigate a way through the hazards planted in the
colonial civil and criminal codes, and the considerably more
hostile post-independence statutes. The use of such “insulting”
words as dumb,120 or thief,121 or scavenger,122 or Suharto Inc.123 is
punished, but so are complaints against allegedly fraudulent
sellers.124 A patient sending an e-mail to friends complaining of
maltreatment in a hospital,125 editors warning authorities not to
install an official who was still facing customs suits, and
consumers complaining about bad service through letters to the
editor are brought to trial. The Press Law of 1999 is not an
adequate bar against criminal prosecution or tort suits.126 An issue
of grave concern is that serious critique, and by any standard
necessary,127 directed against public authority, even if public

120. The Bersihar Lubis case. See supra notes 56 and 57.
121. The Indies Social Democratic Party Congress case in Bandung, Raad
van Justitie Batavia, Second Chamber, April 6, 1923, T.120 at 496-500.
122. The Tomy Winata v Tempo case, Central Jakarta Court of First
Instance, Decision No.233/Pdt.G/2003/P.N.Jkt.Pst, March 18, 2004.
123. The Suharto v Time Magazine case, Supreme Court Decision No.3215
K/PDT/200, August 30, 2007.
124. The North Jakarta Court of First Instance Decision Number
178/PDT/G/2007/PN.JKT.UT, in the Seng Seng case on May 6, 2008.
125. The celebrated case of Prita-of-the-Coins (nationwide contributions of
coins in support for the defense of Prita Mulyasari, a pregnant mother of two
being the first victim of pretrial detention under the Information & Electronic
Transaction Law); her criminal prosecution was dismissed by the Tangerang
Court of First Instance (Decision Number 1269/Pid.B/2009/PN.TNG), but the
prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court, while the hospital’s civil suit
against her awarded the plaintiff damages in the sum of Rp.204.000.000, an
amount she could not afford.
126. See supra notes 70-71.
127. See supra note 46.
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interest is judicially recognized remains punishable.128 On the
other hand, as if to increase the level of general uncertainty,
defendants who failed proving the truth of their allegedly libelous
accusations are pardoned.129 It seems as if a message is forcefully
imposed on the general public that complaints about bad treatment
or fraud by sellers of goods or services must be kept a secret
between the complainer and the complainee, or between the victim
and the police. Complaints must not be put in letters to the editor,
nor in e-mails if the latter is accessible by others. No bad words,
no critique, and no complaints.
All of these decisions were reached by courts by having the
facts meet with the law. This is how the law is interpreted,
applied, and enforced. This IS the law. There is no way in which
the law on the books can be clinically divorced from the way it is
operated in practice. Statements by justices at the Constitutional
Court that laws in operation are none of the Court’s business,
implying that the Court’s exclusive mandate is to mathematically
project a statute against provisions in the constitution. This
understanding is excessively legistic and lack support in the dicta,
holdings, and rulings in their own decisions.
The wait now is for more widespread publicity of decisions and
transparency in the process of decision-making. A more brief and
simplified version of law reports rather than the unnecessarily long
and repetitive texts of decisions should persuade commentators to
dwell more on the reasoning rather than the end result of court
decisions. Open discussions and the emergence of recognizable
doctrinal consensus in the civil and criminal law system of
Indonesia, acknowledged sources of law, should persuade the
judiciary to look beyond the black letter of the law in their search
for justice. For justice is also to be found among the practitioners,
enforcers, and those who receive its painful assaults. Nobody said
that change was going to be easy for a system that survived
centuries of feudal rule, colonial administration, and four decades
of post-independence dictatorships.

128. See supra note 36.
129. Time Inc. failed to prove allegations regarding Suharto’s shifting of
huge amounts of money between bank accounts in Switzerland and Austria.
Tempo was not able to prove that plaintiff Winata took an interest in the
rebuilding of one of the largest garment and textile markets in Asia. See supra
note 23, and notes 36 and 37.

COMMON LAW, CIVIL LAW, AND THE
CHALLENGE FROM FEDERALISM
Santiago Legarre
I. LITVINOVIA
Let me start with some personal anecdotes regarding the life of
he who was rightly termed “the great Litvinoff.”1 Borrowing again
from the same source, I shall call them “Litvinovian
observations.”2 To each observation I shall assign a label; each
will attempt to illustrate some trait of his intriguing personality.
The first one I shall name, not without a certain boldness,
“Litvinovian Intransigence.”3 From the outset I must clarify that I
am talking about intransigence in certain matters only—minor


Professor of Law, Universidad Católica Argentina; Visiting Professor,
Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University; Researcher, Argentine
National Council for the Research in the Humanities (CONICET). LL.B.,
Universidad Católica Argentina; M.St., Oxford; Ph.D., Universidad de Buenos
Aires. This article was the basis for an oral presentation at a workshop at the
Paul M. Hebert Law Center in honor of the late Saúl Litvinoff. The flavor of an
oral presentation and the anecdotes regarding don Saúl’s life have been
preserved on purpose. Special thanks to John Baker, Alice Lapeyre, Henri
Lapeyre, Michael Leachman, Patrick Martin, Joaquín María Migliore, and
Simón Muñoz for their valuable comments. I would also like to thank the many
faculty members present at the workshop for their wonderful questions.
1. From the words read by don Saúl’s colleague and friend Cheney C.
Joseph, Jr. on the occasion of don Saúl’s funeral, a copy of which is on file with
the author. The great Litvinoff’s life was aptly evocated in a piece by Agustín
Parise and Julio Romañach, the latter having a long standing friendship with don
Saúl. See Agustin Parise & Julio Romañach, Saúl Litvinoff (1925-2010), LA
LEY [L.L.] Feb. 2, 2010 (Arg.); and the English version in this same volume of
the JCLS, at 17. For a more detached point of view on Litvinoff’s life, see
Honoring the Legacy of Litvinoff, Years of Service 1964-2009, 6.6 THE
CIVILIAN, Feb. 2010 at 1.
2. Professor Paul R. Baier rightly pointed out to me that they are actually
“Legarrian observations” on don Saúl’s life. Comment by Prof. Baier
subsequent to the oral presentation of February 4th, 2010 at the LSU Law
Center.
3. Let me share with you, gentle reader, that after some hesitation the senior
members of the faculty present at the workshop laughed heartily—with seeming
approval—when I promulgated my choice of this label.
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matters it would seem, matters of detail. I shall illustrate
Litvinovian Intransigence with two one-on-one experiences.
My first encounter with Saúl Litvinoff occurred at a time when
he and other LSU faculty were visiting Argentina. Roberto Bosca,
then Dean of Universidad Austral Law School, had asked if I could
take don Saúl and him as my guests to the Jockey Club in Buenos
Aires. The three of us were to have dinner. But at the lobby of the
Club, don Saúl was kindly requested to wear a blue jacket in place
of the extremely elegant beige jacket that he was wearing. I had
completely forgotten to forewarn my guest that light colors are not
admitted at night in this traditional venue. This omission would
not have been a problem since the Club has extra blue jackets
intended precisely for these situations. That is, it would not have
been a problem had it not been for Litvinovian Intransigence.
Saúl refused to take the old, worn out, rather dirty jacket he
was offered by the bewildered janitor. He would not remove his
own beautiful garment, even if that entailed leaving the Jockey
Club and, as it turned out, dining at a much less elegant restaurant:
a last minute, improvised choice. For don Saúl, the only thing that
really mattered was that his own elegance had been preserved.
The second anecdote instantiating Litvinovian Intransigence
also took place in the early 2000’s in Buenos Aires. During this
period of time, my country was in the midst of economic turmoil.
Many businesses would not take Argentine currency; only U.S.
dollars. That was the case at the Alvear Palace, a venerable
Parisian-like hotel located on the most beautiful street in the city.
The Alvear Palace was Saúl’s favorite hotel.
When Saúl attempted to pay with pesos, the manager explained
to him the Alvear Palace’s policy (and perhaps the reasons thereof:
I do not remember). The reaction was immediate. Saúl stated, “I
am Argentine, I am in Argentina, I will pay pesos or I will lodge
somewhere else.” The manager was perplexed. But even before
any kind of response could have been elicited, Litvinoff had
already exited the building. Litvinoff would not negotiate. He
would stick to principle. What principle? That I do not know.4
I move now to “Litvinovian Culture,” another remarkable trait
of don Saúl. My next story happened in Argentina in 2001 when
several members of this faculty, including then Chancellor John
4. This reference to principle was (by far) the remark that the audience
celebrated the most. As it happens, it was an ad-lib.
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Costonis, were visiting IAE—the Universidad Austral Business
School. At some point we were all in the Chapel with an unknown
gentleman showing us around. The gentleman indicated that the
altarpiece—a Nativity scene—was by a famous Spanish painter
whose name I don’t recall. “That is incorrect,” interjected Saúl,
reminding me of Muriel Spark’s unfathomable Miss Jean Brodie.
“The painter,” he proceeded, “was indeed called [ . . . ] but this
was by a namesake of his [ . . . ] who is Mexican, not Spanish.” Of
course, the guide was flabbergasted. He had given this tour a
number of times, and he spoke with a mixture of relaxed pride and
carelessness typical of one who thinks that he already knows
everything about his trade. He had not counted on Litvinovian
Culture.5 Nor had the gentleman counted on “Litvinovian Wit,”
which takes me to a third remarkable trait of don Saúl.
Cheney Joseph observed, on the occasion of the funeral, that
Saúl was endowed with “sarcasm laced with warm affection.”6 I
think these words capture “Litvinovian Wit.”
In 2005, I was lingering in the faculty lounge of the LSU Law
Center when our beloved colleague unexpectedly showed up. It
was a Saturday morning. “Are you free tonight?” he asked.
“Yes,” I replied. Saúl stated, “Well, in that case I could take you
to the movies. Is there one you would like to see?” Unlike the
first question, which took me by surprise, I replied immediately,
“The Phantom of the Opera.” And “The Phantom” it was.
I had listened to the music a thousand times and found the idea
of watching the movie version of the Broadway show extremely
exciting. As we exited the theatre, master Litvinoff asked if I had
enjoyed the movie. With some hesitation due to the tone of the
question, I passionately described the movie version of “The
Phantom” as a fabulous, incredible adaptation. But Saúl wryly
observed:
Well, my dear, [actually, he said Querido, one of his
favorite Spanish terms] the movie was indeed very bad. It
could have been worse, but it was really bad. Nevertheless,

5. John C. Costonis observed as we left the Chapel, seemingly intent in
distressing all of us present: “Saúl is a renaissance man.” And how right he
was!
6. From Cheney C. Joseph, Jr. words on the occasion of the funeral, see
supra note 1.
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your whim has been indulged, and that was what mattered
this time.
Perhaps this was a taste of “sarcasm laced with warm
affection.”
Finally: “Litvinovian Charm.” On one occasion, Saúl was a
dinner guest at my parent’s residence. I have very fond and funny
recollections of the dinner. When I learned of his death a few
weeks ago, I asked my mother if there was anything she recalled
from that evening so that I could share it with you today.
Interestingly, she did not single out any particular moment
(although I remember, for example, that Litvinoff arrived with
remarkable presents for both of my parents). Instead, she said,
“What a charming old man he was!” Surely, intransigence,
culture, and wit had been displayed throughout the dinner. But the
only thing that caught my mother’s memory was Litvinovian
Charm—the one characteristic among all of the Litvinovia I have
selected that we all should cherish in our own memories as we
move on in this land that Saúl has relinquished for good to be with
the “great spirit up there.”7 With his charm in mind, and using it as
a source of inspiration, I will move on to the second part of this
lecture.
II THE MULTIFARIOUS FRAGMENTATION OF UNIFORM LAW
The title of this presentation is an ambitious one: “Common
Law, Civil Law, and the Challenge from Federalism.”8 Henri
7. See e-mail from Saúl Litvinoff to Santiago Legarre (Sep. 20, 2009) (on
file with author). The full sentence was: “Si me verás depende de tu gran
espíritu allá arriba, pero si yo sigo abajo te veré con mucho gusto pues ya se te
espera con cariño,” which translates to: “Whether you see me or not [when you
come to LSU in February 2010] depends on your great spirit up there, but if I
am still down here I shall have much pleasure in seeing you.” I have reason to
think that Saúl was a believer, although I acknowledge that this view is contrary
to a widespread assumption favored and reinforced by Saúl himself. I will not
go further into Saúl’s religious views here other than to mention one more
exchange with Saúl. In reply to my Christmas wishes of 2006, he wrote: “Tus
plegarias siempre me vienen muy bien y te las agradezco mucho,” which
translates to: “Your prayers always do me good and I appreciate them very
much.” See e-mail from Saúl Litvinoff to Santiago Legarre (Dec. 22, 2006) (on
file with the author).
8. After some reflection and consultation with my friend Paul Yowell, I
decided that “from Federalism” does a better job here than “of Federalism.” The
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Lapeyre, Jr., a distinguished member of the Louisiana bar in
attendance here today, made an astute observation: “I can't imagine
how you can cover the subject of your talk in only an hour and
fifteen minutes, but then, perhaps, you will not attempt to lecture
on ALL there is to know about the common law, civil law, and the
challenge from federalism.”9
Maybe the title should not be taken too seriously. Maybe it is
more like a catch-phrase. Had I chosen a title such as “Recent
developments of federalism in Greenland” (or in Argentina, for
that matter), Professor Moréteau would likely be the lone member
in attendance. On the other hand, a title that includes three key
notions in it—common law, civil law, and federalism—has a
greater likelihood to catch the interest of lawyers. Indeed, such a
title is relevant to a family lawyer, a criminal lawyer, a
constitutional lawyer, a civil lawyer, and a common lawyer alike.
The title, however, is not only a catch-phrase. It also illustrates
a methodology or style of presentation which involves the picking
of an excuse to deal with a substantial problem of law. For
instance, my mental process for selecting this title was the
following.
I would like to deal with a certain issue that really matters, try
to understand it better, explore its potential, and then be able to
explain it to others (colleagues, students). For those purposes I
choose a given jurisdiction—an excuse—that instantiates the
problem at stake in an interesting and rich way. It is not about how
many jurisdictions I pick; it is about how much I can learn from the
selected one(s).10 In other words, it is not so much about the

reader shall judge after exploring the argument. I would like to share with the
reader that one of the reasons I had in mind for the choice of preposition was
that, when I Google’d both alternatives, there were a million more of the one I
ultimately rejected. That should tell you a lot about the extent of my love for
Google searches as source of authority.
9. E-mail from F. Henri Lapeyre, Jr., to Santiago Legarre (Jan. 27, 2010)
(on file with author).
10. The same, by the way, happens with the study and teaching of the class
I have been charged with for the last few years at LSU Law Center,
“Comparative Constitutional Law.” When it comes to selection of countries for
purposes of comparative analysis the medieval saying applies: “Non multa sed
multum”—a saying that captures the essence of the distinction between the
English words many and much.

172

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 3

quantity of comparisons as it is about having a topic deserving to
be compared on account of its worth and relevance.
What is the topic and why is it relevant? Relevance being a
relative concept in law, I will rephrase the latter part of my
question. Why is it relevant for an American readership and
audience?
The challenges for the common law that flow from federalism
in the United States can be exemplified in a way which may
illuminate both the connection of the Argentine situation to those
challenges and the relevance of my analysis with a view towards a
possible solution to some American problems.
The following are only a few examples of these American
problems that are related to the aforementioned Argentine
situation: the Erie11 doctrine and the idea that there is no such
thing as national common law; the Restatements of the Law and
other works by the American Law Institute; the Uniform
Commercial Code and the varying interpretations by the U.S. state
courts; and the several instances of the U.S. federal government
using federal funding to mandate conformity with national
standards set forth in federal legislation.12
Moving now to my excuse: the case of my country: what I
have called “the Argentine situation.” It is a well-known fact that
in 1853 Argentina used the Constitution of the United States as a
source of inspiration for its own constitution enacted in that year.
Another well-known fact is that Argentina deviated from this
model in some instances. It is not so well-known, however, that
one of these deviations was the distribution of powers to make and
apply the law.
Pursuant to the American model of 1787, the powers not
delegated to the Federal Government are reserved to the states.
11. The Erie Doctrine, which follows from the Supreme Court landmark
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed.
1188 (1938), requires U.S. federal courts to honor state common law when
deciding state law issues.
12. Patrick H. Martin mentioned to me the proposed legislation requiring
each state in the U.S. to forbid text-messaging while driving if the state wishes
to receive Federal highway funding. Michael Leachman also noted that this
strong-arm approach was successfully used by the U.S. federal government to
mandate a uniform minimum age of 21 for purchasing and publicly possessing
alcoholic beverages. See, The National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C.
§ 158 (1984).
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This general principle of federalism permeates the whole American
constitutional design and is confirmed by the Tenth Amendment.13
The Argentine text of 1853 embraced this general principle of
federalism and expressly memorialized it in Article 101 of the
Federal Constitution (currently, Article 121).14 Nevertheless, a
power the framers of the U.S. Constitution did not delegate to the
Federal Government—and which, therefore, was retained by the
states—was indeed delegated by the Argentine drafters to the
Federal Government: the general legislative power, if I may call it
so on this occasion, using a hopefully justified simplification.15
Rather limited legislative powers have been vested in the
United States Congress16 (at least in theory17). Instead, most
legislative powers have been retained by the states. These
legislative powers are exercised primarily by the respective state
legislatures (in all cases, but especially in Louisiana) and
secondarily by the state courts interpreting and applying statutes
and the common law.18
By way of contrast, the Argentine Constitution vested in the
Federal Congress the power to make and subsequently develop
what in our country is termed “derecho común,” or substantive
law, i.e., legislation on civil, commercial, criminal and other
matters. Although derecho común translates literally as “common
13. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.” US. CONST. amend. X.
14. “The Provinces retain all powers not delegated by this Constitution to
the Federal Government.” In the case of older texts, I follow Ma. Laura San
Martino de Dromi’s compilation: MA. LAURA SAN MARTINO DE DROMI,
DOCUMENTOS CONSTITUCIONALES ARGENTINOS (1994).
15. In the United States the adjective “general” is used to describe the
power of each state. Thus: “power is shared between state governments of
general jurisdiction and a federal government of delegated and enumerated
powers.” Robert P. George, The Concept of Public Morality, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 17,
20 (2000) (emphasis added).
16. Cf. the different clauses of US. CONST. art. I, § 8, and their
interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 552 (1995). The foregoing is without prejudice to open rules allowing for a
limited extension of enumerated powers. Cf. particularly US. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 18.
17. Questions have been raised, rightly, as to the extent of this limited
delegation in practice. George, supra note 15, at 22-23.
18. See generally ALLAN E. FARNSWORTH, UNA INTRODUCCIÓN AL
SISTEMA LEGAL DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS (1990).
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law” it is better described under the name of ius commune, to avoid
confusion with the common law system.19 Having said that, in the
Argentine legal system, the content of derecho común is analogous
to that of common law in the United States, in the sense that both
are “general law,” even though they obviously differ considerably
in other aspects, e.g., “derecho común” is enacted, whereas
common law is case law. In sum, the Argentine provinces—unlike
the American states—delegated to the Federal Government the
enactment of “general” law.
Why so? The situation of colonial legislation, mostly imported
from, or consisting of Spanish law, was absolutely chaotic. In the
words of one of the most conspicuous members of the 1853
Constitutional Convention, Benjamín Gorostiaga, a new legislation
was needed in order to replace the Spanish laws, which were
confusing—on account of their number—and inconsistent.
Furthermore, he added, if as a consequence of the emulation of the
American model every province were to retain their general
legislative power, the country’s legislation would become a
baffling maze of legal rules leading to “inconceivable evils.”20
Objections had been raised when this criterion was put forward
at the Constitutional Convention of 1853. Delegate Zavalía
asserted that the idea entailed an undue encroachment on the
powers of local legislatures and, therefore, on each province’s
sovereignty. And, as source of authority, he brought up the
American model, where “each of them [in reference to the states]
enacts its own laws.”21
Delegate Zenteno tried to mediate this debate. In an attempt to
ease delegate Zavalía’s concerns, delegate Zenteno explained that
the Federal Congress was “a meeting of men from all the
provinces”22 which would be sufficient to protect provincial
sovereignty and interests.
Ultimately, the Argentine drafters chose to deviate from the
U.S. model in an attempt to unify the law with a view to putting an
end to the chaos brought about by Spanish legislation. For this

19. Cf. infra note 26.
20. 4 EMILIO RAVIGNANI, ASAMBLEAS CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS 528529 (1937).
21. Id. 528.
22. Id.at 529.
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purpose, a centralizing legislative movement was deemed
suitable.23 “Inconceivable evils” would, therefore, be avoided.
But this had, perhaps, an unintended effect: the delegation of
the mass of legislative powers to the Federal Congress left the
provincial judiciaries with little law to apply.24 If the Federal
Congress was to enact derecho común, then this law would
naturally be federal and, therefore, be applied by the Federal
Judiciary pursuant to the predominant federalist principle
enshrined in the constitutions of countries such as the United
States.25
This story, however, does not finish just there. One of the
original provinces, Buenos Aires, had decided not to join the newly
born Argentine Republic in 1853 for reasons that are not germane
here. When this large and rich province changed its mind seven
years later, it established as a condition precedent that a Provincial
Constitutional Convention would review the original text of the
Federal Constitution.
In order to prevent the aforesaid implications of the
centralizing movement, the Buenos Aires Provincial Convention
proposed the so-called “reservation” in favor of provincial
jurisdictions in 1860. Federal drafters accepted this proposal soon
afterwards at a new ad hoc Constitutional Convention convened
that same year. By means of a rule rather cryptically worded,26
23. Centralization was not complete, since—by virtue of the principle laid
down in the current Article 121 of the Argentine Constitution (see supra note
14)—the provinces retained legislative power to enact legislation on local
procedure and public law.
24. In Argentina, like in the United States, the federal judiciary coexists
with a local judiciary: the provincial courts, in the former country; the state
courts, in the latter one.
25. Cf. US. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 1.
26. The original wording—of 1853—of Article 64, paragraph 11, of the
Argentine Constitution included among the powers of the Federal Congress:
“[t]o lay down the civil, commercial, criminal and mining Codes;” but in 1860
an addition was made: “those codes shall not alter local jurisdiction, and [ . . . ]
shall be applied by provincial courts.” Accordingly, Article 100 was amended
that year as well, so the original text: “the Supreme Court and the lower courts
of the Nation shall hear and decide all cases concerning issues governed [ . . . ]
by the federal laws” was completed with the phrase “except for the reservation
of Article 67 [former 64], paragraph 11.” The latter article is precisely where
the term “reservation” is used to describe the spirit of this amendment. At
present, these provisions are included in Articles 75, paragraph 12, and 116,
respectively.
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provincial courts were granted the application of derecho común,
despite derecho común being federal in nature. Thus, an exception
to the aforementioned federalist principle was established.
In 1910—a time equally distant between the bicentennial
Argentina celebrates this year and the 1810 revolution that marked
the path toward independence—the eminent jurist Felipe Espil
shrewdly noted that this so-called “reservation” marked a departure
from the rationale behind the U.S. system.27 Espil captured the
very essence of the problem I want to raise awareness about here.
As he put it, the original effort at unification had resulted in the
possibility—perhaps unnoticed in 1853—of “depriving [provincial
courts] of their power to hear and resolve cases on matters already
under their jurisdiction.”28 In 1860, in order to remedy an anomaly
(according to American federal terms), a new anomaly came into
being: pursuant to the new article 67, paragraph 11, each
Provincial Judiciary would be qualified to render an actually
different interpretation of the same federal rule, be it the Civil,
Commercial, Criminal codes, or the like. This explains why 100
years ago Espil complained that “there were fourteen
interpretations of just one code across the nation.”29 His
complaint, amplified by the greater number of provincial
jurisdictions existing today, still seems to ring in our ears.
Unfortunately, all of the attempts to cure the problem have failed
so far.30

27. FELIPE ESPIL, LA SUPREMA CORTE FEDERAL 193 (1915): “we have, for
compelling reasons, departed from that rationale [behind the U.S. system].”
28. Id. at 193-194.
29. Id. at 194.
30. For the various attempts to unify law—Federal Court of Cassation, grant
of jurisdictional authority to the Argentine Supreme Court of Justice to decide
on substantial matters concerning derecho común, etc.—see SANTIAGO
LEGARRE, EL REQUISITO DE LA TRASCENDENCIA EN EL RECURSO
EXTRAORDINARIO 44-71 (1994).
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The purpose of the present paper can be synthesized in the
following points: a) to expose the concept of the principle of
proportionality in its broadest sense and its different components
or dimensions; b) to draw the attention to an approach which is
usually not studied by authors, that is, the fact that the application
of the principle is not enough to guarantee the supremacy of the
human rights, at least in some cases; c) lastly, to point out those
requirements that could protect proportionality from the risk
mentioned in b).
I. INTRODUCTION:
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY

AND ITS DIMENSIONS

For the last twenty years, constitutional courts have applied the
principle of proportionality as a procedure that aims to guarantee
the full respect of human rights (or fundamental rights) by the
state. This principle is applied in both civil law and common law
systems, in countries such as the United States, Argentina,
Germany, Great Britain, Spain, Italy, France, Belgium, Denmark,
Ireland, Greece, Luxemburg, Holland, Portugal, and Switzerland,
just to mention a few; and also by the European Court of Human
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Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the
European Court of Justice.1 It has been correctly said:
the parameter of rationality—a problematic restoration of the
rationabilitias in the medieval juridical culture—can be
recognized in the constitutional jurisprudence of the vast
majority of the liberal-democratic systems of our days. No
matter what its shades are, this is the question about the
“reasonable basis” of the differentiation in the doctrine of the
American Supreme Court, that of “reasonable justification”
which is put forth by the Federal Supreme Court of
Switzerland; the criteria of “non arbitrariness” which,
following the thinking of Leibholz, is used by the
Constitutional Court of Germany, or the rule of
ragionevolezza, which became a general principle of law by
the ruling of the Italian Constitutional Court (sentence 81,
1963). Among us, the criteria of “reasonableness” of
normative differentiations introduced by the legislator was

1. See JÜRGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 680-702
(1992); NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN
LAW (1996); Michael Akehurst, The Application of General Principles of Law
by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1981 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.
29, 38-51 (U.K.); Sophie Boyron, Proportionality in English Administrative
Law: A Faulty Translation?, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (1992) (U.K);
Javier Barnes, Introducción al principio de proporcionalidad en el derecho
comparado y comunitario, 135 REVISTA DE ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA 495,
495-99 (1994) (Spain); George A. Bermann, The Principle of Proportionality,
26 AM. J. COMP. L. (SUPP.) 415 (1978); Guy Braibant, Le principe de la
proportionnalité, in MÉLANGES OFFERTS À MARCEL WALINE 297 (1974); JeanMarie Auby, Le contrôle jurisdictionnel du degré de gravité d’une sanction
disciplinaire, REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE
ET À L’ÉTRANGER, janvier-fevrier 1979, at 227-238 (Fr.); JUAN FRANCISCO
LINARES, RAZONABILIDAD DE LAS LEYES (2d ed. 1989); JUAN CARLOS GAVARA
DE CARA, DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES Y DESARROLLO LEGISLATIVO 293-326
(1994); ROBERT ALEXY, TEORÍA DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 111-112
(2d ed. 2001); WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929); Anna N. Georgiadou, Le principe de la
proportionnalité dans le cadre de la Jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice de la
Communauté Europée, 81 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 532
(1995) (Ger.); and Javier Jiménez Campo, La igualdad jurídica como límite al
legislador, 1983 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, no. 9, at 71,
72 (Spain).
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invocated by the Constitutional Court, following, in part,
those jurisprudential orientations.2
In the common law systems, the principle is usually called
“principle of reasonableness.”3 In those places, it is possible to
find court decisions in which the principle is applied not only in
constitutional issues but also in civil law, administrative law,
criminal law, etc.
The principle of proportionality prescribes that all statutes that
affect human rights should be proportionate or reasonable. The
analysis of proportionality is made up of three sub-principles:
adequacy, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu.
The first sub-principle is that of adequacy, which establishes
that the statute which affects a human right must be suitable to
achieve the purpose that was sought by the lawmaker. That is to
say, once the interpreter has defined the end that the legislator
aimed for and the means that the legislator has designed to obtain
such end, then the interpreter must verify if the means are capable
of achieving such end.
Through the second sub-principle, the interpreter evaluates if
the lawmaker has chosen, among the means capable of obtaining
the desired end, the one which is the least restrictive of the human
2. Jiménez Campo, supra note 1, at 73. The importance of proportionality
is so big that it has been said to be “the most important general principle of the
communitarian law.” SCHWARZE, supra, at 677 (quoting Jürgen Gündisch,
Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze inder Rechtsprechung des Europäischen
Gerichtshof, in DAS WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT DES GEMEINSAMEN MARKTES IN DER
AKTUELLEN RECHTSENTWICKLUNG 97, 108 (Institut fur Integrationsforschung
ed., 1983) (Ger.)).
3. However, in some cases it is called “proportionality.” See District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2852 (U.S. 2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Virginia v.
Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
(2003).
The references to the idea of “reasonableness” are very common and
frequent. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). See also
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93
(2005); Illinois v. Caballes, 542 U.S. 405 (2005); United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004); Florida v. Nixon,
543 U.S. 175 (2004); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004); Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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rights. In other words, the norm will only pass the test of necessity
if it is the one among those similar in efficacy which is the least
restrictive of the rights.
Once it has been established that the norm has complied with
the first and the second sub-principles, the interpreter should
determine whether it is reasonable stricto sensu, or not. The
doctrine and the jurisprudence have defined this sub-principle as
an examination of the balance between the advantages and
disadvantages brought about by the law. “The [sub]principle of
proportionality stricto sensu means that the application of a given
instrument or means to achieve a given end or objective should not
be unreasonable in its reciprocal relationships.”4 The interpreter
must evaluate whether this balance is proportional (in other words,
reasonable), or not. In spite of this initial coincidence between the
doctrine and the jurisprudence, the dissidences in the specification
of what a “reasonable” relationship is still to come up. The
dominant position proposes that judges should weigh the
advantages and the disadvantages of the measure under analysis.
In French law, this alternative interpretation is called “balance
between costs and benefits.”5 Also, the Spanish Constitutional
Court and doctrine have reached a similar characterization.6 For
example, in STC 66/1995, the court stated that a restriction of a
right is proportional stricto sensu if it is “pondered or balanced
because more benefits or advantages for the general interest are
4. GAVARA DE CARA, supra note 1, at 308; BVerfGE 7, 377; 8, 71; 13, 97;
78, 77; y 79, 29].
5. Cf. Jeanne Lemasurier, Expropriation:”Bilan-cout-avantages” et
necessite publique, LA REVUE ADMINISTRATIVE, septembre-octobre 1979, at 502
(Fr.). See EMILIOU, supra note 1, at 67-114, 92-95; Auby, supra note 1; and
Braibant, supra note 1.
6. The proportionality stricto sensu prescribes that:
There should be a tendency to reach a balance between the advantages
and disadvantages which will inevitably appear when a right is limited, in
order to protect another right or good which is constitutionally protected.
It is necessary to carry out an evaluation in which particular and
collective interest will be confronted, which implies taking into
consideration all the relevant circumstances in the case.
MANUEL MEDINA GUERRERO, LA VINCULACIÓN NEGATIVA DEL LEGISLADOR A
LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 132, 134 (1996) (Spain).
The author insists on this when he says that the balancing test is: “the well
adjusted relationship between the means and the ends in terms of costs and
benefits.” Id.
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derived from it than damages against other goods or values in
conflict.”7
The expression “balance between costs and benefits” seems to
indicate that any norm with a cost proportionate to its benefits will
be reasonable. Therefore, if the hypothetical benefits are high, the
way in which human rights may be affected is expected to be high
too, and this will be acceptable.8 This may be expressed with the
following formulas, using a scale from 1 to 3 to measure the
degree of restriction (3 being the most restrictive measure) and a
scale from “a” to “c” to measure the importance of the end (“a”
being the most important end):
(1) If measure 1 (M1) restricts (r) in a second degree, and it
leads to an end (E) of importance b, then it is proportional;
(2) If M2 r 3, and E c, then the measure is disproportional;
(3) If M3 r 1, then it is sufficient for E to be constitutional for
the measure to be considered proportional.
II. PROPORTIONALITY AND RESPECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Problem
A proportional norm will be: a) adequate to the end; b) the least
restrictive of the human rights among all the adequate options that
could be applied; and, finally, c) proportional stricto sensu, that is,
it must keep the balance between the costs and the its benefits.

7. S.T.C., May 8, 1995 (S.T.C., No. 66/1995) (Spain). In Spanish:
“Ponderada o equilibrada por derivarse de ella más beneficios o ventajas para el
interés general que perjuicios sobre otros bienes o valores en conflicto.” Id.
8. Cf. GERMÁN JOSÉ BIDART CAMPOS, LA CORTE SUPREMA: EL TRIBUNAL
DE LAS GARANTÍAS CONSTITUCIONALES 107 (1984) (Arg.).
The Argentine Supreme Court has said: “the higher the hierarchy of the
protected interest, the stronger the regulation could be.” Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 27/6/1962,
“Partido Obrero (Cap. Fed.) / personería” Fallos (1962-253-154) (Arg.).
However, the principle which says that “the regulation cannot alter the
human right involved in the case, but it should go untouched and in its integrity,
without corrupting nor extinguishing it, in whole or in part.” Is still in force.
See CSJN, 5/9/1903, “Hileret y Rodríguez c. Provincia de Tucumán /
inconstitucionalidad de ley provincial del 14 de junio de 1902 y devolución de
dinero” Fallos (1903-98-20), at 24 (Arg.).
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In my opinion, and this is the thesis of the present article, this
conception of proportionality does not necessarily prevent the
legislator from violating the human rights, at least in some cases.
In other words, if the principle of proportionality were just a
balance between the “weight” of the right and that of the reasons
that have led the legislator to decide to restrict such right, then,
ultimately, that human right could lose its characteristic of
impassable barrier for the state. Indeed, the invocation of a more
or less convincing raison d’état could justify the sacrifice of some
human rights. We can find an example of this in the excesses of
the de facto governments in some Latin American countries during
the 1970s and 1980s. The consequences of this viewpoint cannot
be more disastrous for the general theory of human rights: at best,
the rights will depend on consensus; in all cases, they will never be
called victories in front of the majorities.9
The risk mentioned above can be clearly seen in the following
formula:
If M4 r 3 and if F a, then the norm would seem to be
proportional. However, M4 restricts the norm (N4) so much, that
it causes the violation of the essential content of the human right
involved.
Therefore, it would be sufficient to find an end which is
important enough and a means that can be justified by that end to
transform the principle of proportionality in a mere formal
criterion, that is, without the capacity to guarantee the supremacy
of human rights.10
B. Possible Solutions
There are two alternatives to make the principle of
proportionality more meaningful.
9. According to a well known expression, human rights are “are political
trumps held by individuals.” Thus, they cannot be altered, not even by
consensus. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
10. That has been pointed out by A. B. Bianchi, in his critique of the
Argentine case “Peralta, Luis A. y otro c. Estado Nacional.” CSJN, 27/12/1990,
“Peralta, Luis A. y otro c. Estado Nacional (Ministerio de Economía - Banco
Central de la República Argentina) / amparo” El Derecho [E.D.] (1990-141-519)
(Arg.). Cf. Alberto B. Bianchi, La Corte Suprema ha establecido su tesis oficial
sobre la emergencia económica, 1991 L.L 5, 5-6 (Arg.).
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The first one is to evaluate whether the norm respects the
principle of proportionality stricto sensu or not,11 and
subsequently, whether the essential content12 is also respected in a
given case. Those who defend this opinion should accept that it is
possible for a proportionate norm—in spite of its being so—to be
unconstitutional if it affects the essential content of a human
right.13
The second alternative completely rules this possibility out.
On the one hand, it does not seem appropriate to accept the
proportionality of a norm that violates a human right, both from a
theoretical point of view (because it would be contradictory) and
from a pragmatic point of view (as it would give place to bad
interpretations). On the other hand, the evaluation of the
proportion between costs and benefits cannot be satisfactorily done
without considering the content of the human rights involved in the
case.
Consequently, from this second perspective, a norm can only
be proportionate if it does not affect the essential content of the
involved rights. For example, this is the position held by the
Argentinean Supreme Court. For this court, the principle of
proportionality (principio de razonabilidad) is the technical
instrument it uses to apply article 28 of the Argentinean
Constitution, which prescribes that human rights cannot be
affected.14
The position of the Argentinean Supreme Court does not
transform the two steps explained in the first alternative into one.
In fact, the court admits the existence of the two steps, as the
evaluation of the proportionality of the norm is different from the
evaluation of the essential content. However, the court changes the
11. See MEDINA GUERRERO, supra note 5, at 145-165.
12. See GAVARA DE CARA, supra note 1; ANTONIO LUIS MARTÍNEZPUJALTE, LA GARANTÍA DEL CONTENIDO ESENCIAL DE LOS DERECHOS
FUNDAMENTALES (1997).
13. “No matter how difficult the task may be and, consequently, how strong
the temptation to reduce the content of the limits to the proportionality test, the
guarantee recognized by article 53.1 of the Spanish Constitution undoubtedly
demands its autonomous application as a technique aimed to control the
proportional limits.” MEDINA GUERRERO, supra note 5, at 165.
14. “The principles, guarantees, and rights recognized in the preceding
sections shall not be modified by the laws that regulate their enforcement.” Art.
28, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
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order in which it performs the evaluations. First, the tribunal must
check if the content of the right has been affected. Then, it must
examine if the norm preserves a proportional relationship between
the advantages and the cost that it produces.
Such analysis may give the following results:
(1) If measure 1 (M1) alters (a) the content of human right 1
(D1), it is disproportional;
(2) If M2 ¬ (a) D2, but r 3, and F c, it is disproportional;
(3) If M3 ¬ (a) D3, and r 2, and F to, it is proportional.
As a preliminary conclusion, we may say that the
proportionality of a measure (3) presupposes: a) that the measure
does not alter the content of the involved human rights; and b) that
the measure which does not alter the human rights restricts the
norms about human rights in an acceptable degree, taking into
account the importance of the pursued end. Then, there are two
possible types of violation of the principle of proportionality:
disproportionality due to the alteration of the human rights
involved (hypothesis 1), and disproportionality due to the lack of
justification of the restriction (hypothesis 2).
The evaluation concerning the alteration should come before
the evaluation concerning the justification because the latter
requires determining the degree in which the involved right is
being restricted. Thus, it is necessary to learn which the limits and
the characteristics of the rights are, the relationship between the
specific human rights involved and other human rights, and the
relationship between such human rights and the common good.
Such knowledge may only be acquired if the contents of the human
rights are analyzed. Moreover, it is necessary to inquire about the
degree of public interest inherent to the norm under
consideration.15
In fact, the temporal sequence above described is not lineal.
There is a circle of comprehension that involves both the
15. The Argentine Supreme Court has said: “the degree of the public
interests affected and the principles to be protected will determine the degree of
the regulations in each case.” CSJN, 1/9/1944, “Pedro Inchauspe c. Junta
Nacional de Carnes” Fallos (1944-199-483) (Arg.). Such statement seems to be
extremist. In my opinion, the relationship between public interest and human
rights should not be a one-way road, but there should be a reciprocal influence.
Just as the degree of public interest affected cannot be indifferent, the human
right involved cannot be indifferent either.
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examination of the alteration and of the justification in a process of
mutual feedback (called by Engisch “hin-und herwandern des
blicks”). For this reason, the degree of importance given to the
norm in relation to the common good can influence on the
determination of the precise content of the human right involved in
the case. However, we can conclude, too, that examining the
alteration is the starting point and the key to proportionality stricto
sensu.16 The light shed by examining the alteration transmits its
clarity to the darkness of the exam of justification and thus, the
temptation of utilitarianism may be avoided.
Now a question arises: how should the examination of the
alteration be carried out? To determine if a measure alters a
human right or not, the inquiry about the essential content of such
right should be performed. Once the essential content has been
established, it is necessary to determine if the measure interferes
with it or not. Thus, the most important point is to identify which
is the inalterable content. This is a task to be performed by the
constitutional interpreter, especially by the judges with
constitutional competence. It will be done “in the light of the
constitutional norms, through a systematic and specific
interpretation of the Constitution, and through an understanding of
each human right in relation to its underlying moral values and
concepts, and to the objectives to be achieved through its
protection.”17

16. So much so, that without this test the principle of proportionality
becomes meaningless. If this step is omitted, it may lead to not applying the
principle at all, as Jiménez Campo did. According to him:
The evaluation of the law would not lose much, and it would even
achieve some certainty, if the principle of proportionality, as an
autonomous and direct canon, were less demanded and applied and,
maybe, even excluded. To assess the proportionality of a norm, maybe
legal or not, is, in short, just to compare, to balance or to weight “losses”
and “profits” which, from a juridical point of view, are not rationally
measurable and they leave narrow margin to the argumentation and
counter argumentation according to objective criteria.
Javier Jiménez Campo, Artículo 53. Protección de los derechos fundamentales,
in COMENTARIOS A LA CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE 1978, t. IV, at 438, 488
(Oscar Alzaga Villaamil ed., 1996).
17. MARTÍNEZ PUJALTE, supra note 1, at 73.

186

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 3

In my opinion, the decisive point will be to make a teleological
inquiry of the human rights involved,18 especially taking into
account the goods whose protection is looked for through their
constitutional recognition,19 and without forgetting about the
significant role played by the facts of the case,20 in the manner in
which it has been stated by the Spanish Constitutional Court.21

18. See 1 RAFAEL BIELSA, La locución justo y razonable en el derecho y en
jurisprudencia, in ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO PÚBLICO: DERECHO
ADMINISTRATIVO (1950).
19. Pedro Serna Bermúdez, Derechos fundamentales: el mito de los
conflictos, 4 HUMANA IURA 197, 225 (1994); MARTÍNEZ PUJALTE, supra note 1,
at 72.
From another viewpoint, “the principle of proportionality stricto sensu must
be understood as a formal principle from which no material content for judicial
review is derived.” GAVARA DE CARA, supra note 1, at 319-320. According to
A. Boggiano, “to judge about the reasonableness of the positive law is to judge
about the fundamentals of the positive law in the natural law.” ANTONIO
BOGGIANO, POR QUÉ UNA TEORÍA DEL DERECHO: INTRODUCCIÓN A UN DERECHO
CONSTITUCIONAL 42 (1992).
20. See Guy Braibant, Le principe de la proportionnalité, in MÉLANGES
OFFERTS À MARCEL WALINE 297, 306 (1974).
21. See S.T.S., Jan. 18, 1991 (R.T.C. 1991-I-195, FJ 2) (Spain), in which
the Constitutional Court stated: “the Constitution includes a value system which
respects the demand of a teleological interpretation of the Constitution.” See
also S.T.S., Apr. 8, 1981 (R.T.C.1981-173, FJ 10) (Spain); S.T.S., Feb. 17, 1984
(R.T.C. 1984-I-227, FFJJ 2, 5) (Spain). See MARTÍNEZ PUJALTE, supra note 1,
at 72.
la
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